6. Perhaps the goal isn’t even to build a working NMD.
But rather to force China into an arena of [technological] competition for which they are singularly unsuited. By doing so, we define the strategic imperatives and areas of strategic nuclear competition for the next 20 some-odd years or so. Where is China going to get the high-tech science and gee-gaws necessary to build a counter to NMD?
And by knowing what China needs to know, we know where they are going to look for it, and have a very good idea how they are going to go about it. I’d say that this puts us at least a step ahead of them, intelligence/counter-intelligence wise (barring another Toshiba-Konigsberg, of course).
If an ICBM could be destroyed prior to warhead/bus separation, near the apex of its trajectory…
…or even after warhead separation, the warhead is a “dumb” package, and it’s extreme velocity during reentry would cause enough localized ionization that it can’t effectively “counter” any homing NMD missile.
Does anyone honestly think that, if we develop sufficiently reliable ABM technology (currently a big if, but not an insurmountable one; doesn’t anyone here remember us going to the moon a couple of times, some years back?), that we can’t build enough ABM missiles to counter China’s ICBMs?
If you do, ask yourself this: how many Tomahawks did we launch at Iraq in '91?
That NMD doesn’t address FedEx Nukes or viral agents delivered by rogue states is irrelevant; I doubt any technical means could be developed to counter these threats anyway. The best shield against those particular bugaboos is good old-fashioned HUMINT, gathered by CIA agents in faraway lands with funny names.
Funny thing about that; IIRC, “W” has recently allocated more funds to the various US Intelligence gathering agencies.
SO: with this premise, we can promise to “share” any nominal NMD system all week long, knowing full well that our goal isn’t to actually build one; just force others to try to build one or a counter to one.
And who has the higher GDP surplus to spare?