For reference:
"Cognizant ofthe narrow parameters of our review, we now analyze the challenged Florida law. Florida contends that the statute is only one aspect of its broader adoption policy, which is designed to create adoptive homes that resemble the nuclear family as closely as possible. Florida argues that the statute is rationally related to Florida’s interest in furthering the best interests of adopted children by placing them in families with married mothers and fathers. Such homes, Florida asserts, provide the stability that marriage affords and the presence of both male and female authority figures, which it considers critical to optimal childhood development and socialization. In particular, Florida emphasizes a vital role that dual-gender parenting plays in shaping sexual and gender identity and in providing heterosexual role modeling. Florida argues that disallowing adoption into homosexual households, which are necessarily motherless or fatherless and lack the stability that comes with marriage, is a rational means of furthering Florida’s interest in promoting adoption by marital families.
Florida clearly has a legitimate interest in encouraging a stable and nurturing environment for the education and socialization ofits adopted children. It is chiefly from parental figures that children learn about the world and their place in it, and the formative influence of parents ''Florida also asserts that the statute is eationally related to its interest in promoting public morality both in the context of child rearing and in the context of determining which types of households should be accorded legal recognition as families. Appellants respond that public morality cannot serve as a legitimate state interest. Because of our conclusion that Florida’s interest in promoting married-couple adoption provides a rational basis, it is unnecessary for us to resolve the question. We do note, however, the Supreme Court’s conclusion that there is not only a legitimate interest, but "a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality, and its observation that “[un] democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.”
We also note that our own recent precedent has unequivocally affirmed the furtherance of public morality as a legitimate state interest. It extends well beyond the years spent under their roof, shaping their children’s psychology, character, and personality for years to come. In time, children grow up to become full members of society, which they in turn influence, whether for good or ill. The adage that “the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world” hardly overstates the ripple effect that parents have on the public good by virtue of their role in raising their children. It is hard to conceive an interest more legitimate and more paramount for the state than promoting an optimal social structure for educating, socializing, and preparing its future citizens to become productive participants in civil society–particularlywhen those future citizens are displaced children for whom the state is standing j~loco parentis.
More importantly for present purposes, the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging this optimal family structure by seeking to place adoptive children in homes that have both a mother and father. Florida argues that its preference for adoptive marital families is based on the premise that the marital family structure is more stable than other household arrangements and that children benefit from the presence ofboth a father and mother in the home. Given that appellants have offered no competent evidence to the contrary, we find this premise to be one of those “unprovable assumptions” that nevertheless can provide a legitimate basis for legislative action. Although social theorists from Plato to Simone de Beauvoir have proposed alternative child-rearing arrangements, none has proven as enduring as the marital family structure, nor has the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human experience discovered a superior model. Against this “sum of experience,” it is rational for Florida to conclude that it is in the best interests of adoptive children, many of whom come from troubled and unstable backgrounds, to be placed in a home anchored by both a father and a mother." [citations removed throughout]
From Lofton v. Kearney, 93 F.Supp.2d 1343