You specifically compared Dawkins’ regard for humans on almost (if that matters) the same level of a man who oversaw the systematic murder of hundreds of thousands of people. At the same level of a man who performed grotesque experiments on innocent people and decided to solve a lice problem by killing all the people in a barracks. Changing your tune to imply that you think he is a monster becuase he merely becuase he inspires horror or disgust is quite a revision.
Assuming God does not exist delusion is a fairly accurate description:
Delusion:
The act or process of deluding
The state of being deluded.
A false belief or opinion: labored under the delusion that success was at hand.
Psychiatry. A false belief strongly held in spite of invalidating evidence, especially as a symptom of mental illness: delusions of persecution.
I’m curious about something, Lib. You’ve said before that you’ve had experiences that you feel were divine in origin. Now Dawkins, like myself, is an atheist. Which means that, according to our world view, your experiences cannot possibly have been divine, as we feel there is no such thing. How should we regard your experiences without abandoning our own perceptions of reality? You have perceived something which I maintain does not exsist. As distasteful as you find the term, “delusion” is an accurate descriptor for your perception, at least from my point of view. What term could be substituted that would accurately represent my own beliefs, and not be labelled as “monstrous” by you?
We’re getting further and further from the original points we put forth, so it’s hard to quote and respond. But I’ll do my best.
Fallacy of bifurcation. The fact that Dennet’s results are paltry results has nothing to do with whether other attempts to explain mind are equally bad.
Yeah, Dennet’s book amounts to saying, “The brain does it somehow.” I will give him credit for one good point of his: He denies that there is a central processer in the brian, a homunculus. That is a very good point, but not one worthy of a whole book.
I am not so much arguing against Dennet’s view as simply saying that he hasn’t come up with anything special yet.
Cite?
You are confusing neurology with cognitive science. Did I ever say that the brian has nothing to do with cognition? Try to understand what your opponent is saying.
That is the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof. I am not so much opposing cognitive science as saying that it has not yet come up with useful information. As I’ve said in many other threads, as far as understanding how cognition works, we are not even at the phlogiston vs. oxygen level yet.
It is clear that you don’t understand my counterargument at all, so this is fruitless. If you say that all is physical, then what in your philosophy is “physical” differentiated from?
Then I have a very unfair advantage in this debate. For whereas you have only inklings and hunches to go on, I have at my command the power of Reason and Philsophy.
That’s what I’m saying. You can’t deny the existence of anything simply by pointing out that other people think of them as non-physical.
Actually, I think that physical/non-physical is a false category. Rather, I hold that all is pattern (or essentially of the same substance). The contingent-physical as we know it is one type of pattern.
Oh, Monsieur, you are welcome to them. Please feel free to point out how MY position shoves God into gaps. BTW, I never use the word God in talking about my position, but rather the Divine.
[/quote]
this being irrelevant: I (and Dawkins) assign low probabilities to both God/Descartes demon and the Matrix. You said that, on the contrary, you could disprove the latter.
[/quote]
By that standard you can’t disprove the Matrix, can’t disprove God, and can’t disprove a goblin living in your pinkie. Why can’t you disprove them? Because there is no standard of proof in the first place. Not having a standard of proof in the first place is an even lower category for a proposition to be in than that of having a standard but failing to meet it.
Actually, it doesn’t have an answer, since there is no standard by which an answer to the question can be judged.
I didn’t say “We don’t have the tools at hand, ergo…”; I said, “Philsophically speaking the very concept is void.” Big difference.
Bessides, we do have the tools to differentiate brains made from silicon and flesh.
How about a real example? It used to be hard as hell to tell one rare earth metal apart from another. Eventually they were all isolated and identified. But before that was possible one could at least conceive of what it would mean for the metals to be differentiated.
If I said that there was deuterium type 1 and deuterium type 2, wouldn’t you say, “What’s the difference?”? And what would you say if I responded, “Well, we don’t know what the difference is now, but there could be a difference–and you can’t prove there isn’t one!”?
You’d call me a retard. Same thing with the whole simulation/reality thing.
Oh, you were serious?
People exist only in their own spacetime. They are not in any state outside of that spacetime.
“Dennett’s results” are those surprising results of decades of neuropsychological and computational research. His model is just one of many proposed explanations for those results. Were Galapagos finches “Darwin’s results”?
Hmm, you see, I worried a little before when you said you didn’t really understand memetics, but Dennett references them heavily in the important chapters 9-14. It is not an easy read - it took me over a month to properly understand it and I was even familiar with the books from the 1950’s onwards on which he builds. Your summary does not inspire confidence that you have really exercised your imagination as he asks, but are merely content to naysay in a Pythonesque argument-sketch manner.
Again, if you are holding him up as the be all and end all of what cognitive science (which covers vast fields of neuroscience, psychology, AI, philosophy and all kinds of others) offers, I’d suggest we go back to basics. I’ll take up Gyan’s offer in the next two weeks.
Consciousness Explained, Appendix A, p.460, third paragraph.
Again, cognitive science is highly interdiciplinary. You asked for an applied example. From the AI/computational direction, I’d offer robots developed from 1972’s Shakey or even computer games as real, applied example of better and better-modelled cognitive processes giving real results.
I’m happy to explore research results and computational models of the mind on their own, but we are also considering which general explanations we find most probable. Don’t go Creationist on me.
Which themselves only provide connections between premises (validity), not the truth of the premises themselves (soundness).
And I don’t. I deny their existence because the physical evidence is such that they are unnecessary.
And yet, if only physical things existed, then they would necessarily have a configuration in spacetime. You seem to suggest that pattern causes physicality, not the other way around.
What is your chosen explanation for consciousness, abiogenesis, the 3 dimensionality and temporality of the universe, or religious experiences? Would you say they were scientific explanations? If not, are you not appealing to the Divine as a default alternative?
Which is precisely what I and Dawkins said right at the beginning: You can only ascribe probabilities to them. I’m glad we now all agree on this point.
Well then, you’ve changed your mind: you said you could prove that the answer was no.
In post #25 you said: “I feel I can prove through philosophical arguments that we are not in a computer simulation”. Merely saying you think it’s moot if we are is not the same thing at all. (BTW, I think it’s quite important, actually, regardless of the fact that I could never know for sure one way or another.)
A= ‘reality’ (atoms in spactime, say)
B = ‘simulation’ (photons in cables, say)
You, post #25: -B.
Me: Huh?
You: A=B, therefore -B. Logical non sequitur.
Would you be willing to accept arbitration on this point by a third party, say, an expert in logic whose essentialist theist position is diametrically opposed to my own?
And, who knows, we might discover a way of finding a weakness in the simulation and even developing a Blue Pill? This is why we can never say that a simulation is impossible. And if it is not impossible, we must … what phrase did Dawkins use again? Ah yes, put a probability value on it.
I’ve been jerked around by those who wilfully mischaracterise my position here many times. I’m “serious” insofar as deliberate strawmanship is “not funny”.
So, hang on, that state is not life. “After” being a temporal modifier, there is therefore no afterlife? You deny any afterlife but still quibble with the description “dead forever”?
If you think that, somehow, our consciousness emerges from our physical brains, such that we are nonexistent before its formation and after its necrosis/burning/decomposition, we agree entirely. Calling the universe “the Divine” and our 80 years of life “the afterlife” is just a perverse use of language, IMO, but hey, if it makes you happy …
I don’t know why there needs to be a term for two people having different perceptions. If a man tells me that he feels awed by a Timberlake still life, I don’t know why I should think anything other than, “Our perceptions differ”. I suppose if I were Dawkins, I would suggest that the man is psychotic. Nothing is more subjective than perception. Even in this discussion, I am perceiving a problem with Dawkins that you are not. Ought I to conclude that, because you fail to perceive the problem, you are delusional?
Lib, do you believe there is a difference between value judgments (“This still life is awesome!”) and factual conclusions (“This is an oil painting on canvas!”)?
I believe there’s a difference. If somebody points to a table on which a bowl of fruit rests next to a bottle of wine and a plate of cheese, over which afternoon sunlight pours, and utters the first statement, I’ll not gainsay them. Nor will I consider them delusional, though the scene fails utterly to awe me.
If they point to this same table and utter the second statement, I may consider them to be delusional. Now they’re not making a subjective declaration: they’re making an objective declaration.
In this case, I’d consider their objective declaration to be in such violation of the obvious facts that I’d consider them delusional. In the case of religion, I don’t think that’s true: I think that facts in the evaluation of religion are few and far between, and so the most I can say is that I think religious folks are mistaken, with the caveat that it could very well be me who’s mistaken.
That said, to accuse Dawkins of being almost Mengelean is to subscribe to the concept of thoughtcrime. I absolutely reject that. Mengele was monstrous for his acts, not for his thoughts, and if we turn his name into a synonym for thoughtcrime, we show contempt for his victims.
Yes, it does, doesn’t it? It is a ‘metaphysical thesis’ in that it pertains to that branch of philosophy called ‘metaphysics’. It is the thesis that the “outputs of the mind” are themselves physical, and thus that ‘metaphysics’ is just as linguistic referent for a branch of philosophy.
In short, physicalism is the thesis that there’s no such thing as metaphysical things. Calling this a metaphysical thesis is rather just a confusing convention, perhaps like calling James Randi a “magician”.
Well, no, it’s the thesis that everything is physical. You’re thesis is, I am suggesting, a scientific thesis, one which can be true or false even if one held a Berkelian view of “reality”. I’ll read the complete article before commenting further.
One more time (hopefully for posterity) I did not say that Dawkins was almost Menelean, but that his declaration was almost Mengelean. If there is a difference between a still life and a real pot of flowers, then there is a difference between a man and the statement he makes. Statements that dehumanize, demonize, or otherwise present people as inferior, psychotic, or mentally unstable have been the kinds of statements used by despots, madmen, and power-mongers the world over and throughout history to justify the maltreatment of other men. It’s no different than Pat Robertson calling homosexuals deviant, hoping thereby to rally people via horror and disgust against them. If you see it differently, that’s fine. Why you would insist that I see it your way is unclear. It is not the case that I must always see things just as you do to merit your respect. At least I hope it isn’t.
Yes, OK. I only sought to clarify that the physicalist does not deny that mental entities like thoughts, feelings and theses exist, merely that they are ultimately physical too.
If someone characterizes (for example) modern-day liberals as zombies, would it be fair to call that person’s statements almost Mengelean? I don’t think so: hyperbole of this nature, while regrettable, is not the sole province of monsters. Indeed, I suspect that the overwhelming majority of such rhetoric is NOT used by monsters, nor by people who advocate monstrous policies.
If we are talking about rhetoric that dehumanizes one’s opponents, incidentally, it’s hard to come up with a better example than comparing one’s opponents (or their statements) to the Nazis.
Absolutely not. This is, however, great debates, where we get to debate such issues.
But there’s a fundamental difference: if I say that you are an idiot for not believing in God, then no one will ever put you away for being an idiot; but if I say you are delusional for your failure to perceive what I consider obvious, and a judge agrees with me, you can be involuntarily committed to a mental institution. It is no more untoward to call a Nazi statement a Nazi statement than it is to be bigotted against bigots.
Of course, laypeople have adopted the technical term and turned it into their own, nontechnical term. No judge will listen to a layperson’s appellation of “idiot” and consider it a diagnosis.
Which is eerily similar to Dawkin’s use of “delusional” in all respects.
In fact, I’ll invite you to read the words of Dr. Down, after whom the syndrome is named, and decide whether the word “idiot” or the word “delusional” would be favored by Dr. Mengele.
Heh, thanks! Do you agree, though, that your calling me an idiot would not be a Mengelean statement?
Because that’s my point: words that have one meaning to a psychiatrist may have another meaning to a layperson, and it’s unfair to hold a layperson responsible for a word’s technical meaning, much less to act as if the layperson was using the technical meaning. I very seriously doubt that Dawkins would use “delusional” in the psychiatric sense in a setting where that use might have any ramifications; if he ever does, I’ll join you in condemning him as a right bastard.
Until then, I’ll just say he’s engaging in a bit of hyperbole, a crime that we’re all guilty of now and again.
Very well, his writings have not advanced human knowledge any appreciable amount.
I don’t really buy into memetics, just as a lot of scientists do not. Not so much because memetics is wrong, but becuase it doesn’t say much that is important.
I won’t have much to say about consciousness other than that we don’t understand it very well.
[/quote]
Consciousness Explained, Appendix A, p.460, third paragraph.
[/quote]
Dennett says:
"A single proposition isn’t a theory, it’s a slogan; and what some philsophers do isn’t theorizing, it’s slogan-honing."
Would you care to tell me what slogan I’ve been honing? Thank you.
If that’s the case, then you’re just saying that cog-sci has to do with a bunch of stuff, and since within that bunch of stuff some good things have come about, then cog-sci is good too. I wouldn’t disagree on that level. But has cog-sci allowed us to understand consciousness or related things in the same way as we understand chemistry; does it give us the same power over nature? No way. And the reason isn’t that cog-sci sucks; it’s simply that it’s a field in its infancy–like chemistry or physics in the 1500s.
Someday I suspect that we will understand consciousness, and Dennett’s best or most influential opus will be seen as the precurser to the precurser to the phlogiston theory.
Name-calling is crap for rhetoric.
I am rubber, you are glue, etc.
OK, let’s work on this. According to your physicalism, the set of All Things = Physical Things. At the same time, becuase Metaphysical Things do not exist at all, Metaphysical Things = Empty Set.
So you do not have a distinction between Physical Things and Metaphysical Things, since the latter cateogry to you is void. Rather, your philosophy separates merely the set of All Things from the Empty Set. In other words, it covers new ground and is not about what you say it is about.
Gilbert Ryle in his essay “Systematically Misleading Expressions” (Logic and Language, Anthony Flew, ed., Doubleday Anchor, 1965) writes:
**Since Kant, we have, most of us, paid lip service to the doctrine that ‘existence’ is not a quality’ and so we have rejected the pseudo-implication of the ontological argument; ‘God is perfect, being perfect entails being existent, …God exists’. For if existence is not a quality, it is not the sort of thing that can be entailed by a quality. [Elipsis in original.]
But until fairly recently it was not noticed that if in ‘God exists’ ‘exists’ is not a predicate (save in grammar), then in the same statement ‘God’ cannot be (save in grammar) the subject of predication. The realization of this came from examining negative existential propositions like ‘Satan’ does not exist’ or ‘unicorns are non-existent’. If there is no Satan, then the statement ‘Satan does not exist’ cannot be about Satan in the way in which ‘I am sleepy’ is about me. Despite appearances the word ‘Satan’ cannot be signifying a subject of attributes.**
Hence, in saying “Metaphysical and non-physical things do not exist,” you are not saying anything about those things or about their category. The distinction physical/metaphysical is not really being made, since (in your view) “metaphysical” signifies literally nothing.
Hence, “physicalism” as you define it is without meaning.
That’s actually not correct. “Socrates is a man” is a premise but is certainly subject to both empirical examination and philosophical analysis. And even if a premise is at first glance subject only to empirical examination (e.g., the book is blue), there is still an entire background (linguistic/scientific/philsophical) behind the terms “book” and “blue” that is subject to a check for relevence and correctness (e.g., is the person calling an aquamarine book blue out of ignorance, or is that a fair cateogorization, etc.).
The Divine is a principle within Reality; it is not the creator of Reality. The things you mentioned all (I should think) have varying explanations, the vast proportion of which are unknown to us.
I don’t agree. Even if we don’t go to the philsophy zone on this one, in order to ascribe a probability to anything we need a model. Obviously, we don’t have a model of how God could or could not exist. Hence, there is no way to ascribe a probability to His existence, and your feeling about such such a probability is nothing more than a gratuitous personal feeling.
I didn’t merely say I think it’s moot, I proved that it’s moot. And to prove that something is moot is equivalent (superior, really) to proving that a statement is false, as I have explained numerous times here.
You made an illegal chess move with your paranthetical “photons in cables, say,” since the technology behind the supposed simulation is always and by necessity left open-ended, since any given proposition is subject to an easy empirical refutation.
But your symbolic logic is still useful. The trick behind the simulation argument is pretty damn simple. You have “B” as the strict definition of what a simulation would be, and a little though reveals that “B” is indistinguishable from “A” (Reality). But at the same time there is a B’ of emotion-tugging implications: The coldness of the technology, the mind-bending idea of reality not being real, etc.
If we determine that A = B (as we must), then indeed the imposter concept B’ is revealed as without evidence, or false.
If you do not agree that a proposition is to be considered false when it is without evidence, then we simply disagree on how to treat gratuitous assertions semantically.
Do you mean Liberal? I’m sure he’d agree with me on the whole about this simulation argument. Bring it on. (Not that I consider him a higher authority or anything, but the more the merrier.)
If the simulation is defined such that it has attributes that are distinguishable from those of Reality, then that’s a whole different argument. But the trick of the simulation argument is that it defines the simulation as being so good as to be indistinguishable from Reality.
