Saudi British Ambassador's Terrorism Links to 9-11

Great Debates
1

There are strong indications that Saudi Arabia’s royal family has knowingly and willingly supported al Qaeda for some time now. Their willingness to pay “protection” blackmail to these terrorists may well have resulted in al Qaeda’s ability to organize and carry out the 9-11 atrocity. Blank copies of even the most modern and tamperproof versions of Saudi Arabian passports have fallen into the hands of this violent group.

Articles below detail extensive contact between Saudi Arabia’s new British ambassador, Turki al Faisal, and al Qaeda or the Taleban. As a member of the royal family, it is difficult to imagine that Turki al Faisal’s actions were unknown to the royals, even in the highest circles. If this information can be verified beyond doubt, it will form a valid basis for the ongoing one trillion dollar lawsuit against Saudi Arabia by the 9-11 victims and their families.

This duplicity makes it all the more clear that Saudi Arabia has viewed their alliance with the United States as one of convenience and little else. Any putative loyalty or dedication to the eradication of terrorism is now only so much lip service and not much more than that. I have long maintained that Saudi Arabia was little more than a fair weather friend to the United States. These recent turns of events seem to substantiate that to even a further degree.

Turki al Faisal appears to have been a voluntary conduit for massive monetary and materiel transfers to both al Qaeda and the Taleban. His role as head of the Saudi intelligence agency gave him exclusive access to assessments and specific foreknowledge of actions to be taken against the terrorist organizations. Additionally, in his professional capacity he had access to the documents that have found their way into al Qaeda’s possession.

While Turki al Faisal’s tenure expired before the new E-series passports were distributed, there is little doubt that whatever network he may have originated or supported remains in place inside the Saudi intelligence organization. All of this is more than a little suspicious. The recent al Qaeda attack in Riyadh notwithstanding. Saudi Arabia has emerged as a major refuge for the al Qaeda organization. Decades of sanctioned anti-Western teaching in religious schools has bred an enduring hostility that the royals are now unable to quell.

I, for one, hope that the current lawsuit succeeds. A one trillion dollar judgement will effectively neuter the Saudi royal family and significantly deplete any surplus capital they might direct towards further financing of terrorism. Their cowardly pretense of alliance while simultaneously fomenting unrest and diverting the brunt of terrorism in our direction is as offensive as it is illegal.

Excerpts from a Guardian Unlimited article:

[sup]BOLDING ADDED[/sup]

Another Gulf News article mentions Saudi passports that fell into terrorist hands.

[sup]BOLDING ADDED[/sup]

A less reliable article seems to establish the connection of Saudi Arabia with al Qaeda and the Taleban.

[sup]BOLDING ADDED[/sup]

2

This is not a great big surprise.

What is a surprise is that the US nor the UK have chosen to make it more widely known.

3

Is it all about oil? Greed spawns evil. As does religion, if the message is mutilated.

Hell In A Handbasket = our destination if we don’t work together to stop the madness.

4

Not sure what you mean – the Saudi-al Qaeda connection is well known and been much discussed.

Whist I don’t know the particulars of Turki’s involvement specifically, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and al Qaeda (and other terrorist groups) is and was, to say the least, complex.

The top officials of Saudi Arabia are pragmatic real-politik types, in the mold of France (that’s not a dig). So yeah, their alliance with us is one of convenience, born of not wanting to piss off the big dog on the block and a big net oil importer. Their relationship with these groups was also pragmatic – based on fear of internal dissent and the possible overthrow of their regime by people even more religiously radical than themselves.

But here’s the thing – until September 12th, we weren’t really on the Saudis’ case about this – we, along with they, were apparently willing to tolerate a certain amount of terrorism to keep what we and they thought were a larger peace.

Clearly, that policy turned out to be a mistake (also not a dig).

So what’s important to examine here? What’s important is to examine the behavior of people after September 11th. Remember, the world changed that day – at least as far as American foreign policy is concerned. It’s a bit unfair to apply September 12th rules to conduct on the 10th, as we were the ones who changed the rules.

So to castigate Turki, I think we’d want to see either a) conduct after the 11th which indicates that he continued to support the group or b) foreknowledge of what al Qaeda had in mind.

Many members of the Saudi Royal family apparently did continue support for al Qaeda after the 11th – this has been an ongoing issue between the U.S. and the Saudis. The top members of the family have pledged to stop their relatives’ support, with varying success. Unsurprisingly, the level of cooperation increased markedly after the Riyadh terrorist attacks.

Finally, many people have been wondering why we haven’t called for “regime change” in Saudi Arabia, given the family’s less than complete cooperation and sometimes opposition to the war on terrorism. The answer is that regime change is coming – King Fahd has been in poor health for years, and there’s some doubt about the support Crown Prince Abdullah has to succeed him. So the U.S. regime change policy has been to wait.

5

Hmmm…Assuming that this lawsuit succeeds…How will you make them pay? Do you expect them to leave a trillion dollars in assets in the US if there’s a slight chance that this lawsuit could suceed? Or are you under the belief that a judgment by a US court will be enforced in Saudi Arabia?

6

I seem to recall that the Saudis have 3 trillion dollars lodged in American banks. This money gives them leverage over the US because they could withdraw it all at once which would cause a lot of damage to the US economy.

If a lawsuit went against them then the Supreme Court could probably order the banks to pay over some of the money they are holding. I would think that they could only do this though if the money is held in the names of those individuals and companies that have been indicted in the lawsuit.

However, as manhattan says, it would be hard to prove proximity - that these individuals were closely enough connected to 9/11 to be able to sue them. My prediction is that there will be a big ugly court case which will damage US-Saudi relations and, at the end of it, the claimants will lose.

But what do I know?

7

They could simply withdraw all the money they have in american banks if they’ve the feeling they might lose the case…

8

Unlikely. They wouldn’t want to withdraw 3 trillion dollars and wreck the US economy unless they really had to, as a last resort. They would probably rather lose the 1 trillion than destroy relations with the US.

They wanna keep the 3 trillion there to dissuade the US from ever invading them.

But in any case, no doubt the Supreme court could order a temporary freeze on their assets pending the outcome of the case.

For that matter, should the US ever decide to invade Saudi and Saudi decide to withdraw the money then US banks would, I’m sure, come up with some pretext to avoid handing the money over anyway. So if Saudi thinks that having the 3 trill. in place protects them from attack then they are mistaken.

9

All 7000+ of them?

No, I doubt it. In fact those at the top have reason to fear al-Qaeda - It was the Saudi government that harassed ObL until he was forced to flee the country during the Gulf War when he turned against the state and it is the Royal Family that will pretty much be the first up against the wall if ObL ever comes into power in SA. One of the principle ideological engines driving the al-Qaeda thinkers is opposition to what they term the “Sheikhists”:

According to the militants, there were, however, two kinds of salafists, as they defined them. The “sheikhists” had replaced adoration of Allah with the idolatry of the oil sheikhs of the Arabian penninsula, with the Al Saud family at their head. Their theorist was Abdelaziz bin Baz, Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia since 1993 and the archetypal court uleme ( ulema al-balat ). Their ostentacious slafism was no more than the badge of their hypocrisy, their submission to the non-Muslim United States, and their public and private vices, in the views of the militants. They had to be striven against and eliminated.

From Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam by Gilles Kepel, translated by Anthony Roberts ( 2002, Belknap Press ).

That said I don’t find the idea al-Qaeda has the support of at least some of the more extremist members of the al-Saud family all that unlikely. However equating that with the support of the Saudi government is just too far of a stretch from my standpoint.

Actually I don’t find it difficult to imagine at all. However it is true that what is far more likely is that they would turn a blind eye to it as a matter of both external and internal ( national and family ) realpolitik, up until the point it actually directly threatens the regime.

[quoteThis duplicity makes it all the more clear that Saudi Arabia has viewed their alliance with the United States as one of convenience and little else.[/quote]

I would have thought it was patently obvious that it has always been an alliance of convenience for both sides. Most alliances are, really.

No, I disagree. SA has real reasons to want to reign in jihadist terrorists, as noted. What they probably don’t care about are terrorists that don’t directly threaten them. But in the case of al-Qaeda at least, the U.S. and SA have a commonality of interest. The problem for SA is that they have to walk a careful line, beholden as they are to there own conservative elements.

He certainly was pre-1991 ( with the quiet assent of the U.S. ). Whether he has been since is open to question. The 1998 bribery charge ( i.e. buying off Mullah Omar and al-Qaeda with trucks ) I don’t find at all unlikely really, even though they remain unproven. But again, realpolitik - Which doesn’t seem to have held up very well at all, considering the attacks since that time. All the more reason for SA to tighten up in its stance and aid U.S. efforts.

Possibly, unless there was an internal purge of some sort, which sometimes happens when new family members take over positions. But it may well be besides the point. The al-Saud’s are neither all-powerful, nor all-knowing and in a country like that anybody could have compromised security - Either out of ideology or to make a few bucks. I’m not saying he’s not guilty, but certainly wouldn’t jump to conclusions yet that he is, based on supposition.

This, of course, has some real truth to it. SA is a fucked up country in many, many ways.

I, for one, expect it will not. The connection, post-Gulf War, seems weak to me and it assumes the government and the entire family moves in lockstep - a very dubious assumption IMHO.

  • Tamerlane
10

What about the tribe of al-Ghâmidî (also variously spelled Algamdi, al-Ghamdi, etc.)? Saudi is still internally structured by tribes to a great extent. There are al-Qâ‘idah terrorists who belong to this tribe, as well as senior figures in Saudi Interior Ministry who are tribally linked to the terrorists, and are reported to be covering up for them. This is an especially serious case of the fox guarding the henhouse. The Saudi government itself is in cahoots with al-Qâ‘idah.

11

According to a Time Magazine article, the Saudis have already withdrawn 100 billion dollars worth of capital since 9-11. These actions are serving as a shot across the bow of Shrub’s administration concerning any pending lawsuits or other potential action the United States may take.

Tamerlane, I am well aware of how large the Saudi royal family is. I was referring to the ruling circles in my OP. However. I’d wager that the huge size of the royal family is also a major sticking point. I’ve read that the Saudi per capita income is now one tenth of what it used to be. This is a drop from $60,000 per annum to a mere $6,000 yearly income. To sit by and watch the royals live in palatial homes with solid gold lavatory faucets is sure to generate unrest. The “gulfies” are already looked at askance by most other Arab countries while their continuing profligate lifestyle and conspicuous consumption is a blatant poke in the eye to the common people.

They have submitted to both economic and moral blackmail in pursuit of their now tenuous grip on the reins of government. To appease the Wahabbist mullahs in regard to their hypocritical free-spending ways they have permitted the fomenting of openly hostile propaganda against the United States. They have sent untold millions of dollars to terrorist organizations in an (now unsuccessful) attempt to avert any attacks within their own borders. The house of Saud has begun to reap the whirlwind they have sown for these many decades.

While there are cogent arguments that both sides have treated their alliance as a matter of convenience, the United States has put its money where its mouth is in terms of tactical support and training of the Saudi military. The Bush administration (and previous ones to a lesser extent) has willingly remained beholden to oil interests in a way that compromises national security. They too have now seen the repercussions of seeking convenience instead of long term planning.

None of this ameliorates the Saudis’ culpability in terms of supporting terrorism. In making their deal with the Wahabbist devil, they have knowingly and directly contributed to the 9-11 atrocity. Zouaydi was the bagman for Mohhamed Atta’s terror cell. Zouaydi was also the accountant to the Faisal branch of the royal family that includes the aforementioned Turki. The links are far too intimate to be mere coincidence. The top royals are well aware of the financial support that has been sent to Hamas and other terror organizations. Even if they are not, they have willingly allowed loose cannons to roll about their decks. Turning a blind eye to such evildoing is anathema to good statesmanship.

I am also extremely curious as to where the Saudis will consider parking their untold billions, if not in the United States. Should the plaintiffs prevail in their ongoing lawsuit, it is not unforeseeable that other countries would cooperate in our attempts to collect judgment. The Saudis can only be extremely uncomfortable with the prospect of bringing so much wealth back within their own potentially unstable borders. Such a vast accumulation of capital would be a prime nexus for limitless infighting and represent the essence of low hanging fruit for those seeking to overthrow the royals. Should they be so incautious as to withdraw all assets from the United States, the repercussions could be enormous for both countries.

It is quite possible that the current administration has fired its own rather distinctive shot across the Saudis’ bow with the liberation of Iraq. Our migration away from dependence upon Saudi petroleum should be giving them a substantial case of the jitters right about now. I am obliged to repeat how pathetic it is that a nation with the technological might of America is allowing itself to remain dependent upon oil in any way shape or form. We have the ability to free ourselves of any substantial reliance upon hydrocarbon fuels and should do so immediately. The vested and special interests of the current administration in our petroleum industry is nothing short of treasonous. Albeit, there are some quite valid issues of maintaining reliable short term supply lines. However, to intentionally squelch alternative fuels and transportation modes solely for the sake of political gain is flat out criminal.

Even more vile has been the Saudis’ willingness to bed down with obviously criminal and terrorist elements in their pursuit of temporary “stability.” We ourselves have seen the vivid results of such compromises with Osama bin Laden and the mujahideen in Afghanistan. That the Saudis are unwilling to learn from such a stark object lesson and instead pursue patently destabilizing interim solutions opens them up to financial liability. The dance is over and it is time for them to pay the piper.

12

I hope that this is true, for it would be one of the scant few good things to come from the Iraq war so far if it were, but sadly I suspect that it is not. I hope I am wrong, but my understanding of the global oil economy is as follows:

The real value of Saudi Arabia is not that it has oil. Lots of nations - Russia, Mexico, Nigeria, ad infinitum - have oil. No nation, however, is able to change the amount of oil it produces as quickly or as much as Saudi Arabia. No other nation can even begin to match Saudi Arabia’s effect on global oil prices.

To assist its OPEC partners, the Kingdom routinely pumps far less oil than it is able to produce, keeping prices artificially high for the benefit of nations less wealthy and even more dependent on petroleum than Saudi Arabia. To make up for shortfalls in global supply, however (for example, strikes in Venezuela, unrest in Nigeria, or war in Iraq), the Saudis will dramatically increase production in order to drive prices down to pre-crisis levels, which pleases the West and the United States. The overall effect of this Saudi manipulation is that the price of crude oil usually remains remarkably steady, at a value high enough for the nations of OPEC to make a decent profit but low enough for the United States to purchase comfortably.

If the Saudis feel that their position as an American ally or a global economic power is threatened, however, they are in an excellent position to use oil as a weapon. If, for example, a new Iraqi government were to defy Riyadh and attempt to rival it in oil production, setting itself up to replace the House of Saud in its relationship with Washington, the Saudis could simply increase production dramatically and drive petroleum prices to rock-bottom levels. The Saudis would probably be able to weather this depression (though it might certainly aggravate anti-Saud social unrest), but badly-needed Western investment in the dilapidated oil infrastructure of Iraq would disappear overnight. After all, the last thing the world would need would be more oil production.

The United States has no shortage of nations that are willing to sell it oil. The United States does have a shortage of nations that are able and willing to manipulate the price of oil in the way Saudi Arabia does. Unless Riyadh inexplicably chooses to allow it to, it does not seem likely that Iraq will be able to replace Saudi Arabia in this role for the United States.

13

Welcome aboard(s), Publius!

You make some excellent points about Saudi Arabia’s ability to single-handedly influence oil prices. I’m sure this is what has kept them in the driver’s seat for so long. I wonder just how long Saudi Arabia could maintain its oil producing supremacy were the United States to withdraw technological support. Massive amounts of their refining infrastructure is built upon American technology and knowhow. This is not to say other countries would be unable to stand in for us, but there might be a substantial hiccough in Saudi production for a while.

I still am unable to understand (save from the self-serving political standpoint) why America has not rallied its technological resources to free itself from dependence on hydrocarbon fuels. That Shrub’s administration has not made this their utmost priority should serve to eternally condemn them to the moral and ethical scrap heap. Our continuing reliance upon foreign petroleum only serves to invite more terrorist attacks and embroil American troops and commercial interests in one of the most needless and dangerous conflicts of interest in our entire history.

Were we to eliminate oil as a bone of contention in our foreign policy, it would render the Arabian peninsula nearly irrelevant overnight. Instead, we are ethically compromised by continuing dependence upon a stagnant and outdated technology for the sake of Republican political capital. This goes beyond outrageous and into the realm of pure and simple corruption. Shrub should have to answer in open court for his perpetuation of something so obviously contrary to our national interests.

14

Thanks, Zenster! I’m glad I found this place.

Good point about Western technological investment in Saudi Arabia. I’m not sure how much the Saudi oil industry would be hurt by the withdrawal of that investment; that’s certainly an interesting new subject to consider. In large part, I think the significance of the threat of such a withdrawal would depend on whether the Saudis or the Western oil companies were willing to blink first.

At any rate, I agree with you about the need to get ourselves over our addiction to petroleum. Until we do, I don’t think we can really hope to free ourselves from the sort of political baggage we’re currently struggling with in the Middle East and Central Asia. At best we can hope to replace our old, Saudi baggage with new Iraqi or Central Asian baggage.

15

When You Ride Alone, You Ride With Bin Laden. Considering the amount of money that flows into the Mid-East, it’s not surprizing that portions of it get diverted to nutjobs. After all, Saddam was able to build many of his palaces with money from the “Oil for Food” program.

What we need to be doing is looking at ways of keeping money out of the hands of the of the oil shieks. And we need to be doing it quickly.

16

First, the OP is entirely off base. Tamerlane has addressed this adequately on a factual basis, and it has been treated in the past.

Now as to this:

This much is correct. The Kingdom has the largest spare capacity at among the lowest cost to produce. It is the single swing producer.

Saudi Arabia is not and has never been a ‘price hawk’ but rather has acted as a moderator at both ends of the price spectrum. SA policy has been to work for price stability in the range of $18-21/barrel, a comfortable range for both consumers and producers.

In terms of GDP, the Kingdom is effectively entirely dependant on oil production and related activities, it is not a case of them being less dependant, but rather their supply and low cost enabling them to act as swing producers.

That is a far fairer resume than the initial.

Correct, SA has a lot of market power, however it is questionable if they could actually pull the above scenario off, given domestic budget and debt constraints, however the mere threat is serious in and of itself.

Iraq is far away from ever being able to play a Saudi role for a wide variety of reasons including domestic requirements for capital, which is largely the constraint that characterizes other large producers. SA has historically had rather more breathing room on this, although that is fast disappearing.

17

USG does not directly support SA oil infrastructure. It’s private sector, and not US firms alone.

Nope, TotalFinaElf and BP could step right in and make tidy profits off of this idiotic form of short sighted peevishness.

Because it is not as easy as all that, becasue it requires massive infrastructural investments and because the average consumer likes his bloody cars and his bloody fuel cheap.

In short, the costs are high, the problems not trivial and the need only felt in crisis moments.

Not at all, even were the ‘magic bullet’ technology to arise overnight, the replacement of the enormous amount of infrastructure and capital equiopment, as well as consumer equipment, geared to hydrocarbon fuel consumption would take substantial amount of time, ten years or more.

Dents in demand would pinch the Gulf, but insofar as the Gulf is about the lowest cost to produce, they’d be the last to go.

It’s a naive fantasy to think the hydrocarbon economy can disappear or even substantially change ‘over night.’

As to this from Tuckerfan:

The amount of money flowing into the Middle East is far less than the wild fantasies suggest, as to the last statement, I am unaware of substantial diversions from that program, and I am sure you will be so kind as to provide a respectable citation to support.

I would rather hope we could get some basic education in the economics and politics of the subject.

18

Gee, Collounsbury, you maked it damned difficult to be ill-informed around here. How am I supposed to make sweeping generalizations about Middle Eastern politics now? :wink:

I think this is essentially the point I meant to convey, but I did a poor job of it. What I meant was that, in keeping petroleum prices around the $20/barrel mark, the Saudis are still keeping petroleum prices higher than they would be if maximized production. “Artificial” was a poor choice of words on my part; “artificially high” doubly so. I didn’t mean to imply that the Saudis act to drive up the price of oil (because, after all, that also drives down Western consumption), just that they have room to drive it down should they desire.

The Saudis obviously aren’t producing at their full potential, and thus have a reserve of potential oil production with which they could conceivably flood the market should another, less developed petroleum exporter make the mistake of challenging Riyadh outside normal OPEC production quotas.

Is this an accurate assessment of the situation, or have I got that wrong?

19

As a postscript, what do you believe would be a reasonable timeframe for a shift from a fossil fuel-based economy? Do you think fifty years is too soon?

20

Or the assets could be frozen pending litigation. Likewise, it’s amazing how much leeway the government actually has in freezing foreign assets.