We knew *something *was up, certainly. But I suspect most military experts thought it would be an attack on the Philippines, if anywhere. However, given the strength of the America first movement, and the large numbers of Americans who wanted us out of the Philippines, I am not sure a attack there would make us declare war. And even if it did, it wouldn’t be the kind of massive support that the Sneak Attack on Pearl did.
Not a pilot, but dad was so I know the lingo. Funniest link I’ve seen lately!
The Blitz showed how a nation kicked in the nuts responds. Pearl Harbor was a kick to the shin. The US woke up. Nothing else and a bad idea.
Screw the Philippines. While I supported making it a state, Wife said, “Your friend’s father was pissed off when his prize hog messed with him so he killed him with a single punch. Do you really want these people voting?”
I dunno. I’ve known people from around other parts who would do that to a mouthy cow, but her growing up on Chi’s South Side left her with a limited sense of “badass.”
Actually the “14 part message” was more of a ultimatum, not a actual declaration of war.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/p3.asp
There’s a serious problem with jumping the IJN before December 7th:
-It essentially means that the United States is going to face a confused series of events starting the war instead of the historical Japanese attack.
A US Naval attack on the IJN pre-Pearl Harbor could achieve surprise and victory, at the grave risk of having the United States enter the war with a weak casus belli and possibly without the will to see WWII to the end. It could also mean a decisive naval defeat and a massive political scandal against FDR.
There is no choice. The US Carriers must wait for the IJN to attack before making their own attack.
The Political side of this is interesting.
A scenario where FDR, quite possibly with Churchill’s pleading, makes some kind of political move to de-escalate the Embargo, still leads Japan in a rough spot. They need Oil, they’ll buy it, but China isn’t getting fixed and the time limit they have is going broke, not running out of oil. Atrocities committed against the Chinese are pretty damning–there is no real prospect for a victorious peace, and Japan has now been screwing around in the heartland of China for years. The best that could be reasonably accomplished is more unreliable puppet leaders. More than likely, Japan simply remains in a military boondoggle until they go broke.
Delayed US war entry against Germany is an interesting question.
The United States is, by 1941, no longer strictly neutral. In practice, the United States is a non-belligerent that has bent laws to support the Allies. FDR will be looking for a Casus Belli, and Hitler isn’t exactly skilled in avoiding wars. Now, it is to Hitler’s great advantage that the United States takes no role in a 1942 offensive against Germany, although I’m unsure if FDR would eventually opt to simply seek a declaration of war and accept the problem of a weak Casus Belli and a divided United States if it meant stopping Hitler. For political reasons, it might be right after the 1942 midterm elections, so that FDR doesn’t get skewered by Isolationists in the midterms.
Of course, Germany may make this all the easier for the USA to be involved in WWII earlier.
War is always a gamble. In WWII, it is clearly the Axis Power’s gamble and the house is going to come up Allies in nearly any outcome. How it plays out, however, is going to be a wild series of events.
Are there any ground-based aircraft in Hawaii at the time that could possibly make a difference?
Devestators were no better than their IJN equals. Japan lacked RADAR, so advantage US.
RADAR’s no good if you don’t turn it on.
If the US were aware of an impending attack, I’m sure they would have manned the radar station 24/7.
USAAC
Hickam Air Base
[ul][li]33 Douglas B-18 Bolo 2-engine standard bomber, 1936[/li][li]12 Boeing B-17D Flying Fortress 4-engine heavy bomber, 1939[/li][li]13 Douglas A-20A Havoc 2-engine attack/light bomber, 1940[/li][li]2 Douglas C-33 (DC-2) 2-engine freighter[/ul][/li]Wheeler Air Base
[ul][li]6 Boeing P-26A Peashooter open cockpit pursuit, 1934[/li][li]6 Boeing P-26B Peashooter open cockpit pursuit, 1935[/li][li]39 Curtiss P-36A Mohawk pursuit, 1937[/li][li]87 Curtiss P-40B Tomahawk pursuit, 1940[/li][li]11 Curtiss P-40C Kittyhawk pursuit, 1941[/li][li]3 Martin B-12 2-engine medium bomber, 1934[/li][li]3 Grumman OAF-9 Goose observation amphibian[/li][li]2 Douglas BT-2 biplane basic trainer[/li][li]2 North American AT-6 Texan advanced trainer[/li][li]1 Seversky AT-12A Guardsman, advance trainer [/ul][/li]Bellows Air Field
[ul][li]6 North American O-47B observation plane[/li][li]2 Stinson O-49 Vigilant L-1 observation plane [/li][li]Two P-40s on training at Bellows attempted to take off and were shot down before gaining altitude. Other pilots were killed on the ground.[/ul][/li]Haleiwa Air Field
[ul][li]2 Curtiss P-36 Mohawk pursuit[/li][li]8 Curtiss P-40 Kittyhawk pursuit [/ul][/li]USMC
Ewa Marine Corp Air Station
[ul][li]11 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighter[/li][li]8 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicator scout/bomber[/li][li]20 Douglas SBD-1 Dauntless scout/dive-bomber, 1940[/li][li]3 Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless scout/dive-bomber, 1941[/li][li]2 Grumman J2F-4 Duck utility floatplane, amphibian[/li][li]1 Lockheed JO-2 Electra Junior, six seat transport[/li][li]1 Sikorsky JRS-1 Twin-engine, 18 passage flying boat[/li][li]2 Douglas R3D-2 (DC-5) 2-engine paratroop transport[/li][li]1 North American SNJ-3 Texan advanced trainer [/ul][/li]Midway NAS
[ul][li]18 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicator scout/bomber [/ul][/li]Wake NAS
[ul][li]12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighter, just delivered by Enterprise.[/ul][/li]USN
Naval Base Defense Air Force
Pearl Harbor (Ford Island) Naval Air Station
[ul][li]19 Grumman J2F Duck single engine utility amphibian[/li][li]9 Sikorsky JRS 18 passenger amphibian flying boat[/li][li]2 Consolidated PBY-1 Catalina patrol bomber, flying boat, 1936 [/ul][/li]Puunene (Lahaina Roads) NAS
[ul][li]4 Beech JRB 2-engine utility[/li][li]4 Northrop BT-1 torpedo bomber (or Douglas basic) trainer[/li][li]1 Grumman JRF Goose, 2-engine amphibian[/li][li]1 Grumman J2F Duck, utility floatplane, amphibian[/ul] [/li]Kaneohe NAS
[ul][li] 1 Vought OS2U Kingfisher amphibian[/li][li]36 Consolidated PBY-5 Catalina patrol bomber, flying boat, amphibian, 1939 * [/ul][/li]Pearl Harbor (Ford Island) NAS
[ul][li]15 Consolidated PBY-3 Catalina scout bomber, flying boat, 1937[/li][li]18 Consolidated PBY-5 Catalina scout bomber, flying boat, amphibian, 1939 *[/li][li] * The apparently large number of Catalina were not available for scouting. Two squadrons had arrived 23 Nov 41 for training while in transit to outlying islands and new crews were being trained by the few experienced crews.[/ul][/li]USN Air Battle Force
Pearl Harbor (Ford Island) NAS
(spares, repairs, replacement, and training)
[ul][li]8 Brewster F2A-3 Buffalo fighter, 1939[/li][li]5 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighter, 1940[/li][li]5 Grumman F4F-3A Wildcat fighter, 1941[/li][li]3 Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless scout/dive-bomber, 1941[/li][li]SBD scout bombers from Enterprise arrived during the attack. They had flown ahead of the returning task force that had just reinforced Wake Island. About five were lost to Japanese or ground fire and an equal number damaged.[/ul][/li]
So it looks like there were 200 fighter aircraft (USAAC ‘Pursuit’, and USN starting with ‘F’) when you count up all three branches. The Japanese had 108 A6M Zeros, plus the Kate torpedo bombers and the Val dive bombers. The link says that there were 387 attacking planes. U.S. fighters were more than capable of taking out the bombers, but they had to get through the Zeros first. The P-40 was formidable, but pilots required different tactics from what they were used to to beat the nimble Zeros. (The P-40 was used to good advantage by the American Volunteer Group in China before the Pearl Harbor attack.) The Brewster Buffalo was really outclassed. Nevertheless, they did have some successes with the Australians or English (I don’t remember which) fighting in Papua New Guinea. I don’t know anything about the P-36, but it was being supplanted. the P-26s were very obsolete.
I think that for defence, we may have had a fighting chance if we had enough warning of the coming attack.
As far as going out and attacking the Japanese before the attack? I don’t know. There were certainly enough fighters and bombers available for an attack, but I don’t know whether they had the range to get to the Japanese carriers before the Japanese aircraft launched.
The P36 was pretty much a prototype for the P40. Not a bad plane, but only two Mgs for guns.
They did shoot down two IJN Zeros.
Um, okay then, certainly not gonna argue that one.
I dunno, I can imagine a not insignificant amount of the population saying they tried, we smoked 'em, we’re done.
It would certainly be less motivating.
That may be true if Pearl Harbor was the extent of Japanese aggression.
But of course, it was not - it was just a small part of their overall plan to seize an empire in SE Asia.
It is hard to see the US deciding to just sit it out after the Japanese make a (failed!) attack on their navy at Pearl Harbor, and just watch as the Japanese helped themselves to the Philippines (including massacring large US forces that happened to be there).
Isn’t it more likely that the US navy would sail out of Pearl with a vengeance to defend against this?
If you somehow learn the details of the plans, with enough confidence that you trust them, the best course of action is to allow them to purchase oil for six months, with hints of accepting their other conditions while you continue negotiations. Not an easy sale, and perhaps impossible, but if it worked that would make the war so much easier to fight.
Then you continue the preparations for war. Then they are completely SOL. This is why it would be a hard sell to convince them to take it. However, there were may have been enough of the leaders, including the Emperor, who were hesitant about the war that it may have been possible.
If that failed, you prepare to surprise the hell out of them. The battleships and cruisers would go to the south, out of harms way, make as many of the aircraft on Hawaii serviceable as possible, all AA stations armed and manned and the radar on and looking.
The biggest difference would be the Philippines. If good ol’ Doug has a week or so to get prepared then hopefully he wouldn’t fail in the attack like he did. Perhaps his staff will remember to send rice down to Bataan to keep the troops supplied and they wouldn’t have had to capitulate.
A week’s notice isn’t much, but it could have prevented the US military from going into a panic, and perhaps they could have figured ways to have saved the boys in Bataan. If the US prevented Japan from completely taking over PI, then it’s a game changer for the war.
I don’t see how the USA could have held the Philippines with a week’s prep, or even a month. Allied positions there simply weren’t truly defensible (and of course were scarcely more defensible when the Japanese were trying to defend them.)
The Japanese offensive was always going to be generally successful, whatever the details. Pearl Harbor could have been stopped, but that’s a detail; the SW Pacific was going to fall no matter what. The preparation you’d need would be YEARS of alternate history, not weeks.
And the US was always going to win the war against Japan eventually if it got into one. Yeah, the only useful hypotheticals here, other than how USN strategy would have evolved if the battleships had been available all along, is how the US could have been kept out of the war.
USN strategy would have just lost the BBs at Coral Sea, where they could not be salvaged, as opposed to having them sunk in shallow Pearl Harbor, where they were easily accessible.
The original Plan Orange called for the Army to withdraw down the Bataan Peninsula and wait six months for reinforcements to arrive. From the late spring / summer (?) of 1941 they started to reinforce and look at being able to defend all of PI, but obviously weren’t ready. The military was also starting to build up fortifications on the other islands.
The preparations were scheduled to be in place by spring of 1942, probably anticipating that since they couldn’t get ready sooner, then the Japanese wouldn’t want to surprise them or anything like that at all.
Historically, after withdrawing to Bataan, the US and Filipino forces held out for three months, and basically was forced to surrender because of a lack of food.
After getting caught completely off guard; then the sudden shock of the realization that they had grossly underestimated their opponent, combined with some sheer incompetence of some leaders resulted in a defeatist attitude in the spring of ‘42.
I completely agree that the entire Philippine archipelago could not have been held, even with a couple of months notice. However, given that the decision to revert back to Plan Orange was made in mid December, under duress and with the shock of the defeat at Pearl Harbor, etc., there simply wasn’t sufficient time for detailed planning.
One more of the major problems with alt-hist is the underlying assumption that people at the beginning of the war could magically obtain the necessary experience which was painfully developed through the war — in addition to the Monday morning quarterbacking, e.g. “Everyone knows you should have passed n that situation.”
I’ll try to avoid the alt-hist traps, but I believe that given even a week or two with the details of the Japanese plans, the severity of the Pearl Harbor attack could have been avoided. Certainly the defenders could have shot down many, many more of the attacking planes, especially the bombers.
Because of the top leadership panicking, PI was written off and supply ships already in route there were recalled to reinforce Hawaii. Were the detailed plans known, the American side would have had more time to start the planning and I believe that it may have been possible that there would have been less panic.
With additional food and supplies, Bataan could have held out for longer than the three months it actually did. The question would be is if the advanced notice would have given MacArthur and his staff enough time as well as the space to plan better.
I don’t believe it would have taken years for preparations to prevent the Japanese from conquering SE Asia and the Pacific Islands. The entire war with the US and Japan only lasted a little more than 3 1/2 years.
They didn’t have to have perfect defenses. The Allies just needed more air power. In an after war report (which was designed to compete for declining funding), the USAAF claimed that 1,000 fighters in five mutually protective bases would have prevented the war.
The Japanese were not good at amphibious landings and would not have done well against better defended ones if they didn’t have air superiority.