I’m afraid I have to agree, zwaldd. I came to a similar conclusion during my first exchange with Lib when I originally came to the Straight Dope.
Strangely, although I’m absolutely convinced he’s nothing more than a very sophisticated troll, I can’t seem to resist trying to rebutt him. [sigh]
The justification for A is the ontological argument, minus the ontological implication. What is the justification for B?
Moderator’s Note: The Vorlon Ambassador’s Aide, if you really suspected another poster of “trolling”, then saying so publicly in the middle of the thread is not the right thing to do.
Exactly how does the ontological argument justify an aware creator, as opposed to a non-aware process? I think that’s what a number of people have been trying to pin down for at least the last couple of pages.
Ah, but that’s the core of the problem. Is Libertarian simply unable to see the gaping holes in the arguments he puts forward again and again? Is he genuinely trying to benevolently share his “enlightenment” with us? Or is he just seeking attention?
Is being misguided really any better than being attention-seeking?
“Trolling” is against the rules. If being misguided or wrong in one’s views were against the rules, there wouldn’t be very many posters left, now would there? Probably just me, in fact.
To err is human. Persisting in error is regrettable, but occasionally expected. Being utterly bloody-minded has no excuses.
Well, as long as we’re in GD you can argue with me about religion and politics and so forth until hell freezes over, but you really can’t argue with what I say as a Moderator. So, let’s get back to the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God.
So noted.
I submit that, although the concept of possibility exists, possibilities themselves cannot be said to exist in any meaningful way.
We can consider universes in which necessary existence exists, and we can consider universes in which it does not. Without a reason to presume that necessary existence must actually exists, there is no reason to discard the possibilities that it may possibly exist or cannot exist at all.
The Ontological Proof is valid given its premises, but its interpretation is rather tricky. I think that Libertarian has made an error in translating from modal logic to English.
We created the model, but we’ve forgotten that when we talk about the model, we’re creating another model. Talking about the talking, we create yet another. It’s one thing to put a mirror up to reality, but what happens when we put a mirror to a mirror…?
The real question:
Do we necessarily exist?
Relative to what?
Thank you. It’s like brick walls sometimes.
Eris, in answer to your statement:
The justification for A is the ontological argument.
Please tell me what part of the proof proves an aware entity? I have yet to see the word aware used in the definition of G. Did I miss something? Mebuckner has asked the querstion so perhaps it is worthy of discussion now?
DaLovin’ Dj
eris:
We are using terms such as “necessarily” with their modal logic meanings. When I say that truth exists necessarily, I say that because of the modal logic definitions of “truth” and “possible worlds.” No God less basic than truth can exist necessarily, because of the definition of possible worlds. A possible world is a set of consistent statements with at least one true statement. If you believe there are more, complex things which can exist in every set of consistent statements, then tell us what they are. Even if there is something else, I strongly suspect it will be as basic as truth, rather than something like “omniscient creator.”
Even Libertarian has not tried to argue with this. However, he has stated that God exists in a metaworld, and that only aspects which are possible in a given world need exist there. I do not accept this, because a metaworld does not work with this proof. Why? Because there is only ONE metaworld of all possible worlds. Thus, when you are dealing with the metaworld, it does not make sense to use the modal logic term “possible.” Possibility only makes sense in regard to possible worlds, not the one metaworld. Thus the metaworld God is very much unproven.
Ludovic:
I agree with this objection. Modal logic’s “necessary existence” does not make something greater. Does it really make sense to say that being true in every consistent set of statements makes something greater? I don’t think so. All it does is redefine whatever you were talking about, making it something basic like truth.
—You can’t just say SB=NE, so voila! Watch what can happen when you do:—
But you’ve just been saying over and over that these terms are completely interchangeable, intermixable, that they translate into each other. And I agree. There is necessary existence, and hence a supreme being.
Your pigs wallow argument has no place here, because at no point is any equivocation of terms going on: no one is unclear about what information is being conveyed. Anyone should be able to agree that NE is precisely what the modal interpretation of Supreme Being is.
Perhaps I’m not clear on what the pervious argument proved. Did it not prove that there is necessary existence?
Well, look, I’m an atheist. But as for a priori proofs of this nature go, the deists are winning with one attempt. I’d be interested in hearing any others.
Hell, longer than we’ve been here! 
Nightime
Well I’m not arguing against that.
Well, are we talking about how humans use logic to analyze propositions or are we talking about a game with symbols and rules for their manipulation? If the former, then proofs can say a bit more than what you seem to be saying they can. If the latter, well, I respectfully disagree.
Well, either you exist in a world that is more complete than modal logic says it can be, or you are inside of a modal logic proof, or you exist outside of modal logic but can use it to describe relationships between concepts. Which do you feel is more appropriate?
In the case in question, none of it. The ontological argument without the ontological implication is the motivation for mapping the definition of God to
G->G
Nothing is proved by that step.
Then the word “aware” needs to be in the definition. Otherwise, there is no more justification for A then B. The deists haven’t told us whether awareness=NE, and therefore the proof has nothing to do with the age old question:
Is there a god?
Definition, like it or not, is where this falls apart. The argument as posted never posits an aware being at the top creating everything. The variable name is “God” (or “X” or “G” or “IPU”), but to then as a result say that there is an actual object that has the property of being “God” - an object with known traits and descriptors - is to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent. G and God as in aware creator are separate things here.
These two things are not the same. When we make “God” a simple object, then we haven’t proved any qualities that such a thing may have such as “aware” or “zero sum quantum fluctuation”. Since we have no way of knowing which is which the question this pretends to answer isn’t really answered at all. The ontological argument does not mention awareness. It doesn’t a quantum origin either. It is, in this sense, uninteresting theologically.
When Lib says this it raises some interesting questions:
Also outside the scope is whether God is an aware entity that creates everything or a blind-watchmaker process that creates everything. Also outside of the scope is whether or not you can call God a “he”. Lib’s bias betrays him. “He” is a property that “NE” does not necessarily have. Neither is awareness. He may blow it off as what he is “accustomed” to calling God, but that misses the point. The word “He” and “aware” have no place in this debate. It does the whole thing a disservice to imply that they are. Therefore, we are not talking about G as the god of anything or anyone. It’s not a god at all.
DaLovin’ Dj
“If all bachelors are men and I am a bachelor then I am a man” is also outside the scope of the logic which is employed in such syllogistic reasoning. Of course a logical symbol does not contain or prove anything other than what it contains or proves. But we use logic in ways that the rules for symbol manipulation don’t tell and cannot tell.
Question: Would you consider this definition of God-as-Supreme-Being as more or less appropriate?: and aware creator etc with etc.
Answer: yes, I rather think I do.
Q: Do you suspect that such a thing is actually possible? That is, that there is some sort of reality we could descirbe that would contain this being?
Answer: Seems to be so, yes.
[Proof follows showing the relationship between possibility and necessity with respect to a being that we’ve defined.]
Does this proof allow itself to be used for other things? Of course! It applies to anything that satisfies the conditions layed out of G->G and <>G. That’s why I asked you if you felt anything could satisfy those criteria. Modal logic gives us no method of choosing between all the various interpretations, so saying “It can’t be talking about your definition because it could be talking about this other one” is silly. Once a proof in logic is used it isn’t patented or copyrighted. It is used again and again in similar situations. It proves them all, according to itself. They are inclusive criteria, whatever satisfies them is under consideration. Perhaps there is both a sentient creator and a non-sentient creator in all worlds, where one creates through the other. Is that an interpretation you can imagine if your “B” makes sense?
So we might say, “That definition is inconsistent” by using it to derive a contradiction. It is useless to say the proof applies to other things and so can’t be right. They all do. They apply to whatever they apply to, whatever we apply them to.
And perhaps there is just one, the problem is this proof doesn’t tell us which it is, it merely labels NE whatever it wants. I can call it IPU or CarrotTop or Supreme Being, but ONLY IF we define the variable as necessary existence. Once we assign the thing properties (awareness, mindless process) we have to add another axiom. So:
If you accept a priori that awareness is necessary, then you prove awareness is actual, fair enough. I submit that awareness may not be necessary at all, so such is not a reasonable thing to take as a given.
DaLovin’ Dj
But that assumes that both are necessary a priori. How can you make that assumption? If a sentient creator is necessary, then a non-sentient creator is not and vice versa. You can’t prove one without first negating the validity of the second. And combining the results at the end to presume an interaction between two different creators with the same role has no logical basis.