If I may pester you by rephrasing my question:
If materialism were true, do you think the ontological proof of God might still be put forward by someone eventually?
(Incidentally, I’m starting to come round to seeing this argument as valid but unsound)
Me too, and how.
WHEW!! And I thought I could read this thread printed over lunch. It doesn’t seem this discussion is as sound as some are making it out to be. I feel like after I read this my brain is a Heisenberg-type quantum measuring device. Good God people!
Lib seems to be offering a quantum plenum of superposed possibilities to match with the more restricted possibilities of sensory input. Rock on, my afternoon is shot.
Bolding mine. You would do well to leave the “He” out of your wording, as has been pointed out. This proof does not suggest an aware creator, and certainly not a male one. To continually use “He” in light of this illustrates your bias, and my biggest problem with this whole process. You have included “He” in your definition of god it would seem, and allowed the use of the word “God” to make it look like you are proving the existence of a classical aware male god. At least that is what it looks like.
Also, are the words “supreme” and “being” considered descriptive terms? Doesn’t that rule them out of the definition of “god”? And since this proof implies no awareness isn’t the use of the word “God” misleading? When combined with your constant capital-h "He"s, you imply something that just isn’t there. Not only does this not prove the existence of Jesus, it doesn’t even suggest the existence of a sentient creator in any way, shape or form. Yet somehow, your phrasing and presentation continues to imply that they do.
All this proof illustrates is that what is necessary for existence exists. It tells us nothing about the qualities of what may be necessary to existence (like an aware creator).
Bait. &. Switch.
G here could be a mindless process, so to use the word “he” or “god” muddles the whole thing. The worst part is that this muddling is intentional and crucial to the argument. It is not surprising that proponents of this argument would attempt to discredit and dismiss any queries about the definition when that is the part that reveals we are not talking about a god at all.
DaLovin’ Dj
Are there other hypotheses you have declared false that science has yet to declare false besides the hypothesis that God does not exist? If so can you give an example?
Sentient wrote:
Yes. Probably by a cosmologist once a mathematics that is descriptive of singularities has been established.
That is a position that I can respect, even though I disagree.
What I don’t get is this.
In the sentence, “one blue stone weighing 12 pounds exists,” the last word is not a descriptor. But apparently, in the sentence, “one blue stone weighing 12 pounds possibly exists,” the word “exists” (now modified by the adverb “possibly”) is suddenly a descriptor. Am I right? If so, how does the word “possibly” change “exists” into a descriptor?
On the other hand, if “possibly exists” is not a descriptor, then its synonym, “is contingent,” is also not a descriptor. Right?
And if “contingent” is not a descriptor, then it certainly isn’t a positive descriptor, meaning that an entity to whom no positive descriptors may be applied may still be contingent. Right?
Daniel
Too many to name. Here are a few examples:
False — If God created the universe, then the universe would be orderly. The universe is orderly. Therefore, God created the universe.
False — If God answers my prayers, then He exists. God has not answered my prayers. Therefore, God does not exist.
False — Most of the Indians that I have known are not trustworthy. Therefore, most Indians in general are not likely trustworthy.
False — What I discern with my senses is real. I discern the universe with my senses. My sense organs are a part of the universe. Therefore, what I discern with my senses is real.
False — The Bible is true. God does not lie. God says that the Bible is true. Therefore, the Bible is true.
Daniel wrote:
Because now you’re talking about the existence, and not the stone. You have predicated the stone’s existence. The stone’s existence is now “possible”.
I simply don’t understand this, and it may be a concept I can’t wrap my head around. If I say a blue stone exists, then I’m talking about a blue stone, but if I say a blue stone possibly exists, then I’m talking about the blue stone’s existence? What if I say a blue stone necessarily exists - then what the hell am I talking about?
Daniel
And even I stipulate that in the sentence, “the blue stone possibly exists,” I’m talking about the existence and not the stone, how does that help the proof? If God is that to which no positive descriptor applies, I can still say that God possibly exists, right? Because then I’m talking about God’s existence and not God itself.
This is very confusing to me.
Daniel
LIBERTARIAN:
Regarding your most recent comment to me–clearly.
Here is a case wherein it really DOES depend on what “is” is!
As you may have gathered, I’m a purely amateur metaphysician. Well, it happens to the best of us.
For the record, as you and I bump elbows now and then…
My idiosyncratic usage (which I believe is justifiable):
“exists” (has existence) =
“is real” (has reality) =
is some something; is other than nonentity; instantiates: “that it is such that it is able to be the object of nonvacuous reference.”
Thus I feel no shame in declaring that Santa Claus exists, last noon exists, beauty exists, the relation expressed by the Pythagorean Theorem exists, the possible person standing in my doorway right now exists–and more of the same.
Nothing nonexists. In cases where we are tempted to attribute “nonexistence”, it is less misleading to use this form:
Regarding “nonsquare square,” the bracketted language, taken to represent the attempted co-attribution of incompatibles, is without (unial) meaning; therefore it does not signify a referent; therefore it evokes no subject of which an existence claim may be posited.
Thus:
“ exists” is either a true statement, or is not a statement at all.
(However, note that
" ‘ exists’ is true " IS a statement, and MAY be EITHER true or false as X varies. )
Regards,
Scott Dickerson
It was written:
In logic, yes. In science, no. Only if a hypothesis has been proved false logically is its opposite necessarily true. If a scientific hypothesis is proved false, its opposite still might be not false in a different context. That’s how hypotheses from Newton, Einstein, and Heisenberg may all coexist.
OK, we may have different definitions of the word ‘hypothesis’. Is the hypothesis in the above quote ‘God created the universe’? Have you declared that false despite a lack of scientific proof? I don’t define ‘hypothesis’ as ‘a sketchy argument’.
posted by Libertarian
Regarding presence x
Presence x = absence of absence of x
Absence x = absence of presence x
It’s your statement, 
I think it was your responce to Von’s statement : presence = absence
agreed….
But can’t it be said as I have above?
You’ve got it right. Defining God is one thing. But once the definition is established, we begin to predicate God right away with our axioms and inferences. These predicates are manipulated throughout the proof. And the conclusion is itself a predicate about God’s existence. G means “God exists in actuality”. His existence is actual. That’s about His existence. Remember that ontology deals with the nature of existence.
I give examples (and symbologies) for various contexts of “existence” in this thread.
The hypothesis in the example you selected is “God created the universe”. The hypothesis is false because its supporting argument contains a logical fallacy. There might (or might not) be a valid argument to support the hypothesis, but that one ain’t it. At any rate, the hypothesis cannot be tested scientifically because it cannot be falsified.
I’m still confused. When you say that I’ve got it right, do you mean that I’m allowed to say, “God possibly exists”? If so, does this differ from saying that God is contingent?
Or do you mean that I’ve got it right in saying that this is very confusing to me? Because I KNOW I’ve got that right :).
Daniel
Iamthat wrote:
There must be some mistake. I would never say that presence = absence.
I think so. It would be the equivalent of A = Not(Not A) and Not A = Not A.
You may say that God possibly exists as an axiom. That’s exactly what is done here in the argument. But as the inferences progress, the descriptions of the existence change from possible to necessary to actual.
Consider again the example of proving that a triangle is equilateral. You will begin by defining an equilateral triangle. You will first allow the possibility that your triangle is indeed equilateral [analogous to possible existence]. (If you refuse to allow that possibility, then your proof is finished already.) You will then examine the properties of the triangle in light of what is true about every equilateral triangle [analogous to necessary existence]. And finally, if nothing in your inferences contradicts your initial assumptions, your conclusion will show that the triangle is in fact equilateral [analogous to actual existence].
If I may say that God possibly exists, then I may say that God is contingent, right? They’re the same thing, right?
And if so, item #5 in the proof:
is false.
In order for item 5 to be true, “God is contingent” must be making a positive descriptive claim about God. But if I understand what you just said, that sentence is making a positive claim about God’s existence, not about God itself, and so item 5 is false.
Daniel