But ”how am I supposed to live without you?”
Many former intelligence, military, and law enforcement officials go on to serve in consultancy to government contractors, policy think tanks, and non-governmental organizations which will sponsor and maintain their security clearances, as well as consulting back to their former organizations who make hire them through a contractor or bring them back as a “casual” on-call employee; if they are not so sponsored, the clearance is deactivated but can be reactivated with relative easy provided the clearance is still within its review period. Regardless of the state of the clearance, anyone who has previously held a security clearance is required to protect any classified information for life, e.g. not release or confirm secure and classified information without approval from the classifying authority. There is no ‘right’ to hold a security clearance and it can be revoked even without specific infractions if the clearance sponsor or controlling agency determines that the clearance holder no longer needs or should have a clearance. Nor can someone just “[walk] into the building they used to work in and [look] at files.” Even with the appropriate clearance level, you have to have a legitimate need to access classified materials, which are generally secured by an individual responsible party in a safe, Secure Controlled Information Facility (SCIF), or on a secured computing system with controlled user access. Without having information under your control, you have to gain the explicit permission by individual document owners or the Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) to actually access classified information.
Without any particular cause other than disagreeing with their publically stated views on the current administration, ordering the clearances to be revoked appears capricious and vindictive, but within the authority of the chief executive. It won’t have any effect on their ability to offer negative opinions about the current administration or the President in regard to non-classified information or activities, so it doesn’t restrict their First Amendment rights or otherwise limit any Constitutionally-protected actions, and I doubt they could pursue any remedy in the courts unless they can demonstrate that their is some specific offense or conspiracy related to revoking the clearances, and even then I suspect legal action could be tied up indefinitely simply by arguing the necessity of national security and the prerogative of the executive in determining who has a need for access to classified material. Every Department (Defense, Justice, Energy, State, et cetera) issues its own security clearances and has its own policies about retaining clearances after employment, so the DoJ revoking the clearances of FBI agents does not mean that State Department, DOJ, or DOE has to follow the same policies.
Anyone can, of course, make a Freedom of Information Request (FOIA) about any data product or document produced by or for any branch or agency of the federal government, and the responsible agency has to respond by either providing the specified information (in full or redacted form) or giving reason why it cannot (classified, contains personally identifable information, et cetera). There are exceptions for “ongoing” classified programs for which providing even a confirmation of the existence would compromise operational security (the so-called “Glomar denial” after the CIA’s refusal to confirm or deny the true purpose of the Glomar Explorer and Project Azorian) and there is little external accountability for a refusal to provide full information short of suing the pertinent agency, hence why the Department of the Interior is refusing to release complete calendar information on Ryan Zinke’s meetings. The former government officials whose clearances are revoked can still make FOIA requests about information of which they are aware, and dispose the degree of redaction or claims that the information is still operationally sensitive.
Stranger