Why the proof? It’s a trivial result of your (thoroughly invalid, IMHO) definition of “god.” If you define god as “necessarily existing,” you’ve already eliminated the possibility of god not existing – the proof is mere window dressing for dogma. Merely stating that “x is true” doesn’t make it true; definitions (or postulates) have to be agreed upon.
On the contrary, I explicitly said that the alternative premise makes for a valid argument. I just think it is unsound for the reason I’ve stated.
IANAL(logician) or whatever it is i need to be here, but those two statements do not mean the same thing.
the first statement says to me - that there is a possiblity - which is to say it can go either way and the second statement says - the existance is not necessary- which says nothing at all about possibility.
Indeed they do. Who is the reputable philosopher whom you would cite who disagrees with everyone from Kant to Hartshorne?
“The following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason. It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this being it recognizes the characteristics of unconditioned existence. It then seeks the conception of that which is independent of all conditions, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all other things - in other words, in that which contains all reality. But the unlimited all is an absolute unity, and is conceived by the mind as a being one and supreme; and thus reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary.”
— Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
Then don’t you think you should have said that in the proof? What do you mean by ‘representing recessary existance’? I’m having trouble seeing why g–>N(g) should be true for any statement at all (except obvious tautologies).
Possibility is defined as the negation of necessary negation. Something is possibly true if it is not necessarily not true. See Possible World Semantics.
Well, that’s what N(g) means. Informal proof. Formal proff.
On re-reading the rest of your thread, I see you’re defining g differently to how I expected, in which case I was too hasty in agreeing with ~N(~g).
Apologies for any confusion. Let me enumerate my objections by cases:
(1) You define g to be existance of a being which is “omnipotent” or “infinitely good” or some other property traditionally assigned to God. Then (subject to seeing how it is actually defined) I agree g is possible (~N(~g)), but don’t see why g–>N(g).
(2) You define g to be the statement “g–>N(g)” Then I no longer see why g must be possible. (But agree that if g were possible g is necessary.)
(3) You define g to be “g–>N(g) AND exists(omnipotent being)” (or some other property instead of omnipotent. Then I dont’ see why g is possible for the same reason as in (2).
(4) You define g in some way I haven’t thought of. Please, explain it to me - I may yet be convinced.
I think, as someone mentioned earlier, that the layman’s definition of possible is not the same as the logician’s. The two statement’s i was talking about still do not mean the same thing.
G means ontological perfection. See the quote above from Kant.
So, if N(g) = possiblility of god, and
g = god exists, does that then mean that (L) = a bunch of superlogical nerdy bollocks that makes no sense to anyone but you Libertarian?
you can be as logical as you want, but it still doesnt mean God does or does not exist. I bet you’re a real laugh down the pub you.
fucking making my head spin this thread. ‘My friends reckon they hear ghosts’ ‘bleh blah bleh logical progression existence/non existence g(N) god klfy8owgbf’
little numbers and letters written down like (g)N =B if (paul)=U(2) don’t prove fuck all. thankyou.
Well, I don’t think the layman’s definition of “successor” is the same as Peano’s either. But that doesn’t mean that his proof that 1 + 1 = 2 is dubious.
Thanks for replying so quickly. Hold on while I try to assimilate those pages.
Ok, so we have my alternate premise resulting in a “valid” argument that god does not exist. However, you say the argument is unsound. Valid, but unsound arguments are that way because the premise is not true, if the premise were true, then the argument would be sound.
I take issue with you saying the premise “It is possible for god to not exist” is untrue. As you said, the revised premise becomes “It is not necessary for god to exist” in contrast to the original “It is not necessary for god to not exist”.
I do not see any reason to take one as a true premise, but not the other.
Can you express that in logic terms?
Is it possible to have a premise like “it is possible that god exists and it is possible that god doesn’t exist”? What would the proof make of that?
I have no idea who Peano is or why he needed to redefine ‘successor’ to prove 1+1=2, i still don’t see how those two statements say the same.
possible - capable of being true without contradicting proven facts, laws, or circumstances.
necessary - Absolutely essential
so not necessary would be not absolutely essential
thats from dictionary.com and the definitions i use to parse the statements, so that can’t mean the same.
S5 Axioms Invoked … N(g) whatevers …
Way over my head boys.
The only way you know if ghosts exist is if you see one. If you want to believe ghosts exist (and your grandma is sitting with you), that’s faith, not proof. Some people who don’t want to believe they exist have seen them, such as my father.
No science you offer will convince someone that they haven’t seen a ghost if they have. I’ve seen more than one ~ I’d say about 6 in my life, I guess. In different forms. Some are like what you see in the movies ~ a person is just see-through. Some are the shapes of people, filled with the kind of wavy air you see over a hot BBQ in the summer. (Note: I did not see those ghosts standing over a hot BBQ in the summer).
I still know the creeks in my house is the building settling. I still know the tick tick tick is something wrong with the pipes. And I know I’ve indeed LOST the business card with my next hair apointment written on the back of it, not that a ghost is hiding one on me, because they like my hair the way it is.
Oh fine - I wasn’t trying to take issue with your treatment of the OP, rather with the modal proof itself. Sorry if this is to hijack the thread, but it seemed like we’d gotten away from ghosts somewhat. I also am not accusing you of dishonesty, but I do think that the modal proof fundamentally “works” by taking advantage of a misunderstanding, whether consciously or otherwise.
Now, however, things have indeed moved on to the fundamental question of the definition: god as that which is necessary. You seem now to be justifying this by an appeal to authority, and a paragraph in which Kant describes a process of reason leading to the concept of god as that which is necessary. Even assuming that one ought to accept such an appeal to authority, I would take quite some convincing that Kant and every other reputable philosopher mean by their terms exactly what you do, and that they consequently accepted without reservation the existence of god.
From your paragraph, shorn of context, it’s not really possible to derive much other than that Kant wrote at least one paragraph in which he said that some people will reach the conclusion that the supreme being’s existence, should one first accept its existence at all, is necessary. Here again, he has used the word “necessary”, but it is unclear as to whether he is using your concept. More than one source I can find (example) holds that Kant’s Critique of Reason treats god in an epistemic sense, rendering quotations of his irrelevant in this context. To complete your proof, you really need to demonstrate to everyone’s satisfaction why god should be considered to be that which must exist at all possible worlds. Presumably it’s fairly evident, if every reputable philosopher subscribed to such a notion.
Oh, and my apologies Lamia - you’re quite right, I ended up wholly repeating you; I missed your post on preview.
Why not Kant himself?
You realize, of course, that Kant believed your proof to be unsound.
I think his objection was something along the lines of not accepting that existence in possible worlds makes a being “greater”.
I have to agree with Kant, and reject the proof.
In fact, I have an alternative to your “existence in more possible worlds makes a being greater” idea:
The greatest possible being exists in the greatest possible world.
Unless you are going to argue that our actual world is the greatest possible world, we are not graced with the presence of the greatest possible being.