G here does not imply awareness. Greatness is relative. G, while proven, could be a non-aware quantum fluctuation (or some other undiscovered process).
This proof does NOTHING to answer the age old question - Is there an aware creator of everything?
If someone could exclude NE being a mere zero sum quantum fluctuation, then we can talk about G being a “God”. As it stands, the proof does not, and to call G God is intentional, as most speakers will assume you are talking about something that is aware. And who says being aware is any greater than not being aware?
Let’s assume the SB was the Christian God…i know that it isnt but for the moment assume it is. All other things being equal, a God that doesn’t exist in worlds with maximal suffering, injustice, and evil is greater than a God that does.
I would also put forward the idea that a “greatest being” is impossible. What is greater than God? 2 Gods. If there are infinite possibilities, then no one thing can be the greatest.
Either way. I’m still having trouble with the definition of god used here. Does it mean NE or “greatest being possible”? Does or does not the positive descriptor “great” get included in the modern form of the argument?
It seems like at the beginning of the proof G=NE, and after proven, G= greatest aware being possible. Can you have it both ways?
This is where I’m confused. Lib stated that ‘a priori’, which I assumed was somewhat equivilent with ‘the beginning of the proof’, it was possible that God didn’t exist. I don’t see how that would be possible a priori, if a priori G=NE.
Another thing, if a God necessarily exists, then doesn’t that rule out an omnipotent being? If it must exist, it cannot choose not to exist, and therefore does not have free will to do anything it pleases.
I think that’s the matter of interpretation in question.
What could ever let us accept as a hypothesis G->[]G? What could ever have that property? What “reading” of the terms do you find makes the most sense? None of them? Is G->G an assumption that never makes sense? Vorlon seemed to think it could a few days and maybe a different thread ago, he said something like “whatever way things are, that’s how they have to be.”
Does this proof tell whether G=A or G=B? No (or so it seems). Therefore this proof reveals nothing to us in a theological sense. There is no justification for using the term “God” given that tends to imply awareness.
Take it easy, Aide, that was just a flippant remark on my part since I’m finding all these demands for definitions are obscuring my view a little.
Within the course of this thread, I’ve gone from seeing the modal argument for the ontological proof of God as utter tripe to giving it grudging respect.
Here’s where I think we are now:
We all seem to agree that Necessary Existence is true.
Most of us have deep reservations about the positing of a “being” with this property. Some of us even go as far as saying such perfection is impossible (the substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition).
There seems no reason why this proof should not have popped up even if God didn’t exist, since the conception of a being with necessary existence is an obvious step to make for a bunch of thinking atoms if the universe exists but God doesn’t.
I don’t agree that Necessary Existence is true. I’m not even sure what you mean by ‘true’ in that statement. If ‘true’ involves being present in this reality, I have yet to see proof or even reasonable evidence that this is the case.
Lib’s “everybody” gets smaller and smaller the more I look. From this page:
I can’t see how these issues with the definition can be dismissed out of hand (regardless of ones respect for past philosophers) and still be considered honest debate.
"An a priori argument may be justified by definition, however because the definition is subject to individual beliefs that may also affect the end argument, it is not successful in this case. "
Can there be only one thing that = NE? Is it possible that multiple things have the quality of NE? What if NE is present in two contradictory statements? For example:
Awareness is necessary for existence.
Existence is necessary for awareness.
Yeah, I know. But when someone raises an objection to your argument, and you sarcastically suggest that maybe they should publish their results because in the past sixty years nobody has raised that objection before, and earlier in the same thread I linked to a site that raised that objection, it’s a little bit frustrating.
You’ve chided me in this thread for not reading your cites; I figure it’s copacetic for me to return the favor.
Modal logic seems to have some merit in establishing a shortcut method of analysis of possibilities. There may be a distinction between something that is possible but does not exist, and something that is impossible.
Now, that doesnt mean I agree with all of the axioms of modal logic, for instance, “higher order” expressions such as X->X. Since necessity applies to a set of possible worlds, statements such as X would seem to have no meaning outside the context of possible worlds.
Now, depending on how you define higher-order modal logic X->X could be a well-founded axiom, but not its sibling <>X-><>X. After all, if higher-order modal logic refers to a subset of possible worlds, which is the only way it would make sense, then we could be excluding the ONLY world in which X was possible…it would be impossible in the remaining subset!
No kidding. The sarcasm and quickness to disregard/ignore ANY conversation concerning the definition of G is quite telling (in regards to the strength of the position in question). I’ve found many websites taking issue with the way G is defined in ontological proofs. I’ve linked to some and so has DanielWithrow, so now perhaps we can entertain these problems with the definition without the sarcasm and condescending remarks? A kid can dream anyway . . .
I have a new hypothesis and that hypothesis is that Libertarian is full of…um…it. I offer this as proof:
Lib has sidestepped this question:
**Agree or disagree, post priori:
It is possible that there is not a scientific explanation for the creation of the universe.**
The reason he has sidestepped it, according to my hypothesis, is because the same proof that proves God’s existence in actuality would prove the existence of a scientific explanation for creation of the universe in actuality, because ‘explanation for creation of the universe’ = necessary existence, whether the explanation turns out to be a sentient God or a non-sentient chemical reaction. You can’t have God and a scientific explanation for God’s alleged role actually existing in the same room without acknowledging that the two are one in the same, and by extension admitting that the word ‘God’ in the actual existence proof is misleading.
Lib’s claim that I seem to believe that the proof equating God with necessary existence suffers from a fundamental flaw is nothing but a strawman to make it appear that I have brazenly dismissed logical conclusions that are accepted by respected philosophers. The flaw, IMO, is not equating God with necessary existence. The flaw is attempting to attach any attributes to God other than what has been proven once you’ve carried the proof over as a premise to prove God’s actual existence.
So there are two possibilities. Either Lib is attempting to attach attributes to God other than what has been proven, or the word ‘God’ in the actual existence proof is misleading. Either option demonstrates intellectual dishonesty.
I submit my hypothesis to the GD community for testing and will recant if it does not hold up to scrutiny.