What roots are those? The vast majority of technological innovations throughout history, from construction techniques and work-multiplying machines to energetic materials and electronics have been due to military needs. Archimedes of Syracuse, the greatest mathematician, engineer, and natural scientist of the pre-Renaissance era and whose insights still color our understanding of the world today, worked to build more effective siege machines and weapons of war.
It would be great if we could focus our energies on more positive innovations, and to some degree we are. But it is very, very difficult to get anyone to fund tens of billions of dollars of research into some pie-in-the-sky innovation that is unlikely to return a profit in the investor’s working lifetime without creating a fearsome threat to work against. Virtually all of the technology for modern space programs, including the communications systems, controls, propulsion, and observation instruments is directly descendent from weapon and surveillance systems.
I didn’t say anything about “the region”, but if you want to go there, it’s unclear to me if the situation now is a net positive. Khhadafi was a pretty generous guy to some of his neighbors, and once he fell from power, the spill over of the war into Mali was certainly not a net positive.
With Khadafi in power, we had a stable state. What we have now is… what? Is there even a state that actually has control over the country? How is it in the interest of the US to have a potential failed state in that region? And, of course, one can ask how many US Ambassadors had been killed prior to the overthrow of Khadaffi? Certainly Khadaffi had his time as a “bad guy” from the US perspective, but he took an abrupt change in direction and had not be a problem for us for over a decade.
As for whether or not the Libyans are better off, you tell me. But I think we should acknowledge that this whole process is hardly over. What Libya will be like 5 years from now is anyone’s guess.
Human nature we like to explore new bounds, new territories.
True. I absolutely agree.
Weapons associated mostly with violence. How do we stop this endless cycle of violence?
I wonder where would we be now if the budget between NASA and MIC (mil industrial complex) were reversed. Nobody loses their jobs, just change in employers and priorities. We definitely be closer to finding a cure to our dependence on oil.
Right. We can’t blind ourselves to the fact that declaring strikes to be “limited” doesn’t change that they are acts of war, certainly from Syria’s POV. We will be in a state of war with them thereafter, until it is somehow concluded.
Punitive strikes are dumb at best, a lie to lead us through a backdoor entrance to a full-blown war at worst.
A set of objectives needs to be defined. Maybe only removing the WMDs, then continue letting everyone duke it out? That could conceivably be achieved without resorting to the military.
If we need to take down Assad’s regime, let’s discuss that, and the fact that we will end up fighting the rebels, creating a disaster, and provoking Iran, Russia and China, along with risking God knows what else.
All your problems tend to resemble nails.
or as I would paraphrase it. When you think that the only tool you have is a bomb,all of your “problems” tend to look like targets.
It would be funny. but the show is run by some very paranoid control freaks.
I call them “Men behind the Curtains”
Ignore them at your own risk.
Yeah, but you said “If exactly what happened in Libya happens in Syria, that will be a gigantic failure, not a success”. Libya is not without it’s problems, but right now I’m sure many people, including the Syrian population, would prefer to be where Libya is now.
But my point wasn’t really directed at you. I’m just saying this whole “we always make things worse!” idea never gets falsified.
Libya and Syria give good examples of what interventions can potentially do, and what may happen if we just sit and watch.
A success FOR THE US. Syria has CWs. In Libya, the rebels (or others) raided the weapons depots and took the weapons out of country. If Obama’s Libyan adventure resulted in CWs being taken to parts unknown, how would that be a success?
Our goal is not to end to the civil war. Our goal is to halt the use of CWa.
You were “correcting” Measure for Measure about whether the Libya intervention was successful.
The primary goal of the Libya intervention was not to prevent chemical weapons getting out of the country. For what it set out to do, it was broadly a success.
Now in the case of Syria, if we’re saying that our only goal is to prevent chemical weapons use (and not all would agree with that, I wouldn’t), we’re pretty much at the worst-case scenario right now. Large-scale indiscriminate use of CWs against civilians, and no reason to assume that the CWs are still in one hands, or even still all in Syria.
Perhaps this should be its own thread, but I think realpolitik has been a long-term failure. Looking out explicitly for the interests of the US would be fine if we were a nation among equals–but our military is insanely and disproportionately massive, so when we look out for US interests, we stomp on a lot of other interests. In doing so, we create a lot of enemies. Without making a single excuse for the enemies we’ve made (al Qaeda et al can of course go fuck themselves), it’s not a successful strategy.
Reagan was terribly wrong in about a million different ways, but his vision of the US as a shining city on a hill was a good start. A foreign policy based less around protecting access to strategic resources or business partners, and more around protecting human rights, would make us fewer enemies, requiring us to engage in fewer wars.
Libya, by realpolitik measures, was perhaps a failure. By Shining City on the Hill measures, it was a qualified success: it showed the US’s interest in protecting human rights and encouraging nascent democracies. Attacking Assad’s military might serve a similar purpose.
I don’t see how this is a condemnation of realpolitik (which the U.S. has almost never used, arguably only the administrations of Teddy Roosevelt and Nixon pursued traditional realist foreign policy doctrine), as realpolitik properly executed would absolutely take into account how your actions relate to your enemies and whether actions that seem to be in your favor create more problems than they are worth. If we were engaged in realpolitik and it lead to these problems I’d argue we were simply doing a bad job of analyzing and understanding the international situation.
Take Bismarck, probably the best modern example of someone using realpolitik. His goal was first to create the German Empire with Prussia and its King at its head, he succeeded in this. His goal was then to expand that Empire’s power to make it the preeminent force on continental Europe. He did that. He then sought to create a system of alliances such that the German Empire would have enough friends that a union of countries like Britain, France, and Russia would be dissuaded from attacking the Empire–he succeeded at that (Wilhelm II was unable to continually balance the international picture and messed up the complex web that Bismarck had woven.)
Throughout, something Bismarck was always keen to do was to never take “too much” from vanquished enemies and to always concede enough that he wasn’t planting seeds for long term trouble. There is one big exception to this, commonly considered the most glaring mistake of Bismarck’s some 30 odd years as Chancellor, and this was his annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. While Germany’s military leadership made the argument the province was essential to a future war with France, the fact that the German military easily defeated France already without control of the province and would later do so again in WWII demonstrated that this was a poor argument. No one is entirely sure why Bismarck took Alsace-Lorraine, as it was very uncharacteristic. It was uncharacteristic because it made any long term peace with France impossible, as France would never, long term, concede German ownership of the province.
This is a valid, if semantic, point. The realpolitik I’m condemning here isn’t the theoretical realpolitik you’re discussing, but rather the real realpolitik, the sort espoused by people like John Mace, which de-emphasizes the advantages of being a shining beacon and of helping other folks in favor of a strict protection of immediate US interests.
I am all for the “Shining City” kind of stuff. When I was a kid (not in the US), that is how US was perceived, and unfortunately US politicians since then worked very hard to kill that perception.
But I still fail to see how the Libyan operation succeeded in that respect. Libya was an authoritarian state. Right now AFAIU it is a failed state, with no law and order, and warring militias controlling their own little fiefdoms. “Human rights” are definitely not being protected. In those terms the intervention was a miserable failure.
I also don’t see how the proposed Syrian operation can possibly be a success from the “Shining City” perspective. Yes, if you look really hard, you may find some from the Assad opposition who may have a few “democratic” thoughts in their heads, but the ones that are actually doing most of the fighting are as authoritarian as Assad is, if not more. Taliban-authoritarian. Attacking Assad’s military will help them - there is no doubt about that. I don’t know about you, but in my perspective a “Shining City” should not be helping out authoritarian jihadist militants.