He’s no anarchist.
Some of those societies lasted for thousands of years. Look, for example, at India’s caste system: it was around a lot longer than our gender-equal society (such that it is) has been around.
I just don’t think there’s evidence to support your proposition.
It appears to me that you’re considering morals to be society-specific rather than universal propositions to which societies (or, more accurately, individuals) hold to a greater or lesser degree. Is this correct?
I did point out that my little thought experiment was not very realistic; there are a lot of different factors to account for in the real world. If, for instance, a persecuted group consists of about five people, they simply don’t have the means to change society in any appreciable way.
But still, think of societies where oppression of some class was a direct cause in their downfall/revision – think of revolutions and all that jazz. What emerged from each of those events where societies with altered morals.
I do believe morality to be a societal construct, rather than something universal, yes. I don’t think there is any gold standard of good and evil.
Oh, okay–I was responding to someone who claimed that he was describing objective morality.
I’m as confused as you. Perhaps (and only perhaps), I’ve found the reason for the disconnect. After googling objective morality, I found that people could be using the term in one of a number of ways.
I’m guessing you’re using it in the way described by the third bullet point. I’m using it in the way described in the first or second.
Isthis what you’re describing?
In many instances, when people are talking about objective morality, they mean some morality that transcends time, place and culture which is defined by an external source such as God. And they interpret what the external source (such as God) through other sources. I’m not sure, but it doesn’t seem like that’s what you’re discussing.
I came across the following set of quotes used in a religious argument against torture, and have had a great time chewing on them ever since:
My point is these guys seem to be saying that behaving ‘immorally’ is ‘bad’ for the person who does it. Ruined character, deformed souls, turning into swine… if (IF!) we take these guys seriously, we can infer that ‘immoral’ behavior can degrade the subjective quality of an ‘immoral’ person’s personal experience, among other problems.
Why is it illegal?
Doesn’t the fact that something is illegal offer a clue that society has also judged it immoral? So mcu so that they went to the trouble of criminalizing it?
Not necessarily. There are some laws that are passed just to enforce a standard. In the US, we drive on the right side of the road, and there’s a law that enforces that, and makes it illegal to drive on the left side. That’s not because we think it’s morally better to drive on the right side of the road than the left, but just because you need some standard that everyone follows.
Replace “illegal” with “felonious”
Huh. I have no idea how you got the idea that I was talking about Ayn-Rand-style objectivism; that’s absolutely not what I was talking about. I’d appreciate it if you could reread the post in question; if it still comes across as talking about objectivism, then I’m a complete failure at communication here.
No: I was describing a means by which we may establish, objectively, that certain acts are good and other acts are bad, and to the extent that an ethical system agrees with these objective criteria, it is objectively correct or incorrect. This means of judging ethical systems depends only on the definitions of (and existences of) “preference”, “desire,” and “should.”
I’ve read your post so many times I’ve lost track. The thing is that all I can see in it is moral relativism.
I went back to search for any links I could find that you sent to Rand Rover. Here’s one I found, which says:
Are you claiming the other-worldly view of objective reality? That’s the only objective morality claimed in that article that I could find.
Are you saying that there are objective criteria for these “shoulds” that are independent of time, place, culture and society?
I looked up an essay on objective morality from an atheist perspective and found this.
bold added
Your explanation of your system doesn’t sound like that either. Could you link to the article that you seem to be explaining that mirrors your arguments here? I’m not seeing where the objective part of your argument that your objective morality is based on.
Supposing you were starting a new country from scratch, what basis would you use for constructing a criminal justice system?
Sorry, forgot my link to the last quote which is here.
I confess I’m baffled. Again, I said: “Ergo objective morality: the satisfaction of preferences and desires is prima facie good (i.e., should happen), and the thwarting of preferences and desires is prima facie bad (i.e., shouldn’t happen).”
This is not a relativist statement. This is not a subjectivist statement. It is an objective statement: I believe that, where there exists a desire in this universe, it is better (all else being equal) to meet that desire than to thwart it.
If you see this as relativist, I’m afraid I don’t know what to tell you.
As for some specifics, I encourage you to read about preference utilitarianism. I find this highly influential, except that I believe some strands of PU consider the preference, not the individual holding the preference, as holding primacy when resolving conflicting preferences; I believe that the individual holds primacy. But at that level of detail I’m afraid I’m not equipped to give a clear defense of my position.
As for the idea that moral objectivism is the province of theologians, this is not only false, it is (according to what I consider a persuasive argument) impossible to establish a theological basis for objective morality. That is, if we simply define Good to be whatever the Creator likes, then Good ceases to have the meaning we assign it in common parlance. If there is Good in the world, it is independent of what any particular omnipotent entity likes; and we may judge the omnipotent entity along the same standards of Good and Evil that we use to judge other moral agents.
Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Peter Singer are three influential philosophers who argued for a nontheistic basis for objective morality.
I’ll add that the first several paragraphs of that article are extremely poorly written and not at all cited; I can’t really make heads or tails of what the person is claiming, and I wouldn’t rely on them for anything. The Internet exemplifies caveat emptor, except you’re not emptoring anything.
I’m sure you would agree that if my desire is to rape and kill women, it is not good and should be thwarted. I’m sure I could desire thousands of other equally problematic things.
I think the point people have been arguing is that there is no universal objective moral good (or bad) that is ujniversally applicable in any practical manner.
So is objective morality synonymous with preference utilitarianism?
Here’s a
[quote]
(Atheist Ethicist: Desire Utilitarianism and Objective Moral Relativism - Part I) from someone who doesn’t think so.
Admittedly, it’s not the best source. So if you have a better source that tells you that it is, please share it.
And here’s more information about the nuances between subjective and objective morality.
So far, all you’ve done in this post is told me something that you’re claiming is true and then telling me that you don’t know what to tell me if I disagreed. A little more explanation and perhaps some background on where you got your information might be more helpful.
I’d be happy to emptor any article, source or argument that you provide (with a caveat).
Perhaps I ought not speak for Left Hand, but I assume he would tell you that, yes, your preference for raping and killing women is relevant, but it is a preference that is far outweighed by the preference of countless others that the woman in question **not **be raped and killed.
Ah, then, you’ve only seen part of it.
Come back when you’ve attained enlightenment, grasshopper, I really don’t feel like shouting at a brick wall tonight.