Nightime wrote:
Again, there seems to be confusion about whether defining God as necessary existence means that He is in fact necessary existence. Merely saying it doesn’t make it so. If you define a triangle as equilateral, then you must show that its angles are equal or else your definition is of something without equal angles.
Apos wrote:
No. You’re done once you show that SB is true. You can’t just say SB=NE, so voila! Watch what can happen when you do:
Let F = “fly”
Let W = “wallow in mud”
Let P = “pigs”
Let F = W
P -> W
W -> F
Therefore,
P -> F
No, I think you’re right. The way I said it was sloppy. The correct way to say it is that necessary existence is true.
I’ve said repeatedly that a pantheistic interpretation of the argument is reasonable.
How about an atheistic interpretation, given that this proof could be put forward even if God did not exist?
That question reads like an Escher painting. 
How could a proof that God exists be put forward if God does not exist?
The conception of a necessary being would be necessary if, Godlessly, atoms somehow became able to think.
But that’s merely pantheistic, not atheistic. Such pantheism dates back as far as Lucretius.
Not only do I not believe that, earlier in the thread, after voicing my objections, I linked to several professional philosophers and logicians who had come up with exactly the same objections to the proof. You know as well as I do that many professional logicians find the ontological proofs of God to share a family of fatal flaws. Let me know if you need me to repost those links.
I’m no more claiming groundbreaking thought on this issue than you are. I can’t speak for anyone else, but I hardly think they believe they’re revolutionizing philosophy here.
Daniel
When I said it was disingenuous, I meant that it was disingenuous to call what it proves “God.” When I said that it was uninteresting, I may have overstepped: it’s interesting, but also a little bit obvious.
What I’m seeing in looking at ontological arguments is the conflation of multiple definitions of God, spurious claims that the definitions necessarily lead to one another, and false inferences about the necessity of such an entity’s existence based on other, defined characteristics of the entities. These turned out to be, once I started reading up on ontological arguments, precisely the objections that professional philosophers had raised against them.
Daniel
OK, the conception of a necessary being would be necessary if, Godlessly, atoms somehow became able to think and God were not the atoms themselves.
In other words, given materialism as espoused by most materialists is true, the proof would still inevitably appear somewhere in human history.
from YOUR LINK:
which is essentially my objection.
Anyway, why do “Great Philosophers” have to agree with us? According to that view, we are either rehashing old material, or dont have the proper authority to do so, no in between. As I have said before, this is Great debates.
The post you’re responding to with that was not addressed to you.
If God is not the atoms themselves, then the interpretation is panentheistic, not pantheistic. Both are popular interpretations.
Well, you quoted the objection, but not the response! How do you respond to the response? “All else held constant, beauty that exists is greater than beauty that does not exist. Similarly, an existing God is greater than a non-existing God.”
I put it to you that given atheistic materialism were true, this proof would still emerge.
Nightime, modal logic holds no special power over truth than any other logic, and I see no proof that the only thing that is necessarily the case is modal logic and truth itself. Frankly, I’d be more willing to admit that God exists in actuality because of this proof than think that all these symbols only talk about themselves… or don’t talk at all.
Why is the only thing that has to be true modal logic?
Contradiction with what?
I would respond that things that exist are bounded by existence, while things that don’t are not. Aphrodite is bounded not by the limits of biology or sculpture, but by the imagination. Similarly, an entity that does not exist can be more powerful than one that does, because it isn’t bounded by things like the inability to make nonsquare squares.
Is there any practical difference between an entitiy which exists out of our reality and one that does not exist?
If “greatness” refers to the number of possibilities something exists in, then just because something exists in reality doesn’t mean that it’s greater than something that doesn’t exist in reality.
What the heck are you talking about? If you’re referring to existence in probablity, then yes, something that’s not possible is greater than something that’s impossible if we use your terminology. So what? Why should we care about the greatness of anything?
I would say that there’s no difference. Being part of our reality is what existence means.
Lib presumably feels otherwise, but I can’t tell because he’s still never answered the question I asked him so many months ago: what do you mean by ‘existence’?
The thing that I’ve got.
How’s that?
I don’t suspect that the proof suffers from a flaw at all. I am accepting by your word, or philosophical proof, or by whatever logic you feel is sound, that God means “necessary existence”. Is it OK that I have agreed with that premise? Can I now pose a question with that as a given?
Agree or disagree, a priori:
Given that God=necessary existence, it is possible that God does not exist.
And with a different given:
Using the Pope’s concept of God (i.e., created the first man from dust and the first woman from the man’s rib, dubbed them Adam and Eve, and put them in the Garden of Eden, only to cast them out after a snake tricked Eve into eating an apple, etc., etc.), it is possible that God does not exist.