Would you define the Supreme Being as contingent?
“If this triangle is equilateral, then this triangle is equilateral in all possible worlds”
Only in Euclidean geometry. The triangle might not be equilateral in other geometries.
I posit there is a possible world where God does not exist (but NE does).
Sentient wrote:
Then what is God? Doubtless, while the four-hundred-year-old definition is lacking, yours will suffice.
Nope - I wouldn’t think that would be allowed, any more than I’d think it would be allowed (in traditional logic) for me to define the Supreme Being as “that about which the statement, ‘this being exists,’ is true.” It’s begging the question. I also wouldn’t include the statement, “the supreme being is impossible,” or, “the supreme being is necessary,” in my definition, because to do so is also begging the question. The point of modal logic is to determine whether an entity is necessary, contingent, or impossible; I would think any definition that includes any of these states cannot be properly examined using modal logic.
I have to point out that when you say,
You’re incontrovertibly incorrect. McHugh is indeed redefining God in order to avoid Professor Martin’s objections to the ontological proof. I suggest that in doing so, he doesn’t fully avoid the definitional problems of the ontological proof, but he does create a new problem – namely, that the entity whose existence he “proves” has no meaningful existence.
If he weren’t saying anything new, then he wouldn’t have made this redefinition. He wouldn’t have written the paper. He corrects one ontological error, continues a second ontological error, and creates a third, new ontological error. But you are incorrect to accuse him of adding nothing new to the debate.
Daniel
When I said,
I should have said,
Daniel
Daniel
You are incorrect to say that I have accused him of “adding nothing new to the debate”. The definition is not the whole debate. He hasn’t redefined God. He has merely reworded the definition to get away from Martin’s protest that a looser definition may allow in a nefarious god. His first premise is then the same as everyone else’s, G -> G, and is notated the same as everyone else’s, that it follows from the definition.
Daniel wrote:
Then if God’s existence is not contingent, it is necessary.
A thought. An idea. A fantasy. An imaginary construct. A fictitious illusion. Make-believe. Whimsy.
If you want any more I’ll have to fetch the thesaurus.
Sentient wrote:
Can the same be said of your argument? 
Of course. I’m a materialist, remember.
You misread me. As I said:
So in defining God, I wouldn’t make any reference to whether God was necessary, contingent, or impossible: to do so would make it impossible for me to examine God using modal logic, just as defining God as “a being about which the statement, ‘God exists’ is true” would make it impossible for me to evaluate God using traditional logic.
Once more: when McHugh got rid of the possibility of a nefarious God, he equally got rid of the possibility of a benevolent God. He threw the baby out with the bathwater.
Daniel
Very well. If you can state that “God is possible,” and work from there, what is stopping me from stating the axiom that God is impossible?
Robert, the axiom in question states that:
I think this is valid: failing any a priori reason why a being cannot exist as defined, you gotta admit that it’s at least possible it exists. If you say, “Frank is a cat who is a pigeon,” then you’ve defined Frank in such a way that he is logically impossible: Frank exists in no worlds. But if you say, “Frank is not a cat or a pigeon,” and every time someone asks you, “Is Frank smart? Is Frank kind? Is Frank mean? Is Frank in Texas? Is Frank 50 pounds overweight?” you answer, “Nope!” (as McHugh answers), then you’ll never contradict yourself, and therefore, there’s some possibility that this Frank being exists. Whether Frank could exist in any meaningful sense is another question.
Daniel
Is the concept of God free from contradiction? Don’t we run into minor problems like, If God created space-time, where was he before then?
But see, that’s the beauty of McHugh’s definition: his God DIDN’T create space-time, because in order to do so, he’d have to be a Creative God, and McHugh defines God as that being to which no positive descriptor can be applied. “Creative,” like, “Destructive,” is a positive descriptor.
While other concepts of Internally inconsistent (check the link out – it’s interesting reading!), McHugh’s definition, by not saying much of anything at all, is internally consistent.
Daniel
How can a thing with no properties be said to exist at all?
That, Vorlon, is the $64,000 question.
Daniel
The problem with denying the possibility of God’s existence remains no matter how you approach it: it is a substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition, and therefore is a logical fallacy — thus, recognizing the possibiliy of nonexistence is to recognize contingency , and recognizing contingency is to recognize the possibility of existence.
But the answer is free. From McHugh’s paper:
I know an answer is in his proof, but it’s a dissatisfying answer. The exchange looks like this:
Q. What does it mean for a being with no properties to exist?
A. It exists, man, it’s just too deep for you to understand.
If we cannot conceive of this being, how can we apply other concepts to it? How can we know that “existence” is a meaningful concept to apply to a being when there’s no other meaningful concept we can apply to it?
What is the meaning, in modal logic, of “radical transcendance”?
I suspect the term is undefinable by its very nature; if so, it doesn’t have a place in a logical proof, and cannot be used to answer the objection that the being has no meaningful existence.
The $64,000 question stands, as does my question about why we should consider “Hate” to be a positive quality (and therefore not ascribable to McHugh’s God) wherease “Love” is not a positive quality (and therefore is ascribable to McHugh’s God).
Daniel