To phrase it differently, McHugh popsits a being who has two properties: of being necessary, and of being fluberqy. I’ve discussed my problems with defining a being as necessary elsewhere; here I’m questioning whether it’s meaningful to describe this being as fluberqy.
It’s important to McHugh for this being to be fluberqy, because otherwise, the being is indistinguishable from nothingness (nothingness, of course, not being fluberqy). But unless he can provide us with a meaningful definition of fluberqy, then he’s in trouble.
Fluberqy, of course, is “transcendental in nature.”
It’s wonderful that modal logic has so many applications. But just because something has many applications doesn’t mean that it is relevant, or can be applied, in a totally new area. For instance, simple geometry is a wonderfully powerful tool that has been applied in an enormous number of useful ways over the course of human history. But, as anyone who has seen Dead Poet’s Society can attest, trying to use simple geometry to calculate the quality of a poem, even in a fashion that seems fundamentally logical, is meaningless.
So you’re trying to apply Modal Logic to Theology and Cosmology. And you’re trying to decisively answer one of the Great Questions of Human Existence with it. How is that different from, say, trying to use Partial Differential Equations to prove that there is no soul?
(Note: there’s a very important difference between arguing about things and claiming that one has proven things. For instance, I am right now using, at some level, basic logic to argue about theology. Which seems hypocritical, given that I’m arguing that it’s not OK to use logic to discuss theology. The difference, as I see it, is that I’m just arguing. You’re claiming that you have proved something. Proved. Absolutely. Period. Paragraph. End of story. I honestly believe that I’ve come up with a pretty compelling argument that your argument is invalid, but I wouldn’t claim it’s a proof. Proof is something that rarely happens outside pure mathematics.)
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It’s absolutely one hundred percent true that operations in modal logic do not represent real world phenomena. Operations in modal logic are just that. Operations in modal logic. For the purposes of a particular thought experiment, or a particular computer science algorithm analysis, or some such thing, one might temporarily set up correspondences and analogies between real world phenomena and concepts of modal logic. Those might even end up being very useful and valid. But they do not exist in some independent and absolute sense.
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Operations in arithmetic don’t represent real life phenomena, either, in any absolute sense. They just happen to be very very frequently useful. There’s an incredibly useful correspondence between the arithmetic concept of “5” and the “number” of fingers I have on one hand. But those two things aren’t really the same.
Also, Modal Logic is not, by its very definition, derived from the same set of axioms. Go back and reread your Stanford link. It has extra axioms. That’s what makes it Modal.
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First of all, and this is a side issue, why not respond to my post directly and refer to me by name? I find your tone more than slightly condescending… but I also find this discussion truly interesting, so I will do my best to argue respectfully.
Secondly, the onus seems to be on you to demonstrate any connection between the modal logic concepts of “possibility”, “existence”, and “necessity” and their real life counterparts. Not to be flip about it, but, you’re trying to prove that the most important thing ever (if it exists) exists. Can you first demonstrate the validity of your method by proving or disproving the existence of other, less important, concepts? Can you give me an example in philosophy/theology/cosmology where Modal Logic proved something’s existence, and then hey, presto, sure enough, there it was, out there in the real world, confirming said proof?
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Seriously, ixnay on the ondescensioncay.
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No, let’s not leave it aside. It’s a wonderful example. OK, it’s an undefined term. If no one had ever heard of arithmetic, and I came up to you and said, “hey, look at this cool concept I’ve come up with. It’s called a ‘successor’. And look at the fun little games I can play with it. Now, trust me, let’s base our economy on these games” you would be perfectly justified in not trusting me. But arithmetic, regardless of whether it is built on undefined terms (and is there really any difference between being built on undefined terms and being built on axioms?), has been shown again and again and again to be useful for modelling real life concepts. Thus, in those areas in which arithmetic has been shown to be useful, we use it, and trust the results it gives us, and don’t worry about whether “successor” is undefined.
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So you’re claiming that the correspondence between the Modal Logic symbol G and the concept of God is a more precise one than the correspondence between the arithmetic concept “5” and the number of fingers on my hand?
Given the other discussions going on in this thread right now, which consist of a number of well-intentioned and intelligent people arguing at great length about abstruse details concerning the definition of God, I must question that claim.
One last thought… Modal Logic, as I understand it, discusses possibilities. That is, it discusses multiple worlds, and things that are true or not in all of those worlds. So, at least when applied to theology and philosophy, it implies a framework inside which are some number (quite likely an infinite number) of entire universes. You are using it to make claims about things that might or might not exist in some or all of those universes. But what about something that transcends that framework? Can that be addressed by Modal Logic at all?
It’s one thing to argue about something like a blue horse. There may be no blue horses in our universe. There may be. There may be a universe in which all, or some, horses are blue. There’s no reason why there couldn’t be universes that go each way. But God, if God exists and is a supreme being, exists outside of that set of parallel universes. Which, in one sense, is exactly what your argument is saying. But in another sense, immediately invalidates your argument, because it is not something to which Modal Logic can be applied.
To put it another way, one of your assumptions is that it is possible that God exists. But “exists” in a Modal Logic sense means “exists inside one of some number of possible universes”. And God, being transcendental, can’t possibly exist “inside” a universe. Which simply means that the language we’re using (Modal Logic) is incapable of analyzing God.
If the article really refers to “transcendent” reality, it’s foolish of McHugh to call that “existence”. It isn’t existence. Existence is the word we use to describe the stuff around us.
For lack of a better term, he should have called it the Tao.
I’ll second a call for the end to the condescension, Libertarian. I was wondering earlier if it’d help you for me to pat myself patronizingly on the head while I’m reading your responses to me: it feels like you’ve reached the limit of condescension possible over electrons, and might need some help.
Given that you failed to recognize the numerous respected counter-arguments to the ontological proof, I hardly think you’re justified in placing yourself in a position of expertise on this matter. Discuss it as an equal, or not at all, please.
I don’t think it is foolish at all. From what little I read about platonism it seems that, in fact, such existence is the most important kind. Transcendental egos, ideals, and so on, have had no small voice in philosophy for quite some time.
You try fielding 5 to 1, wherein each person, like yourself, demands personalized attention to every laborious detail of his magnificent posts, repeating the same things over and over and over again, and see whether you come out of it in a cheery mood. If you can do that, then I would appreciate the benefit of your good counsel.
People have a lot of nerve calling me condescending, I think. So far, I’ve been told that I’m ignorant, stupid, dull-witted, dishonest, and dodgy. Would you like to spend literally hours in discussions with a mob of people only to get that kind of crap? And the mob consists of everything from a heel-nipping chihuahua who has contributed nothing but has four thousand questions, all the way to erudite people like yourself and Max. If I miss responding to even one damn tiny clause of someone’s protest (which is often a rehash of something already covered), then I am charged with failing to recognize the many excellent arguments blah blah blah blah blah.
I’ve seen hundreds of objections to the argument. And I’ve seen those addressed. There isn’t anything new here. You people demand respect, and yet you call me basically an idiot for buying into the argument. It so happens that I resent that. You call me “snippy” whenever I lose my temper answering a question that I had just answered two posts up, but I am not infinitely patient.
I’ve already made enemies out of some of you, and I certainly had no intention of that. But honestly, when an argument devolves to the place where people are asking for “proof” of definitions, it’s beyond ridiculous.
Now, Max has told me to go back and reread the Stanford site because I said that modal logic and arithmetic are derived from the same axioms. His response? No! There are extra axioms. Well, I mean, duh. Of course there are extra axioms — axioms that are added to the base axioms from which arithmetic is derived. It all comes from Peano. I consider that to be a disingenuous argument. Here, I can twist what you said so that you look stupid. That’s crap.
If I miss anything, I’m evasive. If I don’t give the answer you want to hear, I’m dodging. If I complain about it, I’m putting myself on a cross. And if I leave the discussion altogether, I’m admitting defeat. You’ve designed the game so that it is not winnable for me, and you have a whole gang behind you to spawn more questions and points than any one human can address. If you take pride in such a means of “winning” a debate, then you ought to be ashamed.
All I’ve asked for in this whole business is to be considered a peer. I gave examples of materialists who recognize the argument as valid, and even one who converted to theism because of the argument. And these are learned professionals. If you won’t respect me, at least respect them. There is absolutely no cause to throw out the argument because of a definition. I mean, hell, there are probably 50 versions or more of this thing out there with everything from 5 inferences to 20. And even though you might not think they’re sound, they are valid.
I just hope that there is some way that you and I can restore the mutual respect that we once held for each other. I would like to hang around, but this is not good for me. I somehow too often manage to get embroiled in the debates that find me at an overwhelming numerical disadvantage, and after a time, I can’t handle it. I need a break.
Go ahead and flame me if it makes you happy. You won’t get me to say you’ve won, but if you will be reasonable, you’ll get me to say that you and I both hold reasonable views. But not to worry, Robert will be along shortly to spit at me, and ask me to prove an axiom or define “definition”. That’s all I have to say.
Recognize that each of us are posting individually.
Recognize that we’ve not “designed” some sort of “game” which is “unwinnable” for you.
Respond to each of us as individuals.
Don’t respond at all to anyone you think of as a “chihuahua”: save your energy for responding to people engaging you in intelligent debate. If the chihuahuas end up thinking they’ve won, it’s no skin off your ankles.
Other than calling you “condescending,” you’ll note that I’ve not said anything negative about you. I’ve been careful not to do so. That’s why I don’t appreciate it when you’re condescending to me.
If you can’t distinguish between us different arguers, I’m sorry. I recognize that other people have been rude to you here, and if I were responsible for their behavior, I’d apologize for it.
If it helps, here’s where the condescension to me really shone:
Earlier you made a straw man out of my arguments:
It’s very frustrating for me to argue with you when you act like this. I do appreciate debating you when you keep your temper and don’t get snippy; when you don’t suggest that I ought to go along with an argument because it’s convincing to people more learned than me.
I hope you’ll take my counsel above. I hope you’ll continue in this argument, recognize that there’s no group effort here to get you, and choose to respond only to people whom you feel are really engaging you. And I hope you’ll do it without condescension.
There is every right to throw out an argument because of its definitions.
For me, its not that I want you to prove your definitions, its that you do not debate them. Logic is not interesting, from a GD perspective, since when a thing has been shown using logic and agreed-upon definitions, its difficult to have a Great Debate over it.
If we can agreed over the definitions, what follows logically from them will be agreed upon (barring a disagreed-upon logical model, of course.)
If we disagree, then we discuss it, or we agree to disagree.
But you have basically said “hey, everyone else agrees with me, so i dont have to debate the definitions. nya nya.”
This is supposed to be GREAT debates. To me, this means discussions of the definitions of God are fair game.
This isn’t “debates only within a previously-agreed-upon definitional model.”
This is my problem with the proof. Assuming ~<>G will lead one to the conclusion of either
~G or ~G (I can’t remember which exactly but I think the latter). The logical argument is totally sound, but the acceptance of <>G instead of <>~G requires the ontological argument to be effective, so it doesn’t sidestep anything, only pushes off the question for later. I have no problem with thinking God (or G or whatever) is possible (and with God aren’t all things possible? ;)), but in light of the proof showing no way to tell whether we should entertain <>G or <>~G there are no answered questions IMHO. I will paraphrase Spiritus Mundi’s characterization of the assumptions as:
“Assume by hypothesis that a being who exists in any world exists in all worlds exists in one world.” Telling, IMO.
I appreciate your counsel, and will heed your advice except that I truly need a break. Already, despite that I believe I have shown convincingly that ~<>G is not a tenable premise (denial of possibility implies contingency, and contingency implies possibility), it has been raised again. Please understand. When I’ve recovered emotionally and get caught up on my work, maybe I can try again. Meanwhile, I regret my condescension, and I apologize for it. Thanks.
No problem, Lib, on needing a break. I do know it can be stressful to argue an unpopular position. Lemme know if and when you feel like tackling this again!
Meanwhile, I wish there were someone else around taking the ontological (specifically McHugh’s) position: I’ve got some questions about it.
It’s true that there are many people disagreeing with you, and no one (or close to no one) agreeing with you.
So? What can we do about that? It’s not your fault, but it’s not our fault either. And we’re certainly not forming some kind of conspiratorial cabal here.
If you are overwhelmed and unable to continue this argument now, or ever, well, that would be a shame, because this has been, at least at times, an interesting and productive discussion. Reasonable people won’t interpret that as you “admitting defeat”, particularly if you are clear about what you are doing and why.
(Also, you may well have heard all of these arguments dozens of times before, and seen them answered dozens of times, but again, that’s not particularly relevant. It would be a very poor GD in which someone proposed something controversial in an area in which they had done a lot of reading and thinking and arguing in the past, and whenever someone asked a question, the response was “I’m so sick of that question”. Not that you are doing that, for the most part…)
Oh, and as for the “based on the same axioms” business, I wasn’t trying to win the whole argument by catching you in what was pretty clearly an accidental misstatement and/or ambiguity. But your argument at the time was “Why shouldn’t you accept ML arguments about the world? You accept arithmetic arguments about the world, and they’re based on the same axioms”. Trouble is, the very parts of ML that allow it to be extended to talk about concepts of existence and possibility are the parts that distinguish it from arithmetic.
Furthermore, and this is a very crucial point, the distinction between ML and arithmetic is not very relevant. Suppose you came up with an argument using nothing but propositional logic and arithmetic which started with a few definitions and assumptions and then, very clearly and straightforwardly, proved that God existed, with no ML at all.
Would I accept that proof? No.
Because nothing that I have ever observed in this world or in my readings about math, philosophy, religion, etc. (which may well not be as extensive as yours) has in any way convinced me that propositional logic and arithmetic are valid tools for proving things about fundamental theological truths.
Fundamentally, I don’t think it’s humanly possible, using nothing but thought, to prove the existence of God. It might be possible, but only experimentally. (Ie, if God does exist, presumably He could demonstrate that to the satisfaction of everyone.)
One last note: I said a few paragraphs up that I would not accept that proof. Does that mean that I would never, no matter what argument was given, change my mind about whether I, personally, believe that God exists? I don’t think it does. I can imagine the hypothetical existence of a very convincing argument that someone might give which might actually, potentially, change me from an agnostic to a believer of some sort. Parts of such an argument might well include logic, of whatever variety. But there’s a crucial distinction between a convincing argument and a Proof-with-a-capital-P.
(Of course, since I just admitted that it was possible that such an argument might exist, you could now ontologically argue that that argument must exist. So perhaps Necessary Existence is not God, it’s an argument about God )
Yet another last note, upon previewing: I personally think it’s possible that God exists. But that doesn’t mean that I accept your assumption <>G. Nor does it mean that I support ~<>G. It means (as described at greater length elsewhere) that I question the validity of attempting to translate English Theological Thought into ML and vice versa. I can’t speak for whether that addresses what other people have been questioning about <>G or not…
Aargh. I can’t stand either platonism or Plato. I can only conclude that Socrates must have existed, because he got too many things right for Plato to have simply made him up.
Plato was on the right track when he came up with the idea of ideal forms, but he erred in claiming that this world was separated from everyday reality.
Besides, his insistence that knowledge is inborn is just silly.
I kind of wonder if McHugh’s problem is that he’s trying to combine two fundamentally incompatible systems: transcendental philosophy (which cannot be defined) and logic (which depends on clear definitions). I might just as well deliver my rebuttal to McHugh in the form of a banjo solo: if you’re using the wrong tools for the wrong job, you’re gonna run into problems.
Then I would argue that McHugh isn’t using transcendental philosophy, because if he were, his brain would necessarily be unable to encode it. Therefore, he isn’t.
I still maintain that the problem is that modal logic allows us to consider possibilities that are things as well as *meta-*possibilities.
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