DJ wrote:
“Supreme Being” is just a paraphrase of “necessary existence”:
Supreme = necessary
Being = existence
So how does God fit in? Since when has the term “God” meant “necessary existence”? Here is what I find when I look up the term god:
None of these definitions work in this proof it seems.
And when I look up “Supreme” I find:
I have not really seen the word used to mean necessary anywhere except here. The definitions say greatness. I don’t see how you can say that something being better than something else in necessary. It is possible that nothing is any better than anything else. It also is possible, that what is great to one person is terrible to another. When do you define “Supreme” as necessary do you remove the idea of greatness and replace it with necessesary? Why use the word Supreme at all then?
DaLovin’ Dj
Second to last sentence in my last post should read:
When you define “Supreme” as necessary do you remove the idea of greatness?
Well crap, then I totally agree.
If Supreme Being=necessary existence
and
God=Supreme Being
then I absolutely agree that God exists. Although I do agree with dalovindj that using the term God is needlessly confusing considering the definition and baggage traditionally attached to that term.
However, now that I understand the definition, I disagree with the statement
It is possible that God does not exist a priori, unless priori simply defines God.
It’s derived from Anselm of Canterbury’s definition. There’s a thousand-year history to this. Sometimes dictionaries are helpful, and sometimes they’re not. They’re not always helpful in specialized disciplines like science, logic, and other philosophies. For example, you and I both know that equating natural selection to survival of the fittest is not only inaccurate, but dangerous. And yet, lo and behold.
The reason the paraphrase is acceptable, even to materialist philosophers, is that everyone agrees that necessary existence is the greatest conceivable existence since it exists in every possible world. Thus, it is the supreme existence; there is none on any higher level. You could even mix and match the terms: supreme being, necessary existence, supreme existence, necessary being.
That last sentence looks confusing. Should read:
However, now that I understand the definition, I disagree with the statement “it is possible that God does not exist, a priori”, unless priori simply defines God.
Zwaldd wrote:
Huh? You lost me there. “A priori” just means presupposed, as in prior to experience. It’s the Kant sense of the term.
OK, try this. Agree or disagree a priori:
Using the Pope’s concept of God, it is possible that God does not exist.
Given that God=necessary existence, it is possible that God does not exist.
This is kind of what I’m getting at: if the proof tells us nothing except that that which necessarily exists in actuality exists, it’s not particularly interesting, and seems a little bit disingenuous.
After all, I might prove that Atlantis exists by defining Atlantis as “that which necessarily exists.” My logic would be impeccable, both valid and sound – but my use of the term “Atlantis” is going to mislead people.
Daniel
So “greatest” is included in your definition. Isn’t that a positive descriptor? And when you say “everyone” agrees, I’m guessing you mean “some” people agree. Greatness is a relative term. Existing in every possible world is not so great to me - I mean then you have to exist in the world where Carrot Top is president.
DanielWithrow sums up what I have been getting at for 7 pages:
That said, I will concede that the 1000 year history of this debate is incredibly interesting and I have learned quite a bit about logic in the process of participating.
DaLovin’ Dj
No, that’s an axiom of modal logic already:
A ->A
The proof demonstrates that anything that exists necessarily, should it exist at all, and is possible (not forbidden or impossible), exists in actuality.
I was about to post all of these objections as well (well, except the one about Carrot Top–at least he’s better than ALF :D). I mean, Greatness as in “size”, I can understand, but I dont see what the truth states of other possible worlds has to do with “greatness” in this one.
There are some objections to some interpretations of proofs in modal logic because some terms refer to different ontological existents in different possible worlds.
For example, “The creator of bifocals”. Can we use this as a legitimate variable? On one hand, we should be able to describe many worlds only slightly different than our own and they could have creators of bifocals. But on the other, it is also possible that the creator of bifocals in different worlds was in fact a different person. So is that interpretation of the proof permissible or not? (I guess it would matter on what sort of conclusions you wanted to draw, but it would definitely be settled outside of modal logic).
Again, there seems to be confusion about what necessary existence is. If G has necessary existence, then it is impossible to think of a consistent set of statements, with at least one true statement, in which G is not true. That is all.
Because of this, the ONLY things that can have necessary existence are things that are necessary to avoid contradiction, and truth itself. Anything more than that is out of the realm of modal logic.
As a result of this, it is impossible for any God with more characteristics than being “truth” to have necessary existence. The metaworld argument fails, because we have not proven the existence of anything less basic than truth. Even if we grant that the Christian God exists, He does not exist necessarily. We could easily imagine any number of other Gods who are “truth” in their worlds. Only the “truth” is necessary. No deity is or will ever be capable of being necessary according to modal logic.
I think that is an excessively restrictive view of any logic.
How so?
---- It uses the conclusion that necessary existence exists in order postulate that G -> G (from G -> G, the 4-Axiom).—
But I still don’t see how the proof is required. I mean, if Supreme Being equates with necessary existence, then it seems like we’re already done once we’ve shown that NE is true. We already seem to have a G.
I’m also not quite sure what is meant by “necessary existence exists.” Shouldn’t that just be “necessary existence.”? Doesn’t “NE exists” add an unnecessary wrinkle to the description, sinc NE is already a statement about existence? After all, NE is not contingent on anything: it’s just a way of saying that comething exists WITHOUT any contingency to the proposition. Or am I mistaken?
Again, what is the problem with taking this conclusions as pantheistic, or atheistic? Why is NE, or Supreme Being, god? That is, what is objectionable to you about it NOT being what one means by a “God?”
(1) I don’t know what the Pope’s concept of God is.
(2) Well, we’ve been round and round this maypole. The claim that God is necessary existence holds ONLY if He is PROVED to be necessary existence. You can’t just define things into existence. Not until step 9 of the Tisthammer and Suber versions (and always the penultimate step in any version), is it proved that God is in fact necessary existence. You can’t make pigs fly by defining “fly” to mean “wallow in mud”.
Let me ask you, seriously and honestly, do you believe that if the proof suffered from such a fundamental flaw as you seem to suspect, that it would escape the attention of professional materialist philosophers and logicians, like Suber, since the 1940s? If you do, then you should publish your findings so that you can be the first to announce the news. If you don’t, then why not pay close attention so that this particular point won’t have to be revisited? Again.
Please at least understand that <>G (= ~~G), and as the materialist Suber explains, is a restatement of Anselm’s postulate that “perfection is not impossible”. It’s opposite is ~<>G, or “perfection is impossible”. It’s opposite is not <>~G. When either <>G or <>~G is stated, the other is implied since they are an OR relation. But <>G works in the disjunctive syllogism in step 9, while <>~G does not.
DJ wrote:
Had you quoted the entire sentence rather than just a dependent clause, it would be clear that I mean that every philosopher agrees. Link to one who doesn’t, and we can discuss it.
To quote Tisthammer:
I don’t think (and no other philosopher that I know of thinks) that this definition of God is disingenous or misleading.
And to quote Suber:
But an assertion is not a proof.