Those questions are exactly the ones that led me to the thought experiment described in post 47. Please read it carefully.
What do you mean? You think it’s possible to wake up in both rooms simultaneously?
Yes, and the problem is the question “where will YOU wake up?” - it assumes the existence of something called ‘you’ that exists prior to, and independently of conscious awareness.
Your consciousness is a point of view. You think you’re the same person as you were yesterday, but why? What property do you actually have that makes you different from a copy of you?
Why? You need to justify this statement.
From the internal point of view both are identical, as well. I have provided reasons for why this should be so upthread. You have not challenged any of those reasons. The I in room 1 wakes up. The I in room 2 wakes up. Nothing more, nothing less.
Si
Here’s another angle: When you are unconscious, is there a thing called ‘you’ that is waiting to wake up? If so, what is it made of?
Yes, because you are now two separate people.
OK, try this: You have a 50% chance of waking up as Me1, and a 50% chance of waking up as Me2. BUT (and here it almost gets a bit quantum) both outcomes actually occur. Me1, from his own subjective point of view, went to sleep as you and woke up as Me1; and Me2, from his own subjective point of view, went to sleep as you and woke up as Me2.
It doesn’t make sense to us on a visceral level to duplicate the consciousness like this because it’s completely impossible based on what we currently know, but this is what follows unavoidably from the conditions of the hypothetical.
I don’t think that the simple question “where will you wake up?” assumes anything.
When I go to bad at night I know for sure that I will wake up in the same bad unless somebody carries my body in another place. So you could ask me quite legitimately without making any assumptions where I think I would wake up the next morning. Right? But if the experiment described in post 47 were carried out on me during the night I’m really not sure about the possible answer.
If I wake up somewhere I get sensory input from my surroundings. My copy in the next room gets the informational input from his surroundings as well. But since I don’t have the sensory access to whatever experience he gets I don’t consider him being me. Right? That’s why I can NOT wake up in both rooms. Only in one of them.
I dare to assume my existence is somehow suspended during that period.
Interesting point! Never thought of it in QM way. It may be worth it’s while to ponder this version.
Right - and if that suspended state contains no metaphysical components, and is copied (like a VMWare snapshot), and the copy is faithful, then there is no difference between resumption of the copy or the original, in fact, ‘original’ doesn’t mean a whole lot.
I think the problem is that ‘I will wake up’ suggests something is waiting to happen. “wake up and be me” is perhaps a better way to describe what really happens.
I don’t see the point in the statement “wake up and be me”, because it suggests the possibility of “waking up and being somebody else”, which seems to be nonsense.
And it is exactly the same for the copy in the next room. Until they open their eyes to see if they are in the blue room or the red room, they are the same. At that point, they start to diverge due to experience. But even then, they have an identical claim to being who they claim to be. And neither can support a claim to be I’ (I-prime).
Si
Right, but if you ask me before the experiment what room I expect myself to wake up in, what line of reasoning should I follow to make some conclusion on where my waking up would happen.
I will say room B, because I prefer not to choose the first option. And I will be 100% right. But I will also be 100% wrong, too.
Si
Am I supposed to be satisfied with this sort of answer?
What I’m trying to say is that this morning before you woke, ‘you’ weren’t floating around waiting for your body to wake up, so you could inhabit it. Your body woke up, and because of the stored memories etc in it, ‘you’ came to life in that body.
If there were somehow two bodies in this pre-woken state, each identical in every way, they would both wake up, and both have the equally valid sense of being ‘you’.
This wouldn’t be a shared experience; there would just be two beings, both having the same sort of experience you had this morning when you woke up. Both would be ‘you’, but not the same ‘you’.
Meant to add: the reason this doesn’t make sense is it has never happened to us. The notion of persistent single identity is just very deeply ingrained.
It’s been repeatedly reiterated throughout the thread and I completely agree with it.
But is it at all legitimate to ask this question:
And if it is then what is the possible answer?
If you think this question doesn’t make sense, please explain why.
The question doesn’t have a proper answer, because the goalposts are moved halfway through the game.
Whichever room you choose, one of the awoken persons will have been right all along, the other wrong.