Yes.
Selective Service – the draft – was repeatedly upheld as a valid exercise of governmental power. It involved requiring much more than coding effort.
Citizens can be forced to serve on juries.
Here is a good discussion about compelled assistance and the posse comittaus law.
Aside from the general theories about military service and jury duty, which presumably establish the government’s right in those limited circumstances, is there some existing law that empowers the government to point its giant finger at someone and say, “You must now work for us” – regardless of the job. Just for the hell of it, let’s posit that this guy is older and not eligible for the draft.
And BTW, if they WOULD have to literally draft him, is that possible without some enabling legislation?
The short version – would Congress have to pass some law that doesn’t now exist to compel this person?
Boyo, my city requires people to shovel the sidewalk in front of their properties within six hours after a snowstorm. This place is chockablock with lawyers, a few of whom are willing to sue about anything, so I can only assume that someone has tested whether the 13th Amendment prohibits an unconstitutional, unpaid call to shovels.
For Ravenman:
Thanks!
Hey, those are all legitimate actions which the user totally agreed to by clicking on the Terms and Conditions!
To be fair, the U.S. Government didn’t produce the Newton. So, one point for the Republic.
I was reading some blogs this morning and I came across one that I thought was pretty relevant to your question – here’s the meat of it and a link:
I haven’t thought about all the applications and implications of this test, but seems like a reasonable place to begin.
This is all incorrect. The A6 processor on an iPhone 5C contains a hardware key that cannot ever be read (cite). The user’s passcode is tangled with that hardware key by the iOS software, and files are then encrypted with that key. It is not located in plain format anywhere in the file system.
Why do you think the passcode is only a 4-digit number? Not that it has to do with the legal aspects of the case. I’ve been searching the reports and haven’t found any indication of what kind of passcode the terrorist used.
A good explanation of the security on a 5C and other iPhones is at the link above to my cite. The 5C has an A6 processor, which contains a hardware key that can’t be read. The iPhone takes the user’s passcode, scrambles it up with the A6 hardware key, to generate the encryption key. That key will probably be 256 bits.
Even if the FBI gets the encrypted files out of the phone’s memory, it won’t do them any good. There is no way they could break AES256 encryption. They need to be able to guess the guy’s passcode, and to do that you need it to be running in the iPhone with the processor that the key was created with. Guessing the guy’s passcode could be possible, and his own iPhone could then decode the files. But no one can take the files and guess the 256-bit key, so moving those files to another iPhone does them no good.
I try to keep up with the security/encryption community, and why I don’t view that as part of the security is that you should never trust the security of your data to something that’s possessed by a third party. iOS 8 has strong encryption where you alone have access, and that’s where the security comes from.
An analogy is that you have a safe that is uncrackable without the combination that only you know. If you choose a good many-digit combination, your data is hopelessly out of reach for anyone else. Further, your safe is located inside a bank vault that you and your bank have keys to.
Now in this situation, what provides the security of your stuff? You would have to know that the police with a search warrant could force the bank to let them get to your safe, right? That’s security against your next door neighbor, but not against a search warrant from the state. It’s not a hole in the security of your stuff if the bank knuckles under and is forced to let the police get to your safe. The security comes from the uncrackable safe itself.
United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 US 159 (1977) is undoubtedly very important precedent here.
It looks as if some courts have found that if following the order would harm the company’s reputation with its customers, then that may pose an “undue burden.” It raises the question of whether the people saying this is a PR stunt have it exactly backwards–maybe the PR aspect is in service of the legal case, to help them better suggest that compliance with the FBI order would harm the company’s branding.
Lots of interesting questions here.
Regardless if some here think that the wipe feature isn’t a security feature – as absurd as that is on its face – Apple clearly thinks it is a security feature. I read somewhere last night that Apple programmed in an 80ms delay on the 5c, and increasingly longer delays on newer phones, between each incorrect passcode entry in order to interrupt brute force attacks that the FBI says it would do.
Plus, there is the little matter that Tim Cook himself sees the wipe feature as a security feature, because his whole damned claim is that the software he’s being directed to build would “undermine decades of security advancements that protect our customers.”
So even if you don’t see it as a security feature, Apple does. For better or for worse, that is why they’re fighting it.
I can’t help but think this is all some ploy by Apple to sell more phones.
I wonder if the FBI tried “1234”? 
Yes. I cited those examples for the proposition that the government can compel labor in furtherance of certain interests without offending the Constitution.
But they do need enabling legislation, which in this case does not exist.
In this case they are recording devices. No other records are protected in that manner, why should these be?
One thing that comes to mind is that specific court orders are needed to access certain types of information. Bank records, for example. Email is another. Passwords to any number of personal and merchant accounts. Records of telephone calls. Etc.
Granting law enforcement total access to someone’s smartphone is like giving them a search warrant applicable to any and all of your records at one time. Doesn’t seem kosher to me.
Still, those are matters for the courts to figure out. My point was that smartphones are not toys.
I’m pretty sure it’s been settled for a few decades now that police can get a search warrant for a computer. A smartphone is little more than a computer that fits in your pocket.
It isn’t legally settled at all whether they can get a warrant to search the entire computer based on probable cause of a particular kind of evidence being on that computer. It is, in fact, highly contested with court splits all over the place.
I’m not sure that’s at issue here. Has the FBI said they will be searching the entire phone? ISTM, they would need this help even if they had some more limited search in mind.
The FBI wants to scrutinize the phone for evidence to determine whether the shooters had ties to any terrorist organizations. Presumably this would involve texts and telephone calls, bank records, online purchases, photos, etc.
And if they have PC to believe relevant evidence might be found in each of those places then it’s not a problem.
The issue arises where they have PC that, say, the criminal texted an associate. Does that give them the right to search the whole phone? What about all the texts, or just texts to the associate? Importantly, what counts as “plain view” in that context? Can they scan through the texts to find the relevant one, but use other texts they happen to see as they flip through?
Those are all basically unsettled legal questions. But I don’t think they are likely to arise here, both because of the likely nature of the FBI’s probable cause, and because there is no one alive to challenge that aspect of the search.
That’s correct. I don’t think anyone has a problem necessarily with wide ranging examination of the in this instance. I think the concern is more that law enforcement breaking into phones and thereby gaining access to all of a person’s private records, whether pertinent to issue under investigation or not, may become much more common if the courts begin forcing manufacturer security measures to be overridden.