Russian Tank Offensives: They don't make 'em like they used to?

Initial reports from the Georgia/Russian conflict in South Ossetia said that massed columns of Russian tanks, supported by strategic bombers, smashed into Georgian positions, killing as many as 20 people.

Noting that estimated casualty figures have since increased, and meaning no disrespect to the dead, this seems small.

Used to be, Russian tank offensives had some punch to them.

Actually, it’s not just Russia.

All militaries these days seem much, much smaller and less…man-dense, to coin a term. Fewer people and spread out more. Is this mostly a function of the increased killing power of technology, or are modern planners perhaps deterred by the cost of benefits and retirement for the soldiers of mass armies?

I’m assuming tis is a conscious decision to have smaller, higher tech armies, but it seems like most current military conflicts I read about have surprisingly lower casualties than WWII/Korean War era battles. I often hear things like “both sides sprayed the West Bank with rockets, small-arms fire, and cluster bombs for hours. Three people have been killed and seven wounded.” Seems like a lot of ordnance with little material result. Is this perhaps because people are much more inclined to hide/flee than in the stoic old days?

Curious,

Sailboat

Several things happened. First, the great powers either got a lot weaker (Russia) or their methods totally changed (United States, somewhat China). But lesser powers haven’t grown to match. Maybe, say, Iran could do a decent approximation of a human wave, but their economy is basically shot to pieces. It’s doubtful they could sustain an offensive.

A lot of this is changing technology. The military found it was a lot easier to win through pinpoint accuracy than overwhelming random firepower. Not that the latter has totally lost its place. Still, accuracy, combined with increased lethality, make raw numbers less important.

The reason untis are spread more thinly is that this presents no target for the enemy. With superior speed and communcations, soldeirs can link up quickly and unite for offensives, then spread back out to prevent the enemy from having any target.

In the trade, this is called the “Revolution in Military Affairs.” While it is true the average soldier is many times more deadly than his father or grandfather, there is much more to it than that.

Modern technology allows much greater precision in management of force. My uncle sat out WWII in Panama because nobody could be sure the Japanese would not invade the Atlantic side (or that u-boats might blockade the Pacific side). Nowadays we can leave huge areas unmanned knowing we can detect incoming enemy forces and if need be move force to the threatened area very quickly.

Further, we can now hit targets more accurately. That does not mean “hitting a building.” It means hitting exactly the right building at the right time with the right munition. A side effect of this ought to be reduced civilian deaths. Instead of bombing “Berlin” now we can smack the Chancellory at midnight, just as the weekly game of High-staff Johnny on a pony is about to start.

Also of course, modern computing power and new techniques allow us to us much less stuff to fight wars. Remember when you were a kid and the surplus store had all those neat toys from WWII? They had to make a whole lot of widgets just to make sure enough widgets got to the guys who needed them. Most cargo was duplicates and much was misdirected. Now most of it is just the right amount going to just the right place.

Of course this can be (and may have been) carried too far. One Hitler Youth with a popgun can stop a division by taking out a forklift. We need to watch the tendency to go too lean. Still the RMA is a movement in military stuff that matches developments in many civilian enterprises.

Does that help?

This has been a general trend in wars for thousands of years. As the killing power of an individual soldier has increased their density on the battle field has decreased which paradoxically reduces casualty rates. Greek and Roman phalanxes fought shoulder-to-shoulder in large clumps and defeated armies would lose a majority of their soldiers (sometimes all of them.) With smooth-bored firearms soldiers were in smaller clumps of one or two lines. Rifled guns and cannons engendered small combat teams. Etc.

There are probably other trends I’m leaving out (perhaps the ratio of combat troops to support personnel?) but that’s a major one.

Part of it may be that nowadays a key military skill consists of not exposing yourself to enemy fire for more than a second or two (lest you be turned to hamburger) while weaponry and ammunition are much more lethal, plentiful and liberally used than they used to be.

So there are half a dozen enemy soldiers hiding in a wood, and hiding well. But you suspect they have two RPGs, a sniper rifle and some machine guns, meaning that you daren’t move your vehicles or troops through the wood in case you lose a few. So you call in some air, some mortars, and machinegun the crap out of all five bajillion places they might be hiding. Then you drive through the wood and discover that they actually left five hours ago.

The Bomb rendered large formation armies obsolete. Plus improving technology that finally could deliver the application of overwhelming force to a single point.

Man, I knew that the Isthmus of Panama was twisty – such that the Caribbean entrance to the Canal is further west than the Pacific entrance – but I didn’t realize that it was that twisty!

[Otherwise, great post!]

There’s also the issue of the difference in strategic goals. The Red Army in WW2 wanted to kill as many Germans as possible, to turn back the invasion of the Motherland that threatened the existence of the State. Massive losses by one’s opponents was a cause for celebration. Nowadays, with the world watching, it’s not good PR to go on an unnecessary killing spree (although it certainly happens from time to time — see Highway of Death at the end of Gulf War I). This time, Russia wanted to slap Georgia’s wrist and show it who’s boss, not annihilate a population.

At the risk of hijacking into GD territory - continuing an attack against retreating troops isn’t an unnecessary killing spree. The way to get the enemy to stop shooting at you is to surrender. For all an attacker knows know, retreating troops may be planning to meet up with another unit over the next hill and start a counterattack. Militarily, it’s almost always wise & prudent to continue attacking retreating troops.

As weapon systems become more deadly, you need fewer of them to get the job done, but they also become more expensive.

Also, as weapon systems become more expensive, you become more sensitive to losing a unit. (That is, tank, ship, or plane.)


Compare battleship growth at the turn of the last century.

In 1890, battleships typically mounted 4 large caliber guns, as well as a host of smaller weapons. They also had rudimentary fire control, and could not hit much beyond 6000 yards (unless through pure luck), even though the guns themselves were capable of throwing a shell out much farther.

By 1914, the “all big gun ship” was the norm, with 8 to 14 main guns, capable of hitting at 15000 yards (with 20,000+ being theorised). However, the cost of such ships skyrocketed, as well as build times, fewer raw numbers of these ships were built. But they clearly outperformed ships only 15 to 20 years older. New strategies also had to be developed. Because of the advances in submarine and moored mine technologies, close in blockades became an obsolete tactic, and “fleet in being” and “distant blockade” was adopted.

By 1940, the airplane was beginning to make the battleship obsolete, although it took some time for that to be realised.


In aircraft technology, much the same is observed. The aircraft of the 30’s were small, short ranged. (But also light and cheap.) They got heavier and more expensive (as well as much better performers) during WW2, but trying to oppose late war designs with an 8 year old aircraft was not in the cards. (Compare trying to fight a Supermarine Spitfire MkX with a Italian Fiat CR. 32, a “hot” biplane when it was debued in 1936 or so.)

Even now, modern jets are really pricey, but to try fighting one with 20 year old tech is tough. (Although an F-117 was shot down in Serbia with a then-30 year old missle system.)


So, again, the cost of modern weapons (as well as the training of the troops in their use ) in both time and money makes the modern armies seem more "surgical’ in their tactics, and less “human wave”.

It is worth noting that the current conflict in Georgia in no way compares to WWII.

WWII was a “Total War” and every country was almost completely given over to fighting. All the industry and man power that could possibly be spared was tossed in to it.

If the Russians came rambling across Western Europe they would likely need to muster that kind of effort to pull it off. Georgia? A fraction of their forces are sufficient.

Just to toss a few numbers out there, here is a screenshot of a table from a Rand report on urban warfare showing how much it has changed since ancient times, and a partial paragraph restating what has already been said here. I’ve heard more up to date numbers but can’t find them now. I hate when that happens.

At least for most of the history of phalanx warfare, it was very unusual indeed for a whole army to be massacred. There are a few examples, but few.

It also might reflect two different strategies of warfare, anti-personal and anti-material.

Say those tanks and bombers were tasked to neutralize Georgia’s air defenses.
If your intent is to do that by killing pilots, ground crews, etc then those low numbers are really embarrassing.
If your intent is to do that by destroying planes on the ground, fuel and ammo dumps, radar sites, etc then those numbers are something to be proud of.

You can always get more [del]FBI guys[/del] soldier guys to fly planes, drive tanks, etc. It’s a whole lot harder to get new cool stuff for those soldiers to fight with.

CMC +fnord!