There is a lot of truth to that, particularly as cavalry needs either a steady supply of fodder or a lot of grazing to stay in the field - meaning, if they lack a supply-train, they must keep moving.
They are both Wikipedia, your source, on hussar tactics. Does having weasel teeth hurt?
And as established by my cite, the enemies here were fortified Russian infantry positions. That’s why you lose.
Wow, I’m so amazed that you made it this far without lofting the inevitable “it’s straw man” bullshit. Bravo on your restraint, truly. It makes you sound so…intellectual, doesn’t it?
No, we can get to that after you concede defeat on your first point. Because if you’re not mature enough to concede defeat on the first point, the second is quite beyond you and a waste of time anyway.
You haven’t refuted Klushino and I’ve been slapping you in the face with it all morning. Pretending you haven’t lost may be the last refuge of the inept SDMB debater, but we all know you’re just pretending.
Hahaha REALLY? You think?!
Guys - hate to be all Junior Mod here, but how about we keep this thread civilized?
I’ve got no problem with that.
Grossbottom, if you have a problem with me, please take it to the pit. I’m happy to argue cavalry tactics with you, or anyone, but not in this manner.
Likewise.
Look, you are both wrong. And right, sorta.
Grossbottom: Yes, people did on occaision charge headlong into disciplined, dense-packed infantry. These people died. This is because a charging horse can’t stop very easily and would died awfully, although it might crush people. Charges were rarely doe against strong, discplined infantry because it was a bad idea. It was done, of course - few things haven’t been done. But it was a bad idea and was avoided by anyone who wasn’t a complete dumbass. Heavy cavalry did often charge at infantry, but never all-out unless they mistakenly thought the enemy was about to break.
Malthus: Don’t try to make things all-or-nothing yourself. People did sometimes make charges against packed, disciplined infantry. The Battle of Bruges (also known as the Battle of the Golden Spurs, and one of the prime examples demonstrating that commoners were bigger bastards than noblemen) was an example of just that very thing. Of course, it turned out awfully for the French doing to charging. But it did happen - it just wasn’t very smart. And even then, the French might have succeeded and broken the line had things been otherwise.
Posting a reply to a way, way far back comment.
I don’t know what kind of chain mail you are using, but I’ve seen coats that weigh upwards of 25 pounds - a non-trivial weight. But even apart from that, I meant that Chain is considered to be heavy armor, and is usually worn by well, heavy infantry. It slows you down, is not an easy thing to wear in battle, and offer considerable protection. Indeed, it’s good enough that some examples of medieval battlefields and soldiers’ gravesites see a lot of nasty leg injuries because people were avoiding the armor and chopping at the legs.
This Battle was, though, an example of your first point - the cavalry was sent in because the French thought that the enemy was about to break to the infantry (sent in before). They didn’t, and so the charge was disasterous.
Examples of this sort of thing - cavalry sent against waivering infantry already “softened up” by other troops in the hope it was about to break, and so be swept from the field - are legion; they include the afore-mentioned Waterloo. The reason why they are legion, is that if the infantry did break, the cavalry would slaughter them - so it was sometimes a gamble worth making.
My point was not that cavalry was not used against infantry; it was, often. Rather, it was that cavalry was not generally used, as a tactic, against formed and disciplined infantry all by itself to charge through by main force against the spears - for the exact reasons you cite.
No doubt some foolish commander somewhere attempted it (though I’ll note again that this thread is rather lengthy and no-one has yet provided an example). But as a matter of practice, cavalry wasn’t used in that manner, as most commanders knew that it did not work.
You mean the part where you lose and maturely concede the point? Yes I can see that. You certainly deserve a good pitting but you’ve taken enough of my time, and let’s face it, you’re pretty much par for the course around here.
Yes, they have. The Battle of Klushino has been cited to you. You have not refuted it. You won’t acknowledge it because it means you’re wrong.
I kinda hate to wade in here after the personal comments, but I’m going to have to side with Malthus on this one.
John Keegan’s excellent book The Face of Battle devotes some effort to examining this very question. Keegan makes a persuasive argument that cavalry charging home and winning by the physical shock of contact is a myth – it is only when “moral” shock causes a weakness in the infantry formation (those individuals shying away from contact that Grossbottom predicts) that a way is found into the formation, or in accidents (he cites an occasion when a dead horse and rider bore through the line and created a crucial gap, and notes the participants regarded it as a fluke event). Furthermore, he goes into the futility of cavalry against disciplined infantry, and the danger of infantry breaking its formation, at great length. He even uses math to show the comparative weakness – how few total moving horsemen you can cram into the line against a mass of pikemen (or infantry with bayonets in the Napoleonic period) – it’s startling what a disadvantage the cavalry suffered in this regard.
Keegan’s work exactly agrees with what Malthus said. In my long-considered opinion, the power of heavy cavalry to break strong infantry formations has been exaggerated to the point of mythology – possibly because the heavy cavalry guys paid the bards and storytellers.
No, pikes were used because they’re effective. Alexander the Great’s infantry used the sarissa, which is a pike in every sense, and the Swiss were just as happy to “push” infantry targets as anything else – the Swiss infamously used the pike as an offensive arm, driving everything before them, like shock tactics but on foot. Pike-on-pike and pike-on-infantry fights happened a lot.
No one implied it was quantifiable in advance. “Disciplined infantry” is defined after the charge, as the infantry that held its formation (and, historically, almost always won when so doing).
That’s not what Keegan said.
The actual historical record (as opposed to “what everybody knows”) is murkier on this than you assert.
Good grief. Look, Grossbottom - people have been using cavalry for a very, very long time. You can posit virtually any use of them you like, and I’m certain you’ll be able to find some example of that use in the real world. You might even find cases in which that bizarre use was successful.
But we’re not really interested in the exceptions, except insofar as they illustrate what we are - interested in: The general principles of heavy cavalry warfare, the ways in which cavalry charges were normally employed and repulsed. What Malthus is saying is that heavy cavalry charges had a number of extremely important functions on the pre-twentieth-century battlefield, including support of combined-arms attacks and charging undisciplined troops. These functions, in sum, justified the expense of equipping and training a heavy cavalryman, even though heavy cavalry could not always, at all times, in all places, carry the day by itself.
I’m surprised that you consider this an objectionable position. I mean, the idea that combined-arms tactics are the correct way to attack a sophisticated and well-equipped enemy dates back to antiquity - Malthus isn’t saying anything that isn’t (no offense to the man) pretty darned obvious.
Sailboat, I hate to do this to you because you spent alot of time on that post, but I’ve already referred to Keegan in this thread and I’m obviously familiar. The problem is that Malthus read an actual scholar('s wiki entry), then proceeded to argue from an absolutist position that contradicted common sense and rational academic inquiry. He was confronted and disproved.
Keegan quotes a cavalry officer talking about looking for “a visible shiver along the line” at the moment of close approach. That shiver was an involuntary flinching indicating the infantry was starting to lose cohesion as individuals shrank from the contact they thought was impending. The cavalry would at that point then commit to charging home, or veer off if the infantry appeared to be holding firm. Keegan vividly describes cavalry at Waterloo (even lancers) pulling up short and waving weapons and threatening, but refraining from charging home.
What he is saying is available for everyone’s reference. Your conciliatory non-summary is unnecessary.
Well, I’m tired of trying to point out that two people in a huge knock-down drag-out fight aren’t even really disagreeing about what went on under the hood. And that was after only one post of mine to that effect.
Look, Malthus, Grossbottom: you aren’t really disagreeing, so stop focusing so much on the worlds you are both using (badly) and focus on the fact that your actual positions are identical.
Where the infantry was steady, the cavalry needed some combined-arms support to soften them up and make them flinch - the reason the cavalry had to resort to waiving their weapons about at Waterloo was that they had left their artillery too far behind. If they had horse-artillery with them, they could simply stand by and watch as the artillery blasted the squares and destroyed their cohesion & morale.
Another interesting tactic, used in the 16th century, was the caracole, whereby the cavalry would first advance towards the infantry and discharge their pistols at close range into their ranks, then wheel about and reload to do it again - the ideal was to force the infantry to flinch and waiver, whereon they could be charged (and “broken” - that is, the infantry would run). This enabled the cavalry itself to do the “combined arms” thing.
I read your Klushino cite and it doesn’t actually describe physical shock defeating formed, steady infantry. It says , to paraphrase, we charged 8 or 10 times and got in among them and fought hand to hand. It doesn’t clarify the murky events at the point of contact. It describes the Russian infantry as “broken” at one point, but doesn’t say that it happened before, after, or because of either physical shock or moral threat. Like so many other battle narratives, it’s open to interpretation from our point of remove. As far as that version of the battle goes, it could very well have happened exactly as Keegan would describe.
I think you are reading into it what you want to prove.
I don’t really think our positions are “identical”. There is a real debate here, albeit on his side more heated than I think necessary.
Though I’m kinda interested in the concept of using worlds badly … 
Yup, though I doubt he’ll listen to you any more than to me.
Indeed, the fact that it was the same unit that “charged” 8-10 times is, I think, good evidence that it was not a charge for physical shock - it is hard to imagine such a charge failing & the same cavalry being capable of doing it again, let alone 10 times.