Well, if in the course of passing that law they were talking about ethnicity, of course they can’t then say it doesn’t apply to Jews and the Irish.
However, I think they can get upset if, say, that law is used by the courts to say that the state cannot treat children differently from adults. Again, legislatures ought to be able to rely on the courts to consider context and intent when construing broad language.
Well, the issue here isn’t really so much the existence of caveats as it is how those caveats are determined. The founders undoubtedly did not intend for free speech to mean the protection of libelous statements; even though that caveat isn’t present in the text, we consider it valid because it accords with the understanding of the framers at the time they drafted the first amendment.
Just an observation.
Which can be extrapolated to reach a reasonable conclusion as to what they intended in toto. No, this is not a mathematically precise operation. As I’ve noted (again and again and again), there can be good-faith disagreements as to how the drafters of a law meant for that law to apply to a given set of facts. I would expect even a court comprised entirely of the strictest of strict constructionists to have dissenters in various cases. They key isn’t that judges reach the same conclusion, it’s that judges apply constructionist analysis in good faith in reaching those conclusions.
Yes it does. If you were to hand the Constitution to an alien from another planet, would he conclude that, say, marriage is a protected right?
I think you’re confusing “clear” with “something I really, really want to believe is in there.”
Canned post time (yeah, we’ve discussed this before):
The Ninth Amendment exists to prevent the argument that the existence of the Bill of Rights invalidates other legal sources of rights (e.g., statutory rights and state constitutional rights). It prevents, say, opponents of the Massachusetts gay marriage decision from arguing that the decision is invalid because the federal constitution’s enumeration of rights is exclusive. It is not itself a source of substantive rights.
Even libbies with law degrees like minty green understand this.
Why? I think the decisions finding such a right in the constitution are incorrectly decided. While such a right exists as a practical matter simply because the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitutionality, that doesn’t mean the courts are correct in finding such a right in the constitution.
I agree with the holding in Loving on its equal protection grounds, but disagree with the holding insofar as it relies on a substantive due process right to marry.
The notion that Goodridge is just a neutral application of precedent is silly. No court has gone so far as to extend marital rights (such as they are) to gays. No court outside of Vermont and possibly Hawaii (neither of which, of course, can speak to the meaning of Massachusetts law) has even come close.