Getting back to Soleimany v Soleimany, one has to ask one’s self what the courts would consider void as to policy with respect to religious arbitration. Let’s go back to those half-dozen issues I raised earlier, and Jodi’s issue concerning estates.
Should a woman’s testimony be given less weight than a man’s testimony? This would be void as being against policy, for it is profoundly gender biased.
Should custody of a child automatically go to the man unless the child is of tender years? This would be void as being against policy, for it is not in the best interests of the child.
Should spousal support to a wife be automatically terminated after three months? This may be void as being against policy, for although parties are for the most part free to contract, it would run against the policy that there should be spousal support when there is a need, and that such need should be met by the spouse rather than the state. Furthermore, there would be the issues of non est factum and of duress that could be raised against any decision that started with a power imbalance between the parties and reinforced that power imbalance in the award itself.
Should a woman be required to get her husband’s permission to obtain a divorce? This would be void as being against policy, for it is profoundly gender biased. (Note that I refer to civil divorce, as opposed to religious divorce.)
Should sex outside of marriage be criminalized, and if so, should the penalty be lashing or beheading? I expect that the by-passing of criminal law would be held as being against policy. It is one thing to have commuity involvement (for example, here in Canada sentencing circles are sometimes used in aboriginal communities), or to even have modified application of criminal law to specific groups (for example, here in Canada particular attention is given to avoid incarcerating aboriginal offenders), but this sort of accomodation is done under or as part of the supervision of the court, rather than in place of such supervision. In particular, I just don’t see a community being permitted to apply barbaric punishment.
Should a woman receive a lesser inheritance? On its face, this is profoundly gender biased. Yes, a party can contract out by way of arbitration using Sharia law, but in appeal the court would inquire as to why a party would agree to such an arrangement. If the party appealing claimed non est factum or duress, I expect that the court would take such grounds very seriously.
Should a woman residing in a secular democracy but raised and living in a Sharia based comunity be required to abide by Sharia laws even after she has recognized and is attempting to reject the profound power imbalances inherent in such a tradition? This lies at the heart of the problem. Sharia law is profoundly at odds with western family law, for it is greatly gender biased. Sharia law is hierarchical, in that the wife is subservient to the man, the man has custody of the children except during tender years, the man has minimal support obligations, the woman has a lesser right to divorce, the woman has a lesser right to inheritance, and the woman has lesser right to testimony. Add to this the problem that many (but certainly not all) Muslim cultures are generally biased against women when it comes to education and economic self-determination, and you have a nasty mix of law and culture that impinges on a woman’s ability to recognize and then reject her own victimization. Please note that although there are conracts in family law, there is one heck of a difference between a simple commercial contract and a family law contract. The courts are very conscious of the difference, and are very keen to protect the parties from power imbalances. Just because the parties agree to something in a family law contract does not necessarily mean that the court will hold the parties to the family law contract. I expect that non est factum and duress would be so commonly used as grounds for appeal that Sharia family law would generally be treated with no more than a token nod, but otherwise tossed at every opportunity.
As Justice Rix noted in the estate decision Myrna Mouaffak al Midani, Omar Mouaffak al Midani v Imad Mouaffak al Midani, Amer Mouaffak al Midani, Alawi Darwish Kalal, Mohamed Said Badinjki, Robert Iskrander Ghanem (QBD Commercial Crt, Rix J.) 22 Feb 1999, 1 Lloyd’s Rep 923, the Islamic Shar’a Council of Great Britain “. . . acknowledges that it “is not yet legally recognised by the authorities in the UK”, but represents itself as gaining recognition and confidence among the Islamic community and at large. It would seem that Islamic divorce and matrimonial questions in general are the focus of its advisory and judicial work. It states that its constitution allows it to deal with cases where either party has been living permanently in the UK and has applied to it for judgment. It can grant Islamic divorce, but it emphasises that such divorce nullifies only the Islamic marriage and has nothing to do with the civil contract.”
I submit that this should remain as it is – do not grant any judicial authority to Sharia law over English family law. It is one thing to let parties who are on an equal footing with each other to sort out their differences through the assistance of arbitration. It is quite another to put in place a parallel judicial system that is fundamentally gender biased.