A recent thread about US fraternities got me checking out wikipedia articles about my Fraternity. In the entry about one of our founders, it says this: "He retired in 1870, was cashiered 3 years later, reinstated in 1877, and restored in 1877 “to be borne as never having been legally separated from the army (decision of the Supreme Court, May 27, 1887).”
I’m interested in the details of this case, and why the SCOTUS had to get involved.
I’d appreciate any input from law dopers or history dopers.
It seems that there was an issue with retirement money, an issue with a court-martial, and an issue with who was authorized to make certain determinations. Beyond that, I’m going to have to ask for a legalese-to-English translation. [I’m not interested in the monetary aspect (a founding father’s reputation seems to be on the line here.)]
From 1867 to 1870, Runkle was serving as an active duty Army major as a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands for the State of Kentucky. In 1870, he was “placed on the retired list” as a major, but continued as a disbursing officer, until he was arrested, apparently for some sort of financial irregularities. What these irregularities were are unspecified in the Supreme Court opinion, it appears that they involved the actions of Runkle’s subagents, and “it is nowhere affirmatively established that he (Major Runkle) actually appropriated any money to his own use.” My reading between the lines is that his subordinates were pulling some funny stuff, and he signed off on the accounts without catching errors he should have.
At his court martial, Runkle was found guilty of violating the Act of Congress approved March 2, 1863, c. 67, § 1 (whatever that is) and conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. He was sentenced to imprisonment, fine, and dismissal from the army (which he was then serving on the retired list, and drawing retired pay).
Under the law at that time, any court martial sentence which involved an officer’s dismissal in a time of peace had to be confirmed by the President. The Secretary of War reviewed the proceedings and issued an 1873 order approving Runkle’s conviction, but in consideration of his war service and wounds, granting executive clemency in the name of the President by eliminating the fine and prison term. The portion of his conviction dismissing him from the army, however, remained in effect. Nowhere in this order, however, was there any indication that this conviction was actually confirmed by the President himself.
Shortly after this order, Runkle petitioned President Grant, complaining that his dismissal sentence had not been confirmed by the President himself. This petition, after being sent for review by the Judge Advocate General, was decided by President Hayes, Grant’s successor, in 1877. Hayes found that the charges had not been sufficiently proven in the court martial, and revoked the 1873 order dismissing Runkle.
On the authority of the Hayes order, Runkle was given retirement pay both from the date of the Hayes order going forward and back pay to when he was dismissed. In 1882, he made a claim for additional “longetivity pay”, which claim was referred to the Court of Claims. In the Court of Claims, however, the government challenged his right to any pay at all, asserting that Hayes did not have any right to revoke the 1873 order confirming Runkle’s dismissal.
With that background, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the 1873 order of the Secretary of War was effective to confirm the court martial sentence. The Court found that, although the President had the power to delegate many functions to cabinet officers, the statute here thave the President a non-delegable duty to personally consider and confirm Runkle’s sentence. The Corut found that there was no evidence that the President actually reviewed or confirmed Runlke’s sentence in 1873, so the 1873 order was ineffective and “Major Runkle was never legally cashiered or dismissed from the army.” As such, he was entitled to all the pay and benefits of a retired officer as though he had never been dismissed.