Full bore tooth and nail combat simply can’t last more than a very few years before munitions and the treasury are both exhausted or one side is decisively overrun. But …
Modern industrial warfare can also be left in a low intensity barely ticking over mode for decades. Trading irritant level destruction that largely hobbles the economic potential of the area in dispute. Or it settles into a fully frozen conflict of hate, guerillas, and the occasional little green men.
The limiting factor for an e.g. 80 years war is more likely political now.
I think Russia is reaching an exhaustion point. The May Day parades were abbreviated, and Putin was scared of being droned during the parades. I think the hot war ends in early 2027, and Russia will be able to keep some - not all - of the land it has “annexed”. In return, the Russians will have to accept that Ukraine receives some level of European security guarantees, and possible Ukraine EU/NATO membership.
Ukraine is no longer “holding none of the cards”. They are holding a lot of cards, and Putin knows it. They can more easily keep fighting than Russia. If I were Ukraine, I would continue the fight enough to make sure they get full EU and/or NATO membership.
By mid-2027, the war is over. Putin is weakened, and Ukraine is looking stronger and rebuilding.
Problem is, would Putin survive that? once the aura of invincibility is gone, how long until he “falls from a window”?
Problem^2 is, Putin knows about the first problem, if he thinks he can survive, all well and good, but if he thinks that his life depends on not losing in Ukraine… what will a desperate old man with a nuclear arsenal do?
I can see Trump threatening that. But he won’t be in office after January 2029. The next President will be fine with Ukraine in NATO, unless it’s JD Vance. And even then, I think Europe is finally getting the message that they can’t depend on the US anymore. One way or another, they’re going to have Ukraine involved as part of their security apparatus. It upgrades EU defenses to bring Ukraine in…NATO or non-NATO…
But not as a matter of tactics. You always threaten first, hoping to obtain concessions. Only if you get backed into a corner where threats aren’t working do you actually execute on your threat. And by and large you’ve lost the exchange if you have to do that.
But yes, the ideal is that trump is out of office and MAGA as a movement is dead. Commerce-first internationalist Republicans still exist and might still have a bit of influence over the R faction of Congress and the WH if they hold it.
Better the entire R apparatus is swept from government for 100 years, but I’m not holding my breath.
In terms of the war’s end, Trump’s decision to basically cut most aid to Ukraine is ultimately to Ukraine’s benefit. Trump has essentially lost a great deal of leverage. Ukraine is far far less dependent on the US at this stage of the war and now receives the vast majority of assistance from the EU. Ukraine can conduct the war against Russia on its own terms, and if that means impacting the world’s oil supply at the American economy’s expense, so be it. Not being beholden to the whims of Trump when negotiating peace on Ukraine’s terms is not only enormously helpful, but essential to securing any kind of lasting peace.
I remain convinced that the most likely end to this war will be as a result of an economic collapse in Russia. They’re one bank run away from their financial system collapsing like happened ~1990.
I agree. Putin himself would unwind this if he had a Time Machine that would simply erase the original decision. Any successor who has not been under a rock will use their “Hey, I didn’t start this mess, let’s wrap things up” card.
Not to mention that it would feed right into a “blame Putin for everything wrong” strategy, which I expect to be very popular with Russian leaders after he’s dead.
Not denying that, just pointing out that it wasn’t drones that caused tanks to cease being such a factor in Ukraine, but regular old ATGMs employed in the usual ways, and amplified by Russian incompetence.
Drones came into their own after that happened and the pace of movement slowed down a lot.
In a broader sense, the question is whether or not Russia can keep up this sort of wartime activity indefinitely, especially in light of the sanctions that are in effect. Economically I keep reading that they’re starting to really struggle, and that militarily, they’ve been struggling for a while now. They’re not going to show up with 10 new divisions and roll over the Ukrainians; they seem to be barely able to manage what they’re doing right now, and saving up for some sort of offensive would seem to be a long shot.
So in light of that, they’re probably slowly declining and the only reasonable move would be to do like @survinga says, consolidate into what they feel like they can defend and/or halfway legitimately lay claim to, and trade that for further integration of Ukraine into Western economic and defense institutions like NATO, EU, etc…
ISTM that the technological development of high PK anti-tank drones occurred largely after Russian tanks were a dwindling / dwindled asset.
So yes, we can totally credit conventional ATGMs with having emptied Russia’s tank parking lots into wreckage. But IMO that’s a matter of chronology, not any inherent superiority of ATGMs vs drones as AT weapons or weapon platforms.
We don’t yet have concrete combat proof of how a mass armored assault would fare against massed 2026, not 2022, AT drones. I have my suspicions the tanks would be toast(ed). But we don’t know. And it’s doubtful this war will deliver the example we lack. Gonna need another war and different combatants to find out.