Can you do the logic behind the scenes and just tell me the final answer? I will assume your logic is sound.
Daniel
Assuming we’re still dealing with McHugh, I don’t follow your latest post at all. I read it over several times and I keep getting lost, sorry. Whatever it is that you’re trying to explain, could you maybe reword it? Thanks.
But I can address this:
(Again, if we’re still dealing with McHugh…) We can’t say that God is blue, or that God is colorless. All we can say is that God is not contingent on color; that is, color is not useful for describing God because color can be conceptualized.
Zwaldd
Okay. The final answer is: it depends. If God is contingent, then it is possible that He does not exist. Otherwise, it is not possible.
Have you come to a decision on whether God is contingent?
And do you agree or disagree with this statement:
If the possibility of x has not been ruled out, then x is possible.
Zwaldd wrote:
Oh, sorry. I think I see what you’re asking me now. No, it is not possible that God does not exist.
Agree
Then it is clear that you don’t understand the question.
If we accept the definition of God, we can then ask ourselves whether it’s possible for a being to exist necessarily. If it is possible, then God must exist. The question zwaldd is asking you is whether you think it’s possible for there to be no things that exist necessarily.
Ah. This explains much of what I have seen on this board.
You are incorrect, zwaldd. Without a way to make your meanings explicit, you can’t examine them; without a way to examine your meanings, you can’t think about them; without metacognition, your search for meaning will fail because you won’t understand what you’re asking about.
If you can’t state what certain words mean, what makes you think that they mean anything at all?
I think it’s time for a new thread.
Libertarian, I’m moving away from my understanding of McHugh, because I think you’ve moved away from him. I’m trying to come up with a coherent reformulation of McHugh’s proof to accommodate how I think you’ve diverged from it. I’m not attached to McHugh especially, but I need to understand the specific proof we’re discussing; my last post involved an attempt to pin down what, exactly, we’re discussing now.
Most importantly, I think you diverge from McHugh when you state that
I think it’s significant that his definition of God does NOT make mention of contingency, one way or the other, in the actual definition. His definition only mentions positive descriptors; any conclusion we draw about God’s contingency must be based on a judgement of whether “contingent” is a positive descriptor.
(to review, his definition of God is “that to which no positive descriptive term can be applied.”)
In fact, in rereading McHugh’s proof, I think I see something of a contradiction. He says, in definition 1: “Note that the term ‘exists’ is not a descriptive term because it does not add to one’s concept of the nature of something.” Then he states, in definition 4, “Something is contingent if and only if its existence and non-existence are both logically possible.” But then, under his elaboration on his definition of God (#5), he states that, “Since no positively conceived descriptive term can be applied to God, ‘He’ must be considered to be non-contingent. . . .” Wha-?
He states that “exists” is not a descriptive term; in that case, why would “possibly exists,” i.e., is contingent, be a descriptive term? Does “possibly exists” “add to one’s concept of the nature of something” in a way that “exists” doesn’t?
“Possibly exists” is no more a descriptive term, by McHugh’s definition, than “exists” is. In which case, contingent isn’t a descriptive term; in which case, contingent isn’t a positive descriptive term; in which case, an entity to whom no positive descriptive terms may be applied may still be contingent.
In other words, his proof falls apart at
because nothing of the sort is implied in his definition of God.
But that’s my understanding of McHugh. My last post, in which the universe collapsed, defined God differently from how McHugh defined God, based on my trying to understand your position: it defined God as, “That which is not contingent on anything else, which is free from internal contradiction, and which possesses no characteristics except those which may exist in all possible universes.” The idea here was to exclude a blue God, whose necessary existence might be disproven by showing that some universes lack the concept of the color blue. I was trying to divorce God from what I think you describe as contingency (different from McHugh’s description of contingency).
However, as I showed, any proof of such a God could be expanded to prove a multiplicity of Gods, some of whom were incompatible with one another and whose simultaneous existence in a world would render that world logically inconsistent.
To recap:
- McHugh does NOT include the concept of contingency in his definition of God; he erroneously suggests that contingency is implied by his definition of God.
- God could be defined in such a way as to include contingency and also to keep McHugh’s prohibition on positive descriptive modifiers; such a god would be logically indistinguishable from nothingness.
- God could be defined in such a way as to include contingency and to allow various other descriptive terms, as long as those descriptive terms would exist in all possible worlds. Such a proof would also prove the existence of mutually contradictory entities.
There are other possibilities, I’m sure, but I don’t know what they’d be. I cannot reformulate God so that it is proven by McHugh’s method.
Daniel
I don’t, and I’m a materialist. Something must necessarily exist.
If this thread is to end, I think it would be appropriate if we all gave Lib a round of applause.
(Clap clap clap)
However, if I might slip him one more question:
If materialism is correct, do you think the conception of a Supreme Being (which obviously must exist) would be inevitable?
I agree, but I think there are better ways to make your meaning explicit than attempting to state an all-encompassing definition that may lead to tangential arguments. Just my opinion…your argument is valid.
No…I believe Lib answered the question correctly as he believes it. I am not applying Lib’s answers to things in general, just the specifics at hand.
Do you believe this has been proven scientifically or just logically.
I disagree. The fact that we don’t know if x can happen does not imply that it can. It only states that we don’t know if it can’t.
** I’m not expecting anyone to give an answer that perfectly conveys their “inner understanding” of a term. My own attempts at defining the ideas leave much to be desired… 
The real question is whether Lib answered the question as you meant it, not as he interprets it.
Well that’s the purpose of my follow up questions. Lib agreed that if the possibility of x has not been ruled out, then x is possible, which is an important part of my concept of possibility. My idea of possible also includes the idea that scientific proof is required to deem something ‘not possible’. If Lib says that the impossibility of God’s non-existence has not been proven scientifically, but still holds that “it is not possible that God does not exist”, then this is where our definition of ‘possible’ parts ways. If he says that God’s non-existence has been proven logically, I may then ask if there are other things not proven impossible scientifically that he thinks are impossible. If so, then we know for sure that Lib’s definition of possible is consistently independent of scientific proof. If not, then I may try to pin down where he applies one definition of possible as opposed to the other, i.e., does logical proof alone only apply to God, or other entities as well? There are no right or wrong answers, just a fleshing out of Lib’s thought process in terms I can understand.
Problem: substitute “not x” for “x” in that statement. Until the possibility of not-x has been ruled out, we must therefore consider it possible. Therefore x and not-x are considered to be simultaneously possible. However, we can’t have x and not-x (if x is such that x and not-x can both exist simultaneously, it’s not worth it to have the discussion in the first place, so the whole argument is moot).
Conclusion: only one is possible. We simply don’t know which is which.
I don’t equate x with the possibility of x. If you do, then we have different definitions of the word possible, which is quite acceptable to me.
All right, then: is it possible for God to be possible?
Assuming you mean by my definitions - yes.
By the way, when I said “If he says that God’s non-existence has been proven logically,” I meant the impossibility of God’s non-existence.
Daniel
I’m still having trouble following. Forgive me, but it just seems to be sort of going all over the place, and my Melancholy temperament is ill-equiped to handle it. It is true that “d = No positive descriptive term can be applied to God” is McHugh’s formal definition; however, implicit in that definition is that God is not contingent because, as he states, “Since no positively conceived descriptive term can be applied to God, ‘He’ must be considered to be non-contingent…”. I don’t think it’s fair (to him, to the proof, or to the whole process of developing proofs in general) simply to disregard everything that he said about the definition before he stated it formally. He went to great pains to explain exactly what he meant, and I honestly think that second quessing his definition is a bit Vorlonish.
With respect to what you think is a contradiction about existence and contingency (or non-contingency), McHugh is stating (as I, or you, or anyone would rightfully state) that to say something exists is not descriptive of something; e.g., in this sentence, “One blue stone weighing 12 pounds exists,” the only word that tells you nothing descriptive about the stone is “exists”. But if we speak of the stone’s existence itself qua existence, then we are describing the nature of its existence, which is what ontology is all about. We may say that it exists as something; i.e., we may predicate its existence. And that’s what the ontological proof does as well. It introduces God as existence qua existence, and then predicates His existence as actual.
I do protest any charge that McHugh and I think differently about contingency. I have every confidence that both he and I view contingency along classical lines. Contingency is merely possibility without necessity.
Zwaldd wrote:
Logically, most definitely.
Science may test only falsifiable data — that is to say that it may only prove a hypothesis to be false; it can’t prove a hypothesis to be true. If it could, then scientific hypotheses could not be amended and changed over time.
Sentient wrote:
If materialism were true, then the supreme being would be logically ambiguous, because there is no absolute frame of reference in nature. I think that Dougherty did the right thing by changing his mind about materialism.
Proving a given hypothesis is false also proves that its opposite is true.
If I hypothesize “if A, then B”, and I find that it’s false, I’ve shown that “not if A, then B”.