Why should I respect the law if I know I can get away with breaking it? I know I really enjoy beating up old people and if I think I will not be caught why should I not do it?
My 2 cents.
What we call morals are rules that allowed mankind to live together as social animals. If you did something “immoral” like kill a member of the clan, steal somebody’s wife, say “fuck you” to the clan’s god, etc. you were more than likely to get your ass booted from the clan and face a high probability of starvation and death. In that sense, morals are really no more than the rules of the pack, just like wolves have.
Much like the fact that our bodies are programed to store fat to prepare us for the lean times, these mores or instincts or whatever you want to call them don’t always make sense in the modern world. On one hand, we still live together in society, so some moral rules like “don’t kill” continue to make sense. Consequently we have made them laws, and it’s from that they derive their consequences. On the other hand, we don’t believe that our clans continued vitality is predicated on pleasing the ancestor gods, so those type of “morals” have become largely meaningless in terms of consequences, as Rand alluded to. But, if you go back to looking at the phenomena in the context it developed in, it certainly HAD consequences.
Rand ROver, I have twice linked you to lengthy discussions of the history of moral objectivism. Did you ever look at them?
Here’s my basis for adopting moral objectivism:
I have preferences and desires. Pretty much by the definition of the terms “preferences,” “desires,” and “should,” these preferences and desires are things I believe should happen.
I also have an objective belief about the universe, namely, that my preferences and desires aren’t the only ones out there.
I have another objective belief about the universe, namely, that there’s nothing particularly special about my preferences and desires.
Therefore, the preferences and desires existing outside of myself are things that I think should happen, prima facie.
Ergo objective morality: the satisfaction of preferences and desires is prima facie good (i.e., should happen), and the thwarting of preferences and desires is prima facie bad (i.e., shouldn’t happen). “Good” and “evil” are just shorthand for these two statements.
Prima Facie is key. Obviously a lot of the time, preferences and desires conflict, and the meat of morality is in weighing with preferences and desires ought to take precedence. But the basis for my objective morality is that it’s better to satisfy a preference or desire than to thwart it, and that’s based off my experience and my objective beliefs about the world.
That’s not just an opinion. If you want to argue intelligently against it, you need either to show that my premises are false or that my conclusion doesn’t follow from my premises. If you say, “so what?” then you’re dodging the question.
Yay, you! You’ve discovered the physicalist critique of ethical norms!
Now consider that law, property, grammar, & custom are also just as unreal by physicalist logic. Mull that over for a couple of years & then tell us what you think.
Perhaps he’ll eventually reason himself out of libertarianism as I did.
Ponder this, Rand Rover: If human dignity and property rights are both social constructs, then why should one be prioritized over the other? If I need to take some of your property to prevent the poor from living in squalor, what is your justification for opposing me?
The fun thing about this is that by doing so, they’re forcing you to alter your cost benefit analysis on top of that, should that analysis include what other people think. If people consider (say) the killing someone is always wrong and needs no further analysis beyond that, you, who consider it worth looking further into, need to take into account that for a lot of people it’s going to make them unhappy, should those opinions be a part of your analysis.
So really I would say you are, effectively, constrained by the moral opinions of others; not by that moral system, but by their belief that that moral system exists.
Rand Rover is not a libertarian, as shown by his support for the deliberate use of force against innocent bystanders, as long as they’re foreigners. He is an anarchist and a sociopath. Please don’t slander our good name in this way.
Except that . . . no, you are wrong. If “the physicalist critique of ethical norms” says that law is just as unreal as “morality,” then I disagree with it, and therefore haven’t “discovered it.”
This post is concerned with designing a system of morality. I don’t care about that. I am saying that if you tell Bob that “action X is immoral,” then you have really told Bob nothing, no matter what ethical system you use to come to the conclusion that action X is immoral.
Unless you have the actual, confirming report of a professional psychologist in your hand, (and possibly not then), you will refrain from calling another poster a “sociopath” in this forum.
[ /Moderating ]
Then, pray tell, from whence does law arise, if not group consensus?
That may be true for the big things or the things which are mostly agreed upon, but how about the small things or things not agreed upon? How about Rand Rover’s SUV example or the morality of adultery?
How do you determine what is good and what is evil?
As I predicted, your post is a big, “so what?” which dodges the question.
If, as I believe, morality is an objective truth about any universe in which desire exists, then you HAVE told Bob something, just as surely as though you’ve told him any other objective truth, such as, “your car is out of gas.”
Bob may be planning on abandoning his car, in which case he won’t care about whether the car is out of gas. Bob may be a sociopath, in which case he won’t care about morality. But in neither case does that mean you’ve told him nothing.
The entire rest of my post explained how you determine what is good and what is evil. Indeed, if you hadn’t snipped just that line, the sentence directly before it is a summary: “Ergo objective morality: the satisfaction of preferences and desires is prima facie good (i.e., should happen), and the thwarting of preferences and desires is prima facie bad (i.e., shouldn’t happen).”
Objective morality boils down to whether or not something is conducive to promoting the health and well-being of society as a whole. The question that haunts us is “which society?” Generally speaking, the ideal is to expand that society as largely as possible. Thus, promoting the welfare of your nation morally trumps promoting the welfare of your family, as promoting the welfare of your family trumps promoting the welfare of yourself alone. But all of humanity is a larger society than the nation, and the set of all beings that can feel is larger than the set of all humanity.
While the decision as to what promotes the well-being differs from person to person and circumstance to circumstance (because of the nebulousness of the “Don’t be a Jerk” rule <please see my previous post above>. Killing, lying, and stealing are all comparatively straightforward), and the hierarchies of numbers vs. level of harm done are arguable, the objective rules are nonetheless quite consistent. Please bear in mind that I am including here only the universal rules, rather than the society-specific things like rites, observances, marital customs, dietary restrictions, etc.
What possible basis can there be for such a claim? This claim is very near to the underpinnings of fascism–and note that this is (I believe) the first time in my ten years on the board that I’ve made such a claim, so I’m not engaging in cheap Godwinization.
It seems to me that desires and preferences only exist on the individual level, and so it is only the individual whose health and well-being need be considered, except inasmuch as we often say the plural of “individual” is “society.”
Morality governs the relations of people within a society; if those sour, the society destabilizes. If, for a not quite realistic example, you have a society comprised of two main groups, and the morals of that society favour one of the groups over the other, to the point of promoting severe inequality (a ruling versus a servile class barely treated as human, for instance), it’s not a great stretch to see that this society won’t exactly thrive, but will be overthrown. Had that society’s morals decreed an equal treatment of both classes, it might have persevered. I’ve previously gone so far as to claim that morality is actually a selector for a society’s survival fitness – if it governs internal relations in such a way as to minimize stress between the society’s constituents, it protects the society from falling apart.
As Oy! points out, though, it does get a bit hairy when one has to take into account interrelationships between distinct societies, which is pretty much the reason why, today, we have supervening societal bodies like the UN.
Here are two ways that dicussion of the morality of a given action may actually consequences for the actor (you).
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The "Official way:
You do something – who cares what, but many people learn about it, and there is broad agreement that it is “bad”. Turns out it’s not illegal though, and many people are doubly pissed that you are “getting away with it”. Then Congress enacts “Randrover’s Law”, to criminalize whatever your did. So if you ever do it again, there will be negative consequences for you. -
The unofficial way:
You do something – who cares what, but many people learn about it, and there is broad agreement that it is “bad”. Turns out it’s not illegal though, and many people are doubly pissed that you are “getting away with it”. Someone decides to be the avenger of society’s wrongs and comes up to you and blows your head off, because they have decided you deserve it.
I’d say it’s a tremendous stretch–look at the inequality between the rights of women and men in most historical societies as just one example among many.
But even if you were right, so what? Are you using “morality” in some way other than “a system that tells you the right and wrong things to do,” or “a system that allows distinctions to be made between good and evil”? If so, I believe you’re using a definition of morality that’s not especially common. If not–if you are using one of these definitions or one very similar–then so what if a society is destabilized–why is that wrong?
Exactly. They are historical societies. Those that are around today generally appear to move in the direction of equality on that front. (Of course, the boarders here are somewhat ill defined. Is USA today truly the same society as USA 1950?)
I’m using it in exactly that sense, broadly speaking.
It’s not wrong, and I don’t think I’ve claimed it was. It’s just that the society does not exist any more. It’s a selection process, in which societies with morals that lead to inner stability are favoured.