Every hypothetical consideration ever imagined treats possibilities as “things”. That is indeed the hallmark of hypothetical considerations.
Hypotheticals consider possibilities as if they existed, not *as existing.
There’s an important distinction there.
If I toss a coin and it comes up heads, is it possible that it could have come up tails instead? From a limited human perspective, I can find nothing impossible about the coin’s coming up tails given the information I possess. But is the coin toss random or pseudo-random? We don’t know. It is conceivable that the outcome of that particular coin toss (and every other event) was inherent in the structure of the universe.
From an atemporal perspective, that toss can be only what it is.
Drat! Oh, I wish editing were permitted in Great Debates…
Well, Vorlon, one could point out that it is impossible to compute the possibility of events in the future, because by computing, you change the universe. It is doubtful that the neural impulses that compuse your mental computation will change the outcome, but Universe + calculation != universe - calculation.
Of course, you’re dead on about things that have already happened.
Why? What makes you think you know what happened in the past?
From a finite perspective inside the universe, we can only assume that our knowledge of the present moment is accurate (or as accurate as knowledge can be). From this, we can extrapolate many possible futures branching from that single moment, much like the branches of a tree.
However, we can also generate many different explanations for that moment. We can extrapolate backwards, producing possible pasts, much like the roots of a tree.
The present is the point where the branches and the roots meet.
Drat, I’ve begun falling back into mysticism again.
You never cease with bold claims, do you? I can see a tangential great debate in like every post of yours. Some quick comments on this particular tidbit:
- I don’t know that such a perpective is possible
- I don’t know that determinism is the rule of the land
- Without access to or proof of the supposed atemporal perspective all comments derived from it are modal
Perhaps there is a distinction. Its importance is debateable.
[ul][]From my perspective looking at a logical proof I consider hypotheticals as if they existed.[]From the perspective of the axiomatic set I consider hypotheticals as existing.[/ul]
** Technically speaking, it isn’t possible for us to take an atemporal perspective on our existence in time.
However, I can create a subreality in my mind and examine my relationship towards it. It’s not perfect, but it’s as close as I can get.
Non-determinism is ultimately useless as a philosophy. It really doesn’t matter if it’s true or not. I strongly suspect that it can’t be true, but I only suspect.
See my reply to point #1.
DANIEL WITHROW:
“…Meanwhile, I wish there were someone else around taking the ontological (specifically McHugh’s) position: I’ve got some questions about it…”
I lack the knowledge to say anything about McHugh, but if you’re interested in someone else taking (what I suppose is a version of) the ontological position, I’ve presented some ideas over in the “proving the existence of the Supernatural” thread.
LIBERTARIAN:
So much of what you present is superb work that I presume that any seeming condescension is in my mind, not yours.
This thread is absolutely one that I will save and make reference to.
Good work! So what is this niggling little problem with no distinction existing again? Or with possibility meaning existing?
Of course I have no choice but to disagree.
!! 
Thank you, Scott! I’m still following the debate, but just from the sidelines. 
Scott, could you address whether or not the definition of God in this proof alows for what is proven (God exists in this world) to be a non-intelligent process? I can accept that the proof in sound, but the definition used allows for the possibility that “supreme being/god” is an unaware, yet necessary thing. This I can accept. We have proven that something is necessary to existence, but not whether it thinks or loves. Correct? The problem is, when one says god, most people assume you are talking about an intelligent being, which this proof most definitely does not prove. This makes the whole point of it seem like a csae of misdirection. A bait-and-switch (god means one thing here, and when I prove it, then it means everything else you ususally attribute to a god).
Where is the hole in this reasoning. I don’t see one. I’ve seen complaints about me even talking about the definition (which, as has been pointed out by others, is not a debate tactic as much as a flame), but not one argument against God (as used here) being a process rather than an awareness. In the end, we have not proved the existence of an intelligent creator as best as I can tell.
DaLovin’ Dj
I find this quite interesting. Why?
In fact, I would hazard the opinion that if the proof is flawed no substitution of terms would fit other than the analytic and no doubt semantically recursive “necessary existence” for “G”.
Why can I accept it or why do you find it interesting? Or why does the definition allow G to be non-aware process?
Assuming the question is “Why can I accept it?”:
Well, the presentation by supporters of the proof seems to imply that it serves as proof of an aware creator. I do not see that to be the case. If all that it is saying is that which is neccessary for existance exists, without making any predictions or statements about the nature of those necessary things, then it seems obviously true. Since we (or at least I) exist, then existence must be, which means so must anything required for existence.
It does not prove that awareness is necessary for existence. Therefore to call G “God” is misleading, since most would assume you are speaking of an aware entity.
DaLovin’ Dj
Thank you. 
As the title of this thread indicates, I’m claiming that possibility does not imply existence. The use of the word “existence” in Lib’s argument conveys no more and no less information than the claim that it’s possible. Therefore, the two different words have the same referrent and are equivalent.
Since I see no reason to have an extra, redundant term, I hereby forward a motion to abolish the term “existence” as used by Lib and return to the term “possible”.
Yep. Now, about why this doesn’t have to be god…
Perhaps this is so; but then neither does it prove that it isn’t. If you are willing to entertain one hypothesis, why not the other? I suppose that is my question.
You’ve got me wrong. I am simply saying that it makes no declaration about whether G would be aware or not. Any implication that such is the case (one way or the other) is erroneus. From this proof we can not tell that an aware creator exists or does not exist. I am not claiming to accept that it is an unaware process while refusing to accept it is an aware process. I am merely pointing out that it does not tell us, and to suggest it does (either way) is misleading and if intentional, decietful.
DaLovin’ Dj
I hope that is a genuine winkie, I know I sometimes sound snarky but if I’m not in the pit I would like to give assurance that it is not intentional (whatever that is worth). (Hell, and sometimes even then!)
And you know, no one would argue with that. Except in the case where its impossibility is shown to be impossible.
I don’t see that, to tell the truth. It seems to make sense to me to say that something that exists is possible, but that something that is possible doesn’t necessarily exist (unless it exists necessarily). Thing of such a phrasing: “Yeah, that’s possible, but I don’t know if it is true.” Does that make sense?
If that were the case it would be so. I cannot construct a modal world where that is true because it would mean not just that existence implies possibility, but that possibility implies existence. Thus the definition of possibility as
~~
would no longer hold.
If you think about this proof, you will find your rejection of it also rejects your opinion about things having to be the way they are.
G “Things/events.”
G->G “Assume that anything that is, has to be”
<>G “Assume that existence is possible.”
etc.
Unless, of course, you still reject “possible” on some other grounds…
It is a one-way road:
A -> A -> <>A
You do not get to travel the other way without other conditions; namely, that the road is already “violated” with
A -> A
in which case we have the proof in question.
When is A->A ever a valid assumption? Well, when we take the ontological argument to heart (IMHO). Or we are Vorlon and say “whatever is must be”.
My mistake. Apologies.
The hidden ontological argument justifying the assumption of
G -> G
does, though. Again, that’s MHO. As I maybe have successfully demonstrated with Vorlon, though, that is not the only thing we may interpret as G -> G.
DALOVINDJ:
“…Scott, could you address whether or not the definition of God in this proof alows for what is proven (God exists in this world) to be a non-intelligent process? I can accept that the proof in sound, but the definition used allows for the possibility that “supreme being/god” is an unaware, yet necessary thing…”
Well, since you asked (it’s flattering to be asked to “address” something as opposed to just plain shooting off my mouth about it…):
I think the FORM of an argument for the existence of an aware, conscious necessarily-existent entity would be to proceed from the fact that we neither know, nor can know, nor can even conceive of what it might MEAN to know, anything other than the deliverences of conscious awareness (which indeed are simply the constituents of conscious awareness).
I mean this in a very strong sense. I think it impossible to conceive of some something properly named “that which lies outside actual or possible consciousness.”
Don’t misunderstand–I’m not saying that chairs and rocks are conscious, much less the universe as a whole. I’m saying they are, and must be, of the same “ontological substance” as the content of consciousness.
It follows that, if there is some something that we wish to term “God” on independent grounds (such as supremacy or necessary existence), then we can be certain that such an entity is not divorced from consciousness.
[This is just a sketch of how I would begin; it is obviously incomplete.]