Your physical location. Then after that a separate set of experiences.
In the present context, though, that’s not a care you can articulate, since what “I” consists in is up for grabs.
So you have to go one deeper (again: “in the present context”) and ask, why do you care about whether you will wake up tomorrow or not?
I think you probably care about that because of all the various projects you’re currently engaged in (loving your wife and kids assuming you have them, keeping your job, getting better at chess, etc etc). You care about waking up tomorrow because you want those projects to continue.
But a duplicate will continue those projects–will care about them–in exactly the same way you do. So it seems the existence of the duplicate answers to everything you could possibly want for tomorrow. So it may be that what lies behind your caring about waking up tomorrow can be fulfilled by something other than you waking up tomorrow. Waking up tomorrow may not be as basic a thing to care about as you thought.
It feels fundamental because waking up tomorrow has been, through eons of evolutionary history, the only way for your own intentions, cares, projects, etc. to continue. But in the scenario you’ve outlined, it’s no longer the only way.
Why care about waking up tomorrow if literally everything else you care about would be taken care of in exactly the same way if you didn’t wake up tomorrow? You may think, “But I wouldn’t be there to witness it at least.” This presumes you care to witness it. Witnessing the ongoing pursuit of the projects, then, is something you care to see happen. (Note the regress incipient here… I won’t pursue that.) But this “witnessing of the ongoing pursuit of your projects” will occur even if you don’t wake up tomorrow. It will be carried out by your duplicate.
“But that’s not me.”
It starts to sound here like you are trying to care about something which makes literally zero difference, to the world, and a forteriori, to anything you care about. That seems very, very strange. Inexplicably irrational! 
If, though, you want to insist that “me pursuing, or witnessing the pursuit, of my projects” is distinct from “my duplicate pursuing, or witnessing the pursuit, of my projects,” then you’re fighting your own hypothetical. You’re saying that the duplicate doing these things is pursuing some concern other than your own. But the scenario is supposed to make your duplicate physically identical to a continuation of you. How can it be physically identical to a continuation of you, and yet have different cares, concerns etc from you? That is–unless you think that cares, concerns, etc are non-physical?
(I CAN’T BELIEVE I’m saying this. I’m having a strange out-of-mind experience right now. Hard to explain.)
The statement “I would wake up as…” is flawed.
Assuming absolutely perfect copying, and also assuming no metaphysical soul-type entities, Me1 and Me2 would both wake up, each with an independent and real sense of having been me the day before, equivalent in every measurable way to the sense that a person normally experiences waking after a night’s sleep with no copying in it.
There are plenty of Dopers who will happily and ably argue that the duplicate is you just as much as the original is. They just haven’t happened to chime in yet.
Some will argue that there’s no determinate answer to the question–that it’s basically a question of nomenclature. You can talk about the situation as though you stopped existing, and you can talk about it as though you continued to exist as the duplicate. Either way of talking aptly describes the situation, and the only thing to do is simply agree on a language. The debate isn’t substantive, it’s linguistic (on this account).
I’m sympathetic with the latter view, despite some other things I’ve said in this thread.
An observer wouldn’t be able to distinguish between the new you and the original.
However, my test is this: would I be willing to volunteer to be killed, knowing that a duplicate will take my place? My answer is “no”; I would not be willing, no matter how accurate the copy.
As far as I’m concerned, I would die, and a doppleganger would take my place. It would believe itself to be the original, sure; but it’d be wrong.
This is a whole *Star Trek *argument, of course. The transporter kills you and creates a copy of you at a remote location. I wouldn’t use a transporter!
Another way to look at this:
If I fire up the calculator application on my computer today, is it the same calculator application I used yesterday, or just one that looks and behaves in every way the same?
I mean, it’s a copy-in-memory of the same program stored on the hard drive, but pretty much none of its fundamental components will be the same - it probably won’t be running in the same area of physical memory on the computer - and in running the calculator application, the computer almost certainly won’t be using the same electrons.
So is it the same thing, or a different thing that is exactly the same? Is there a meaningful difference?
Why is it flawed? Let’s reformulate it and say “I would wake up in room1”, is it flawed either?
It seems I have to ask my question again so as not to let the discussion fly off at a tangent.
If I go to sleep in room1 I assume I would wake up in the same room, provided no one carries my body in another place, right?
Now, what if I get killed during my sleep and my exact replica is created in room2? Would I wake up in room2 in this case?
The multiple possibilities of this have been examined in every variation by science fiction writers long before Star Trek ever got involved.
One of the best all-time stories on the subject is Think Like a Dinosaur by James Patrick Kelly.
Inanimate objects don’t have personal identity, so the example is not very good and even irrelevant to the issue at hand.
Not so much, but it’s unanswerable in conventional terms precisely because an unconventional scenario is at play.
But it’s still attacking the thing from the wrong end, IMO - we don’t project ourselves into the future, we remember ourselves from the past. The person that wakes up in room 1 perceives itself to be the thing that went to bed the night before, as does the person in room 2.
When you wake up tomorrow morning, all you will have of today is memories. Today will not still exist somewhere, with the you-of-today linked by a piece of knotted string to the you-of-tomorrow.
You remember being you yesterday, so you are the same person. Your copy would function in the same way, so there would just be two people under that very compelling impression, instead of the normal one.
Analogies are by definition imperfect, and by picking at this one, you missed the point.
Inanimate objects still have identity, even if they are not aware of it. Is the calculator application I now have open the same calculator application I ran yesterday? - since there’s no personal identity involved, it’s an even simpler question than it would be if we were discussing humans - so what’s the answer?
It’s nearly 2AM here, so I have to turn in now. The person that wakes in my bed tomorrow, with my memories, understanding itself to have been me all along, may return to continue this interesting discussion.
Since there is no factual answer possible to the OP, let’s move this over to IMHO.
General Questions Moderator
How come we don’t project ourselves into future! I’m doing it right now, I know for sure that I will wake up tomorrow in my room and tomorrow I will remember that I projected myself into the future the day before.
The question remains:
My local time is the same, see ya tomorrow!
I’m not seeing a meaningful distinction between the OP’s scenario and a more plausible scenario where one of a pair of identical twins is killed. If you get 'em young enough (as newborns or fetuses) then identical twins have experiences so similar to each other as to be virtually identical. But newborn/fetal twins are not generally considered to be the same entity, and I see no reason to believe that the consciousness of a dead baby or selectively aborted fetus continues in the mind of its identical twin.
What if you get them before they split? Which twin is the real inheritor of the original fetus’ identity and which is merely a copy? I would say that they both are the true successors of the pre-split fetus, and I would also say that both copies of me that awake with all my memories in bodies identical to mine are me.
A friend once told me of a survey somebody had done, in which they asked questions about this.
Scenario #1:
You enter transporter. You get de-materialized. You (or a duplicate???) then materialize somewhere else. Would you step into this machine?
Scenario #2:
You enter transporter. You are scanned, and then you (or a duplicate???) then materialize at the destination – BEFORE you de-materialize at the source. So you briefly exist in both places at once. (Obvious advantage here: If the machine malfunctions and the person at the destination is defective or doesn’t appear at all, the original is still there.) Then, AFTER arriving at the destination, you disappear from the source location. Would you step into this machine?
As I heard it told, most people would NOT use a transporter that works like this. They (as the “original” person) would feel like a new “copy” is being made, and they (the “originals”) are then being destroyed. Nobody wanted that.
For that person himself, isn’t this question equivalent to: How willing are you to die at any time (like, NOW), if that death is painless and happens so instantly that you never feel a thing.
I strongly suspect that death in a sufficiently violent plane crash works like this. From the moment the falling plane first touches the ground until the moment all passengers are smithereens may be a shorter length of time than the time for a nerve impulse to travel from one synapse to the next – hence, the victim literally never knows it or feels it.
How is that different from stepping into a de-materializer machine (as the simulated war victims did in “A Taste of Armageddon”)? And how does that change (for YOU[sub]original[/sub]) if a copy then appears over there?
Twins actually split off from each other before the fetal stage.
I see a pretty big difference between saying both twins are equal successors of the original zygote and saying that both twins are actually the same person. Twins, even baby twins, are generally considered to be two different people, and twins who are old enough to talk will say they’re two different people and not one consciousness with two bodies.
What I’m not seeing is any meaningful ethical or philosophical distinction (ETA: in this context, at least) between a pair of clones with the same memories and a pair of newborn baby twins. Whether one considers the important factor in personal identity to be the physical form or experiences/memories, at the moment the clones wake up they have two different bodies and are immediately having different experiences/forming different memories. Even if they woke up in the same bed rather than in two different rooms they’d still be having different experiences. “I woke up with someone on my left” vs. “I woke up with someone on my right.”
Fair enough
I agree that they are two separate people. But both are the true successors of the original embryoblast. Neither one can be considered merely a duplicate of the other.
I agree completely - as soon as new memories are formed, the two previously identical beings become distinct beings. I would go on to say that both of them can legitimately consider themselves the successor of the original single being.