Change the configuration of their root reality, eh? Can we speculate on what would happen if such a thing were true? That is a “possible world” in an extreme sense. An alternate configuration that is not forbidden by whatever rules we are considering.
That which we cannot change is necessary. That which we can change is possible. That which can never appear is impossible.
It remains my favorite, and the exposition which develops it is quite convincing, but it is a truism of sorts and indeed I never seem to stop chasing chimeras. “Philosophy is the struggle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” Sing it from the highest rooftops, good sir.
My email to Christopher McHugh came back undeliverable. if anyone else wants to give it a go, have at it!
Libertarian, I’m thinking that you’re putting the cart before the horse. If I understand you, you suggest that McHugh’s God has no positive qualities because it is not contingent. But that’s not how McHugh has set it up.
No, McHugh’s God is just the other way around: it is not contingent because it has no positive qualities. He defines God as that to which no positive descriptor can be applied, and then he considers contingency to be a positive quality. God is only non-contingent because that’s a non-positive quality.
That may explain why we’re talking past one another on this issue. If God has no positive qualities because it’s non-contingent, then any quality which is also non-contingent is kosher for God. But if God is non-contingent because it’s got no positive qualities, then you can make a quality copacetic just by making it non-contingent, any more than you can make a quality copacetic by making it non-blue, non-fast, non-hot, etc.
I suppose you could change things around, define God as “that being which is in not contingent on anything else and which possesses no contradictory qualities.” Such a being could have positive qualities attached to it: it could be blue, it could be hot, it could be material, it could be loving.
It would be open to the Perfect Evil parody as well, I think.
But, although I think the proof would still suffer from my other objection (modal logic is incapable of evaluating an entity for whom one of the possible outcomes is excluded by definition), it would not be subject to my objection that the being is logically indistinguishable from nothingness (note the qualifier “logically,” one that McHugh ignores).
Such a proof might look something like this:
Definition: God is that which is not contingent and which has no internally contradictory qualities.
Axiom: Any entity which exists in at least one world and fewer than all worlds is contingent.
Because God possesses no internally contradictory qualities, God is not logically impossible.
Because God is not logically impossible, God exists in at least one possible world.
God, by definition, is not contingent, and by #1, is not logically impossible.
Since the only outcome left is that God is necessary, God is necessary and exists in all possible worlds.
Addendum: All beings who fit the definition of “God”, above, exist in all possible worlds.
Does this proof make any errors beyond those inherent in McHugh’s proof, in getting rid of the God=nothingness problem?
Frighteningly, like the Necronomicon, it (through its addendum) threatens to summon all sorts of malevolent uncaring deities from the depths of an alien logic best left unplumbed by mortal minds.
Fortunately, also like the Necronomicon, it’s full of shit.
Does it make any sense to speak of Existence or Nonexistence as if those terms named particular entities (in the sense in which “red” or “desperately” might be considered a particular entity, a “certain something”–not a physical object, of course)?
I’m not just repeating the Kantian objection, by expressing the useful reminder that “existence” is always found in the thing-that-exists. By the same token, “nonexistence” is never found at all.
I’m not (just) joking when I point out that there’s no such thing as “the thing that doesn’t exist”!
It is if you agree with the statements using your own definitions. Before I make a comment pertinent to the discussion, I need to know on which points Libertarian and I agree. So far we seem to agree on a relationship between the words possible, existence, and necessary.
Libertarian, do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
You might be right that that is why we were talking past each other. Frankly, I think the definition can be developed either way. Necessarily, either contingency or positivity has to be mentioned one before the other unless McHugh writes his definition interlinearly, and that might make it hard to read. But I don’t think that there is any significance to the order since the development of the definition is not bound by the same rules as the development of the proof itself; i.e., there need be no chain of inference.
If God is blue, then He is contingent on color. Likewise, if God is colorless, then He is contingent on color. Color of any kind is a positive descriptor, and McHugh explains positive descriptors in his definition part (2). I rather like his approach to developing his definition, taking steps that are analogous to (but not equivalent to) an inferential chain.
In part (1), he explains what a descriptive term is. In part (2), he describes a positive descriptor. In part (3), he describes a negative descriptor. In part (4), he explains contingency. Finally, in part (5), he tells which witch is which with respect to God. I don’t think these parts are intercausally related. They are merely well organized.
Modalizing your proof, I think would look something like this (feel free to correct whatever you think might be misrepresentative):
Definition: G = G.
Axiom: ~G -> (<>G v ~<>G)
G -> ~<>~G
~<>~G -> <>G
G -> ~<>~G
~<>~G -> G
It seems a little bit wily. Inference (1) could be an axiom, since it is basically the definition of neccesity. Inference (2), though, is invalid since ~<>~G implies G, not <>G. Inference (3) is a restatement of Inference (1). And Inference (4) is makes ~<>~G and G biconditional (because of Inferences 1 and 3), with is probably okay since they define each other. And the conclusion is a bit ambiguous. The conclusion should be simply G or else ~G (depending on which you’re trying to prove).
The Axiom reduces to ~G -> (G v ~G)*, and is a tautology, and that’s okay since all tautologies are true. But nothing in the proof really follows from it, and that’s okay too since tautologies prove everything. It just doesn’t seem to be needed.
That depends on what is meant be existence. See Existence. In the ontological proof, it is meant as an unbounded predicate, i.e., God’s existence as necessary existence distinguishes Him from other existences.
Lib, you seem to have had a rollercoaster of a weekend. As usual, you emerge with greater respect than ever. (That you should be requesting that we treat you as an equal makes me cringe with embarassment, as though we were kicking a football in the park while Zinedine Zidane waited patiently for us to let him play.)
If a piece of meat, over 12 billion years, became sentient and able to communicate concepts via language, it would be necessary for there to be a word/concept for “existence”, a word/concept for “being or entity” and a word/concept for “supreme or perfect”.Sooner or later these three concepts would be combined, ie. a being who had to exist (by virtue of his supremacy/perfection: a non-existent being is obviously sadly lacking in the Perfection department).
“Supremacy” would also mean that the “being” could exist without any such brains around (hardly “supreme” would the “being” be if it was contingent on these smelly, mortal ganglia), and impervious to all attempts to dent its perfection, such as arguing that there were even a possibility that it did not exist.
In short, the plucky little organ convinces itself that the being is necessary due to its supremacy, when in fact it is necessary only if there are any such brains around.
Thus is explained the deep meaning of Descartes’ quote: **If God did not exist it would be necessary to invent him.
Thus the proof could begin ~G->G.
I have no problem with necessary existence. I don’t even have a problem with defining this to be “Everything which exists” in a multiverse kind of way or, at a push, to the non-intelligent set of laws governing the origin of universes. However, to posit a “Being” with this quality appears to me to be, quite literally, mere wishful thinking. I posit that the word God should never be used in ontology or alethic logic.
I’m not sure I see what you’re saying. If God is blue, it doesn’t seem to me that it’s contingent on being blue; merely that if we find ourselves talking about a non-blue entity, we must be talking about something other than God. If God requires worshippers, however, then God IS contingent on being worshipped. In this case, if the worshippers go away, so does God.
But wait – are you suggesting that a blue God cannot exist in a universe without the color blue? If you are, then we’ve got two ways around this:
Don’t allow God to have any traits that aren’t necessary (blue doesn’t exist in some universes, so God must not be blue); or
Say that any trait God COULD have is a necessary trait to exist in all possible universes (God is blue, so “blue” must exist in all universes).
Here, however, we’ve got a problem. The second solution – defining all God’s traits as necessary – leads quickly into absurdism. I may want to define God as a being that loves macaroni noodles; do I, in so doing, make macaroni noodles necessary?
The first solution looks more elegant. But how does one determine whether a trait’s existence is necessary in all possible worlds? Is love a necessary trait? Is knowledge a necessary trait? Is power a necessary trait?
Assuming we can figure out how to determine whether a trait is necessary, we find out quickly that one of two things must be true:
There are no traits that must exist in all possible worlds that we may use to distinguish God logically from nothingness; or
There is at least one God possessing every possible subset of the set of necessary traits.
Lemme explain the second part.
If a trait is necessary in all worlds, then we may add it to our definition of God (that which is not contingent) without substantially changing our proof. If love exists in all posible worlds, then we can redefine our God as that which is noncontingent, that which does not contradict itself, and that which loves everything. We can then prove the existence of this God-Prime.
But is hatred also a necessary trait (i.e., any possible world must include the concept of hatred)? Then our God-Secundus is noncontingent, does not contradict itself, and hates everything. Run him through the ontological proof, and we find that he exists.
Let’s step things up a notch.
Must every possible universe contain a being who existed before all the other entities in the universe? God-Tertius is noncontingent, does not contradict itself, loves everything, and existed before every other entity.
But what about God-Quartus, who is noncontingent, does not contradict itself, hates everything, and existed before every other entity?
We can prove gods Tertius and Quartus, just by running them through the proof. But then we realize that both of them must exist in all possible worlds, yet they both possess a trait that only one being can possess in any possible world. Though they are not internally contradictory, a world in which they both exist IS internally contradictory, and therefore cannot exist. But they both exist in every possible world.
Not with a bang but with a whimper collapses the multiverse.
