Russian paranoia about missile defense

[Sailboat]

@Grey

Because a missile defensive system can be used to prevent retaliatory strikes just as well as first strikes.

Actually, a missile defense system can be used to prevent retaliatory strikes much more easily than it can be used to prevent first strikes. At least in the early generations of such defense technologies (stages we are not yet in, and only aspire to be), the “shield” will be unable to cope with a full-out strategic first strike, but might well be able to handle the much smaller, hastily-launched retaliatory strike. Some analysts have argued that a missile defense system would make a first strike more attractive to the side that possessed it.

[Stranger_On_A_Train]

@YogSosoth

Is there any reason why Russia does not or cannot develop its own missile shield?

Russia does have its own system, the current A-135 system, which uses the 53T6 (NATO reporting name “Gazelle”) short range interceptor produced by OKB Novator with a conventional explosive payload. The previous A-35 system used the 53T6 with a nuclear package, plus the 51T6 (NATO reporting name “Gorgon”) exoatmospheric interceptor produced by OKB Fakel, also using nuclear warheads (presumably similar to the “enhanced radiation” warheads used in the briefly deployed American Safeguard system). There are some rumors that Russia is developing an exoatmospheric mid-course phase interceptor analogous to the GMD interceptor, but they currently have nothing in that role.

@ralph124c

It would be cheaper to build a “Doomsday” device-and let it be. All this Cold War stuff-what is the point?

”Based on the findings of the report, my conclusion was that this idea was not a practical deterrent for reasons which at this moment must be all too obvious.”

@Chronos

What would be the problem with both sides installing missile defenses at the same time? That way, the balance (and MAD, such as it is) would still be maintained, while decreasing the overall risk to both sides.

Assured Destruction (“Mutual” was added by detractors to create the cute acronym) relies upon overwhelming response on both sides (among other provisions) that will make it prohibitive to initiate a disarming attack. Missile defense is inherently destabilizing in that context because it allows for the possibility of limiting the scale of destruction from an attack while also encouraging the expansion of the attacker’s arsenal to overwhelm a target nation’s defensive system. This assumes, of course, that you both satisfy all of the provisions of Assured Destruction (perfect detection/information, complete control, retaliatory capability, force overwhelms defense) and assume that all parties are rational and informed decision-makers. Neither set of assumptions bears much scrutiny in the light of the history of the Cold War and the number of times that a potential nuclear exchange was averted by luck rather than deterrence.

Stranger