It does not matter if the viewpoints were specifically religious. This does not change the fact we are discussing viewpoint discrimination in Rosenberger. The fact it is a particular kind of viewpoint discrimination is irrelevant. Viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional, absent a compelling state reason. As a result, if the petitioner is successful in characterizing these facts as one of viewpiont discrimination on behalf of the law school, then the law school will have to conjure up a compelling state reason and demonstrate the policy is narrowly tailored. However, since Rosenberger is a viewpoint discrimination case, those inclined to find the existence of viewpoint discrimination will undoubtedly cite Rosenberger.
If, however, Bright n Shiny’s argument is agreed upon, which is there does not exist any viewpoint discrimination here, there does not exist any discrimination on the basis of speech because no speech is being discriminated against, but rather conduct, then there will still remain the issue of discriminating against the religious, or in the alterntative a religious group with religious beliefs. (This is not to suggest this is a two issue case, because quite simply it is not a two issue case.) The Locke decision provides a fantastic rationale for justifying the school’s alleged discrimination against the religious.
I think the first issue to be resolved is whether the school is discriminating on the basis of speech. The resolution of this query is necessary to deciding the case.
The thing is, nobody is actually attempting to do this. It’s a lame analogy that Scalia framed that is not on all fours with the actual issues involved in the case.
This is one of the factual disputes I alluded to earlier. First, what is the law school’s policy? Second, how is the policy applied?
The petitioner stipulated factually to the policy, and the stipulation apparently was friendly to the law school. However, petitioner is arguing the policy is applied in a discriminatorily manner. In other words, "A number of groups exercised that apparent freedom in order to preserve their identities and messages. For example, the student chapter of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, for example, required all members to “adhere to the objectives of the Student Chapter as well as the mission of [national] ATLA.” The Hastings pro-life group stated that “[s]o long as individuals are committed to the goals set out by the leadership, they are welcome to participate and vote in Silenced Right elections.” The bylaws of Outlaw reserve the right to remove any offi cer that “work[s] against the spirit of the organization’s goals and objectives.” (Argument made from the article but essentially what petitioner argued on appeal, although not necessarily these examples.)
If the policy is applied discriminatorily, then the question is what is the discrimination predicated upon? Are we talking viewpoint discrimination? Are we discussing discrimination against the religious or a particular religious group/belief? Is it both?
If petitioner is correct, then the law school has a more difficult road to travel down in justifying its conduct. I am not suggesting it is impossible just more difficult.
I disagree with this on two grounds. First, this is not just a viewpoint issue. If the CLS were advocating the gays should not be allowed, that would be a viewpoint. But by enacting a policy that gays are not allowed, it becomes an act not just a point of view. So this is not just a freedom of speech issue.
Second, the religious issue is very important and it’s not surprising that CLS has used it as a basis of their case. The government is allowed to discriminate (or differentiate if you want to use a less loaded term) on a variety of grounds. I used the example above of unemployment benefits - the government will give money to people that are unemployed but not give money to people that are employed. This is differentiating (or discriminating) between people on the basis of their employment status.
But the Constitution specifically states that the Government may not apply a religious standard to differentiate between people, which is what Rosenberger affirmed.
And the Hastings policy is not religious. It says student organizations cannot exclude students because their gay. No mention of religious beliefs there. They do not differentiate between the Christian Legal Society, which wants to exclude gay members because of their religious beliefs, and the (hypothetical) Student Rugby Association, which wants to exclude gay members because it doesn’t want to shower with them after matches.
This (from the linked article) seems like a good summation of the issue:
But the article then goes on to say this:
There’s no such battle going on here. It’s not an either/or issue. Hastings is not telling the CLS it cannot exclude gay members. So both organizations can continue to function under their respective policies.
The problem is that the CLS is not willing to accept that. It’s not enough for them that their policy of excluding gay members will be allowed in their organization. They want to go on to compel Hastings College to change its policies so they are in accordance with the CLS policy.
LittleNemo, this is the source of my confusion from the article:
If the policy is that everyone has to be allowed to join any group (“all comers”), then to my mind, the analysis is somewhat different than if the policy is that a group cannot discriminate on sexual orientation. If the school has an “all comers” policy but is selectively enforcing it, then, to my mind, that raises a host of other issues. If it has an “all comers” policy, but it is not selectively enforcing it, then I think we’re back to my original position.
I think this is a factual question which will have to be resolved and it is apparent some of the justices on the Court may have felt this factual question, along with others, was not sufficiently developed below.
It doesn’t make too much sense that they can’t form a group that is allowed to selectively admit certain students. I started a club at my school, and I had to say beforehand what type of students would be admitted. If I chose an open group, then I would not be able to decline admittence to anyone, but if otherwise, I could choose at my discretion, based on the guidlines I devolped.(It was a History club, so this wasn’t really an issue.) If you set up the club, in the initial stages, in collaberation with the school-- it should be up to the students who is admitted. People are so quick to label any form of selectivness in groups and schools as malicious discrimination nowadays.
As far as I’m concerned, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is malicious discrimination (although, as discussed so far in this thread, it’s not clear to me what exactly has happened here).
The problem with the CLS’s position here, though, seems to be that the policy rejects all gay students, regardless of their viewpoint, so that even a gay student who thought that homosexuality was immoral would be rejected.
Are you trying to imply that my post did not provide enough information for you to address it? If so, let me expand upon it.
You stated that there are a number of important differences that exist. But you did not explain what these important differences were. Please explain what these differences are and how they are relevent to the application of the laws we are discussing here.
I should hope he is also wrong about the campus Republican Club being a “Christian society.” I mean, can’t a Jew be a good Republican?! Can’t a Muslim?!
I think when Justice Scalia said “this Christian society” he was referring to the CLS not the hypothetical Republican Club he had just mentioned.
But on that point, Justice Scalia said, “It is so weird to require the campus Republican Club to admit Democrats, not just to membership, but to officership.”
Hastings policy prohibits student organizations from excluding members on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex, or sexual orientation.
So does anyone think that there is a factual basis to what Scalia said? That Hastings’ existing policies would force a Republican Club to accept Democrats as members. And if so, can you explain what you base that opinion on?
No, no… I have to admit your post did, on its face, fairly imply the precise question you explicitly pose above.
The reason for my Really? was not confusion at what you were asking, but disbelief that you had to ask it, since the answers are just as fairly evident as the question was.
To review: you said:
This would very likely fail the test of “sincerely held religious belief.” In Brown v. Peña, 441 F.Supp. 1382 (D.C. Fla. 1997), affirmed 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979), a plaintiff in a Title VII action claimed that consuming Kozy Kitten People/Cat Food was a religious necessity. The court found that this was a sham claim. They identified a three-prong test for a sincerely-held religious belief:
[ul]
[li]If the belief is based on a theory of “man’s nature or his place in the Universe”[/li][li]If it is not merely a personal preference but has an institutional quality about it[/li][li]If it is legitimately and sincerely believed[/li][/ul]
In contrast, the beliefs cited by the CLS would virtually certainly meet the criteria for sincerely held religious beliefs.
There are others, but let’s stick with that for now, unless you find it deficient in some way.
Yes, because, as Hastings Outlaw, who filed an Amicus brief for the Law School, pointed out:
That Hastings’ existing policies require any official organization to be open to all students, regardless of their viewpoints or beliefs isn’t at question here. That’s the policy that CLS is challenging.
Does Hastings have an obligation to provide access to its facilities to Christian student groups if they provide access to those facilities to other groups?