Science=Opium v 2.0?

Great Debates
81

David Simmons:

Actually the comfort that comes from science exists precisely because science evolves. If people believed that our current scientific theories were the final answers, they would not be comforted, because they are seen as insufficient. But science will keep evolving. More accurate and detailed predictions and explanations will keep being created. This means that people are able to think of uncomfortable things as things that science will someday explain, and this is comforting. For example, it is uncomfortable to think that sane humans decide to murder, so jurors may accept the idea that the killer entered a biologically explainable trance-like state. “I’m sure we will one day have a scientific explanation for this murder.” This leads into another area where science can provide comfort. People with the knowledge that science will advance, and with the knowledge that current scientific theories are beginning to explain many choices, can extrapolate that in the future all choices will be explained scientifically, thus taking away individual responsibility (in their opinion). “This choice was caused by biology, there was nothing I could do.” So yes, science can have an opiate effect. I never said it was equivalent to religion, and of course it isn’t. My whole point is that science can be an opiate for the masses just as religion was. This does not mean science equals religion, any more than it means science equals opium.

82

The word you’re looking for here is thousands (1000s). :smiley:

83

JS Princeton, I don’t believe that at all. I believe the formulation of science which implies that science never proves anything is where the problem lies, and also in the notion of indisputable truths (conveniently, most science discussions involve this very conception, by on one hand denoting the problem of [incomplete] induction and simultaneously allowing for the transcendence of logic and mathematics).

I’ve just picked up Popper’s magnum opus on the subject so I may state my objections more clearly. I trust neither of us are going anywhere? :slight_smile: (Of course, I did that inductively :p)

84

I guess this is true as long as you are willing to be satisfied with the scientific explanation, when it comes, even if that explanation is pretty grim in human terms.

85

And, last, but not least:

A short list of
[QUOTES & DEFINITIONS ABOUT GOD, RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, MORTALITY, TIME, WAR, SCIENCE & SEX]
(http://doorbell.net/tlr/god.htm)

86

“Simply a logical process”?!? Again: the transcendence of logic and its synthesis with truth is supposed to be obvious by inspection? Much of Popper’s book so far (The Logic of Scientific Discovery) has been a determined attack on psychologism, positivism, and a brushing aside of induction (quite literally).

I must say I am personally very impressed with the book, it is a powerfully descriptive system of a methodology that we may name, among other things, science. But in trying to sidestep the problem of induction, he has found himself in a position of asserting the purity of logic (and math, and their underlying motivations in set theoretical formulatoins), and never demonstrates how it is that these tautological “devices” (though he would hate that word ;)) can apply at all to empirical research. He asserts an empirical theory (that is, a theory of science, t [that’s a variable]) which is to be used deductively.

That is awful magical to me. I remain unclear on his separation of meaning from theories, epistemologically speaking. He defines a theory well enough without induction provided we already understand the meaning of the words, symbols, and relations used for definition. As such, he pushes the problem of induction out of science and into the realm of learning science [actually, learning anything, but on-topic here].

Cunning. At the Friesian website we find a similar “burden of proof” shifting against Hume (which Popper seems to “start” from, which is good enough IMO).

The man was unquestionably (to me) smart, and approached scientific research without the use of induction directly, which is a monumental achievement. But his use of falsifiability as opposed to verifiability [reference the Dawkins quote above for some irony, IMO] in order to dodge the problem of induction left (to use a metaphor) the empirical knowledge-set empty. As such, I maintain that this approach to empirical systems is epistemological nihilism, something he seems to never mention thus far (I’m more or less finished with the book right now, it is quick, but terse, reading). His system is at least deductively consistent, but it can never be anything else since it never adds to the body of knoweldge.

Given his own admission that the set of possible theories is infinite, his program of elimination through falsification never adds anything to our knowledge. This much, he admits. It is a wonder, then, that he considers this an addition to epistemology.

I find it to be a somewhat well-defined methodological behavior whose purpose lies outside of the system in the realm of metaphysical speech.

87

Popper… Brilliant guy; utterly reductive. It’s tired, but I much prefer Kuhn over him.

88

Got any reading recommendations, JS Princeton? I’m always game.

89

I’m afraid most of what you just said, erislover, went high over my head (MEGO syndrome). But this:

This one I think I understand, but can’t agree with. If there are 10 theories about something, and applying falsification to the problem eliminates half of them, we have learned something. And if 9 of the 10 are eliminated, we have learned a lot. We might have even learned the truth.

90

The problem is, the act of falsification is also open to falsification. The rejection of a theory is a theory of rejection, and so it is never certain either.