Correct; it’s used in indexes: actuarial predictors of criminal behaviour. A risk factor. There isn’t 100% corellation, so it’s simply false to say that a person prone to animal cruelty will inevitably go on to harm humans.
I think that criminalizing non-harmful behaviour (going by your premise that animal abuse isn’t harmful enough to warrant laws against it for its own sake; a premise I disagree with…) because you think it may lead to harmful behaviour is disgusting fascism.
I think we can upgrade this to “All mammals and most other animals, but probably not insects or lower forms of life than that.” Reptiles, I’m not too sure about… I took care of an iguana for a few years (It was my mother’s, she’s taking care of it now.) and I’m really not sure it did.
I don’t know if I can agree with that. The lines of demarcations should be drawn, but ‘consistent’ is a funny, funny, funny word.
Why not? We do it already. Case in point: The Pinto. It was deemed cheaper to deal with lawsuits arising from deaths than to fix the problem with the car. In fact, we see an increasing commodization of workers (outsourcing, anyone) and consumers.
Why? It’s pretty clear that humans and animals are different. Why does this not matter in regard to rights?
And the ‘pet’ class of animals have these rights, generally, though euthenasia is acceptable.
Animals, generally, count as tools for humans, in their development, legally, and up till recently, morally.
Why should a horse have more rights than a car? A dog more rights than a fence with alarm?
Additional note: “Think as some humans do” This is another interesting phrase. I can say, truthfully, my dog has a sense of time, cause and effect, intuition, emotion, and is at least as bright as a one year old. Possibly brighter. He’s a superdog, he opens doors with doorknobs, and figured out how to turn on the TV. (That was interesting. It was like watching a child suddenly go ‘aha!’)
But that’s more than what I would require for “Think as some humans do”. Simply stated, I’d call it evidence of emotion. Not thinking like humans, not thinking as well as humans, simply the ability to react to the world with some measure of self-awareness. Not the full measure… my dog, I am reasonably sure, is self-aware. He sees a reflection in the mirror, and knows it is him. (I tested this with a bit of tape and some wrapping paper that was reflective. He walked around with it, until he went past the hall mirror, it flashed, he stopped, and pulled it off with his mouth… I like messing with my dog. It keeps both of us entertained.) Squirrels, less so, but they have a measure of self-awareness… or they wouldn’t tease the dog so.
May I suggest that, for the purposes of discussing whether animals suffer, feel pain, etc., we confine ourselves initially to discussing (as Tom Reagan does) adult, mentally normal mammals?
THere are very few animal rights advocates who say that sponges should be protected as vociferously as chimpanzees, after all, so it does us no good to show that sponges should not be protected. To refute animal rights philosophy, we must show that chimpanzees should not be protected.
Furthermore, I suggest that we evaluate whether toddlers (say, age one) should be protected for their own sake, and consider what traits these toddlers have that distinguish them morally from cows.
Not if you kill them first, they don’t. Does this mean that murdering toddlers is copacetic?
To anticipate an objection: we could make it legal only to kill your own toddlers, not someone else’s toddlers. That way, you’re not indirectly harming someone else.
Animal rights activists include non-mammals, including fish, in their animal rights philsophy, so it’s perfectly reasonable to include non-mammals in rebuttals.
And why must we show that chimpanzees should be protected to refute their philosophies? Unless you take the position that you have to either agree with the entirety of the animal rights movement (i.e., subscribe to pretty much everything over at peta.com) or reject it entirely we can refute (portions) of it by examining animals that aren’t chimpanzees.
And no, it shouldn’t be legal or morally acceptable. Toddlers grow up into adult humans. They will almost certainly grow to become an intelligent, fully conscious being. To kill one is to prevent that from being realized.
The same can not be said of a cow. A cow will never grow into an intelligent, fully conscious being. Just a fairly stupid being that tastes incredible if prepared right.
Well, I could just turn it around on you and ask you to justify your Premise 4.
Or I could just say that, between “There is no moral difference between humans and all other animals” and “There is such a moral difference,” I find the second to be closer to obvious and self-evident than the first.
But I’ll take a stab at giving my reasons why I reject Premise 4.
First, there’s the fact that humans are the only animals who, apparently, have a moral sense. They’re the only ones who would even wrestle with such a question. I take this to be a significant, though not definitive, difference.
Second, each human being is a unique individual, with his/her own personality, sensibility, etc. You might be able to say the same thing about some higher animals, but not about, say, ants. I don’t think there’s anything that would distinguish one ant from another, even to other ants. If one ant happens to get stepped on, it’s no significant loss to the world, even to the ant world.
The place where it makes most sense to me to draw the line is between human and non-human. Otherwise… does an ant have rights? An oyster? A paramecium or bacterium? A virus? A plant or fungus? An inanimate object? And if not, why not?
Finally (there may be more, but this is all I can think of right now), I believe humans have unique status for religious reasons, reasons that are woven into the whole notion of what rights are and whether they exist at all. (As the Declaration of Indepence put it, we are endowed by our Creator with certain rights.)
I’m well aware of fishinghurts, thanks–I mentioned sponges, not fish.
My point is that animal rights folks can make the strongest case for extending legal protection to adult mentally normal mammals. If we do not want to extend such legal protections (i.e., if we don’t want to outlaw cattle-farming), we need to present an argument against these legal protections: pointing out that sea-cucumbers don’t have pain receptors is of little use.
If you’re willing to cede this ground to animal rights folks, then of course it makes sense to focus only on fish or other cases where you’re not willing to cede ground; but if you’re not willing to cede ground, you’d do best to argue the most difficult case for you, since your arguments vs. legal protection for cows (or even chimps) will almost certainly encompass your arguments vs. legal protection for fish (or even earthworms).
“Some” in the OP was meant to refer to higher-order mammals. Since I’m not a biologist, I don’t know for sure which animals qualify, just that some do. Someone that knows more about it than I should clarify even further if need be.
[QUOTE=Metacom]
But if someone claims its morally wrong to kill sea-cucumbers, it is of use.[/quote[
Only if you’ve not constructed an argument against extending rights to cows. If you’ve constructed such an argument, it’ll almost certainly suffice for refuting the pro-sea-cucumber folks as well.
However, if you’re bound and determined to construct separate arguments against legal rights for lots and lots of different species, I can’t stop you. I’ll only participate in the argument about adult, mentally-normal mammals, since, as I said, it’ll encompass all the other arguments if proven wrong. I’ll only talk about other animals if and when we agree that the adult mentally normal mammals ought to receive protection.
OK, then participate in arguments about adult, mentally normal animals. My first post in this thread addressed such arguments. My response to your “cows vs. toddlers” questions addressed such arguments. E-Sabbeth, Thudlow Boink, Stonebow, MGibson, and others have made such arguments.
It was once, if not legal, acceptable to abandon children to the weather. I ran across the custom in one of our discussions on abortion. Exposure, that was the term. Up to something like two and a half.
There may be some relation to the custom of christening after a certain period, to be sure the child would be survive. Suffice it to say, historically, even human life was not always viewed as an ideal thing to save. People weren’t considered to have rights, save what their lords gave them till… call it the Magna Carta?
Natural rights come later. Locke? This is, of course, a digression, but one to establish a point. Murdering toddlers is not acceptable now, but if you attempt to establish rights for animals by analogy, you must make sure both ends are supported.
Personally, I’m interested in this thread, and my views on animal rights may not be horribly different from yours, excepting that I recognize some strong hypocracy in my actions, so I’m trying to see where we go with this.
I do wish cows didn’t taste so good, man. It’d make life much easier.
You’re absolutely right that I don’t say from where rights stem. I didn’t want to open that can of worms. But I don’t think the argument needs to specifically address one system in order to make sense. The OP assumes that humans decide who ought and ought not to have rights. That is the only assumption that it needs to share with a particular system of rights. Then it argues for a principle in this decision: that they not be handed out arbitrarily; we need a good reason for deciding where to draw the line. I also tried to address a little of the utilitarianism argument.
Responsibility and justice are good examples of potentially morally relevant distinctions, and we should spell them out. Care to take the lead?
This is also a good point. Though I think the moral status of these humans is in question (Mrs. Schiavo, for example). The moral ground is clearer when we talk about less severely retarded humans.
But the point certainly remains. Can anyone formulate a response to this? Can you, Blake?
I don’t think there’s a semantic distinction between denying something arbitrarily and for arbitrary reasons, but I’ll defer to your clarification. That said, I think you’ve just offered a lot of examples of when we do this but we shouldn’t. I didn’t say the practice of our current system of rights successfully grants them equally – this is clearly false for a lot of reasons. I said it ought to be consistent. Do you disagree?
We all agree there are distinctions between animals and humans. Abstract language, for one. But these distinctions are arbitrary insofar as rights are concerned (argue the AR people). Arbitrary is probably a poor word to choose, I just pulled it directly from Tom Regan’s argument. If you think there is some morally relevant distinction, tell us what it is and why it’s morally relevant.
I think this is a pretty convincing response to whether animals should have a right to life. What about a right to some sort of independence or autonomy?
Thank you for giving your reasons, I was frustrated earlier, I came off too snarky. (Incidentally, I set up the premises in the OP without much defense because I figured the ensuing debate would reveal where they needed to be defended.)
A significant difference indeed, but why is it relevant to whether or not they ought to have basic rights?
Agreed, see my clarification in the above post.
Well, I agree we want to exclude those categories, so we should draw the line and whatever mammals meet our set of qualifications regarding pain, conciousness, etc.
You mean that I must establish that it’s wrong to kill toddlers? I agree–but on the other hand, I’m willing to cut a fair amount of slack to an argument that shows it’s wrong to kill toddlers, as long as it does so for a good reason.
That said, I’m not sure what shape such an argument would take, if it simultaneously allows for killing bonobos.
We may well be close together on animal rights. I wear leather, I eat gelatin-containing Frosted Mini-Wheats, I enjoy fish, I consume cheese. I’m certainly no animal rights purist.
At the same time, animal-rights arguments are difficult for me to dismiss out of hand, and I’ve not yet encountered a persuasive argument against extending rights to bonobos. Nor have I encountered an intellectually satisfying argument in favor of extending more rights directly to human infants than we extend to cows.
I’d still vote in favor of extending more rights to infants–I just can’t justify that vote intellectually.
A response to the issue of cabbages and croquet mallets? Certainly: this is the reason why, for the moment, we should limit ourselves to discussing adult mentally normal mammals. If we decide that this group deserves the protection of certain rights, then it makes sense for us to go “lower” on the list of animals and decide which other animals also deserve rights. If we reject the notion that this group deserves the protection of rights, then we may dispense with further investigation.
Exactly. If the capacity for abstract language were our criterion for granting rights, then:
We needn’t grant any rights to pre-language infants; and
We needn’t grant any rights to stroke victims who have lost the ability to speak; and
We needn’t grant any rights to the severely mentally retarded.
I suggest that we ought to grant rights to all three groups, based on on their capacity for language, but on their capacity for suffering (and their capacity for desires, fears, a sense of self, etc.)
Smarter people don’t have more rights protection than stupid people, even if they’re a helluva lot smarter than the stupid people. Intelligence and abstract thinking don’t correlate to rights within our species; I see no reason why they should correlate to rights across species.
Those groups don’t have the same rights as a healthy adult. In fact, all are going to have a legal guardian making decisions for them or be a ward of the state.