OK, so on page one someone raised this point:
nowhere in Lib’s proofs do I see the possibility of eg. God not existing accounted for
to which you replied:
That would be a substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition.
You now accept the possibility of God not existing.
Does it follow that God is not necessary?
If he were necessary I would think the possibility of his non-existence would be false.
If (G->G && <>G) {
proof follows;
}
Else ~G.
Sorry, but I have no idea what you’re saying.
Welcome to the club, pal.
Now? 
Without context otherwise, <>~G is true, <>G is contingent, and ~<>G is a logical fallacy (a substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition). But when G = G, <>G means <>G, and is not contingent. Modal operators in S5 reduce from the right. Possibility is contingent, but necessity is not.
When you asked me whether I agreed or disagreed with, “It is possible that God does not exist,” my answer was, “If you are still insisting on yes or no only, then I cannot answer that question.” That’s why complex questions are a logical fallacy. It is difficult to tell what is the context of your questions: a priori or post priori. Before the proof (a priori), <>~G is true. But after the proof (post priori), it is false.
From now on, when you ask me a question, I will query you until I am certain of its context. One or the other of us has to provide context. And you’ve made me gunshy of your intentions by putting together contextless responses in a vain search for contraditions.
But if you wish to accuse me of dodging, then you won’t mind answering this question yes or no only: will a hammer fall at the same rate as a feather?
No.
In debate, my definition of ‘will’ is ‘in all cases will’. I use that definition consistently.
You wish to define G=G as true. I wish to define ~(<>G) as true as per the other definitions sans G=[]G in the ontological proof. Fair enough?
FWIW, my intent was not to trick you. On the previous page I posted straight out what my intentions were, including not-yet-asked follow-up questions, what I’d ask in case of either answer, and why I was asking the questions at all. I did not really expect you to contradict yourself. My hypothesis was that you simply believed in God and had come up with some weird logic to prove his existence (I wasn’t familiar with the symbolism, but am now getting the hang of it), but since you now say <>~G (possible not God exists, right?) is true, my hypothesis appears false.
I asked you the last few questions to solidify my new hypothesis that you don’t take God’s existence on faith, but that you ‘proved’ his existence in theory by some logic I don’t fully understand. If you agree that God is not necessary, then that seals it. If you still hold that he is necessary, then I may ask how God’s non-existence is possible if he is necessary. And by is necessary, I don’t mean may be necessary.
Could that be the source of my confusion? My definition of ‘is’? Hmmm…Bill Clinton may be smarter than the Repubs make him out to be. And by may be I mean is.
Zwaldd
Notice that you needed to clarify your “no” answer. In general, it is inappropriate to ask people whether they agree or disagree without further explanation. I run into that on political questions all the time. “Is a ten precent tax cut good for the economy?” That question is loaded forty ways from Sunday.
If God is the Supreme Being, then it is conceptually necessary that He exist. But the proof does not prove that God exists necessarily. It proves that He exists in actuality.
Ludovic
I don’t understand what it means to define something as true.
Does “Supreme Being” count as a positive descriptor?
I didn’t forbid further explanation. In fact, you gave it, and I accepted it:
Lib: If God is contingent, then it is possible that He does not exist. Otherwise, it is not possible.
zwaldd: Have you come to a decision on whether God is contingent?
Lib: Oh, sorry. I think I see what you’re asking me now. No, it is not possible that God does not exist.
That said, do you agree or disagree with this statement, by whatever logic you claim proves it.
God exists in actuality.
My reason for asking is that you agreed with this statement:
It is possible that God does not exist.
I don’t see how the these two statements can both be true:
God exists in actuality.
It is possible that God does not exist.
…unless ‘exists’ in the first statement means ‘may exist’. Is that the case?
—Without context otherwise, <>~G is true, <>G is contingent, and ~<>G is a logical fallacy (a substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition).—
Ok, I’m confused. What is the relation of <>~G to <>G? Isn’t <>~G <=> <>G?
I’m also thinking back to the proof of necessary existence given in the supernatural thread. As I started to wonder there, if there is necessary existence, then what additional explanatory power does the modal onto. proof add to that previous proof? What more does it tell us on top of NE? Or have I misunderstood the interpretation of the conclusion of the proof of necessary existence?
depends on what you mean by “Supreme”. Necessary Existence is NOT a necessary characteristic of something with maximal greatness. I see no reason that a Being must exist in every conceptual world in order just to exist in this world.
you’re nitpicking.
Zwaldd wrote:
I’ll take your word for that. I had no idea.
Yes. For many reasons.
It’s not about the meaning of “exists”. It’s about the context of the statement. “It is possible that God does not exist” is true a priori. But since God exists in actuality, it is not possible that God does not exist post priori.
Not when it is used as a synonym for necessary existence, as it is here.
OK, I see the issue now with a and post priori (learning as I go).
I’m making a distinction between a ‘proof’ proving something and you agreeing with the conclusion of the proof. That’s why I’m asking if you agree with certain statements as opposed to demonstrating the logic.
Also, does your argument presume that God is the Supreme Being even if the “Supreme Being” is one day determined to be nothing more than a complex chemical reaction? Because in that case I would agree that God exists and it is impossible that God does not exist.
OK, that brings me back to this question:
Agree or disagree with these statements (now post priori):
It is possible that there is a scientific explanation for the creation of the universe.
It is possible that there is not a scientific explanation for the creation of the universe.
Is there anything at all added to the definition of “God/Supreme Being” besides NE? If it simply means NE, then why use the term “God” or “supreme being”? I’m not trying to be insulting. I’m either really confused here or this is intentionally misleading (perhaps both).
So the following all hold true?:
G = NE
G != Awareness
G != A living thing
G != A sentient entity
G != Creature capavle of intentional acts (destructive or creative)
If I get this right, we (accepting the axioms) have proven that NE exists, but do not know whether NE is an aware, living, sentient entity capable of creating anything intentionally? Correct?
If one defined god simply as NE, the proof holds. If one defines god as an aware entity it falls apart (or needs one more axiom).
What am I missing?
DaLovin’ Dj
I like Hardigree’s technique for looking at that sort of thing:
A. <>G
B. ~<>G
C. <>~G
D. ~<>~G
Now, translate “~” as “it is not true that”
And translate “<>” as “it is possible that”
We get:
A. It is possible that G
B. It is not true that it is possible that G
C. It is possible that it is not true that G
D. It is not true that it is possible that it is not true that G
Finally, they reduce to:
A. It is possible that God exists
B. It is impossible that God exists
C. It is possible that God does not exist
D. It is impossible that God does not exist
The relation between A and C, therefore, is v (OR).
With respect to the proof of necessary existence versus the ontological proof, the latter begins where the former ends. It uses the conclusion that necessary existence exists in order postulate that G -> G (from G -> G, the 4-Axiom).
I always agree with the conclusion of any argument that is sound.
“Valid” and “sound” have specific meanings in logic. An argument is valid if all its inferences follow from one another. It is sound if it is valid AND all its inferences are true. That means that a valid argument might have one or more false inferences even though they all logically follow. Logicians who discard the conclusion of the modal ontological argument do so because they find the argument to be valid, but not sound. (The premise they most often reject is Becker’s Postulate.)
I don’t understand your question about the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being, as I demonstrated to Nightime, is a metaworld if that’s what you’re getting at.