From Scientific American:
The authors lend credibility to the magazine article. It is also true that the government is somewhat guarded about the true capabilities of its most advanced devices. A lot of the conversation here ASSumes that we know-it-all.
In my own gear head way, I’ll add this:
30 years ago, an engine builder would most likely be considered a certified nut for proclaiming the reality of a Z-06 Corvette. There was/is an entity (counter measures) running blocker, so to speak - the government that will demand 25+ miles per gallon and such low emissions that one would be hard placed to commit suicide by running an engine in a closed garage. Now do all that and I want 400+ horse power. Oh yeah, it must idle smooth, be quite, and totally streetable with all the manners of any normal street engine.
NFW - but it happened anyway - oh $hit, now I’m rhyming - I better get some sleep!
We are not limited to just one system. Who says it is gonna be easy? One thing is for certain, if we don’t try, we will not develop a working system.
Silly anti-ballistic missile defenses… Blix are for Kurds!
Preferably before deploying them. Otherwise it’d just be a waste of taxpayer dollars when we’ve got more pressing issues in need of a thick coating of dead presidents.
Yes, this is a common argument that is made by proponents of missile defense (who aren’t actually actively involved in its development). However, the fact is that most of the capabilities are well-known and, even in cases where they are not stated directly, they can be inferred from basic physics and the type of system it is (e.g., an infrared detector or whatever). This is why those actually in charge of NMD, such as General Kadish, have not to my knowledge even really pursued this “they don’t know the capabilities that we got” argument, leaving it to true believers outside of the NMD program.
The problem with Star Wars is that all development outside of the first stage booster was prohibited by the SALT treaties. We no longer have that problem. We tinkered with lasers because that was not covered under the treaties. We could develop the theoretical side of things, but we couldn’t make them to see how they work and improve them…that’s all different now.
Solves another problem also, the short to medium range missile. To kill an ICBM with a long range 20 kiloton-ish interceptor dozens of miles up is a different problem than trying to kill one a few miles up in the air. Here, again, I’m guessing that people on the ground would not want to detonate a nuke right over their own heads. Maybe if I’m in one of Saddam’s Presidential Basements.
This is true. The Arrow seems to work well against SCUD missiles and its ilk. Hitting a re-entering warhead from an ICBM is a whole different problem and considerably harder to do.
To my knowledge the Arrow has never been tested against ICBM class weapons. Honestly, I don’t think you’d want the Arrow to go after an ICBM warhead anyway but would rather have a separate system to deal with it. Otherwise you’d have to have the missile (or the people firing it) make a decision about what it is they are facing and tell the missile that before it is fired. Just one issue would be the fusing time of the anti-missile. In case of a near miss you want it to explode when the incoming missile is closest. At the speeds we are talking about here (don’t forget it is a closure speed…add the speed of both weapons together) even milliseconds count and the fuse timing to nail a SCUD would be very different than the timing for an ICBM warhead.
I have no doubt there are a hundred other difficulties to deal with as well and I’m no missile engineer. Still, don’t think the Arrow will help you against an ICBM (although if I was an Arrow operator and knew an ICBM warhead was about to drop on me I’d fire my Arrow at it anyway…not like I have a lot to lose at that point and I just might get lucky).
I think you are referring to the ABM treaty not SALT treaties. And, yes, we’ve heard vague claims before about how we needed to get out of the ABM treaty last year to make further progress although these claims have been shown to be highly questionable at best. The stronger claims that you seem to be making here that the ABM treaty has already significantly set back research on missile defense are ones that I haven’t even seen seriously made by those in the NMD program…In other words, cite?
By the way, the ABM treaty is way less restrictive than some people seem to think it is. It really deals mainly with deployment…there were few (if any) constraints that would affect research at least until you got to the final operational testing stage.
Getting out of the ABM treaty had little to do with research, and a lot to do with deployment.
Here’s a little more information on NMD for those who are interested:
Bush approves missile defense
Questions Remain Whether U.S. Missile Defense Works M.I.T. Studies Accusations of Lies and Cover-Up of Flaws in Antimissile System
As Spiny Norman has pointed out, just because you can dream up a cockamainy scheme that you think seems possible does not mean that it is possible. On the other hand, you might try submitting this idea to the folks at the missile defense organization. I think they were accepting proposed ideas from the public. (No, I’m not making this up!)
cockamainy that is right up there with the Cecil’s latest post on cock-and-bull, and more interesting.
I am studying more about intercepting the missile on takeoff. We know Korea may strike; our eyes are on them, can we intercept it on launch or moments there after?
There is preemptive, liftoff, cruise, re-entry and final explosion. Each phase has its own kryptonite.
By the way I have tried name calling on the GD. unless something is totally like out there. Save such cool remarks for something that is way, way out there.
Gotta go with the view that if we knuckled under to “can’t be done” or “too hard” or “too expensive” we’d not have an awful lot of things: Space Program, Chunnel, Etc.
Another way to view it… The computer you are using RIGHT NOW to read/post here would not exist if we’d looked at a pre-UNIVAC world in this way.
You can intercept on launch but you had better be pretty damn close. ICBMs accelerate fast. They may seem to lumber out of their silos but it doesn’t last very long at all before they are hauling ass into the stratosphere and beyond. There is a window of seconds for it to be shot down at that point (say by a plane carrying a Sidewinder missile).
In short, to attack a launching ICBM you had pretty much better be almost on top of it when it goes and lock on and launch very quickly. Not a very likely scenario unfortunately as i doubt the North Koreans would let our aircraft loiter in the area assuming we even know where they keep the things. At that point you’re just better off hitting it in its silo.
jshore’s cockamamy spelling aside, we’re a long ways from being able to mount an effective ICBM defense on an F-16. Besides, it’s a nice word.
(1) On the other hand, if we didn’t prioritize what to do and what not to do, we also wouldn’t be very productive.
(2) Again, the moon and the English Channel weren’t fighting back. The point is not that any specific thing is necessarily impossible (like the “hitting a bullet with a bullet” that this midcourse interceptor technology has now shown it can do with about 50-50 probability under ideal circumstances) but rather that the countermeasures the offense can employ seem to be considerably cheaper and easier than the defense’s job of dealing with these countermeasures. It is like entering a race with a big lead weight attached to you…Even if you are by far the fastest runner in the race (as we are), if the weight is big enough you are still not going to be able to overcome the disadvantage.
As for the boost-phase defense that folks are talking about, I’ll try to find a good cite discussing that later. I think the time you have before the booster drops away is something like 3-5 minutes but I may be misremembering. As I noted, it will be interesting to see what the APS committee determines about this as a possible scenario. Again, even if it looks more promising than the other options, we are not talking about something that can be deployed anytime in the near future, so it is basically irrelevant to the issues of deployment and backing out of the ABM treaty and such.
Awww, please tell us more about the F-16 based re-entry intercept system first. You were the one to mention it as a possibility, after all - and I’m still waiting with baited breath to hear about the RV-killing weapons that can be carried by jet fighters.
We also wouldn’t have cheap space flight or fusion power. Ehm - wait a minute…
I firmly belive that Pamela Anderson’s breasts provide the best protection against this threat. Call it the ‘star boobs’ program.
I was checking around and it would seem there is about 2.5-3 minutes in which a missile is in its boost phase. However, to reliably shoot one down in this phase is difficult. Special munitions are needed to chase these down and the acquisition and decision phases to determine whether or not to shoot are very short indeed.
Further, unless you use a space based weapon, you pretty much need a plane in the near vicinity. One such weapon (mentioned in my link below) has a 75 mile range. Realize you likely need to be closer than that too to ensure a successful intercept. If your plane only has standard air-to-air missiles such as a Sidewinder you had best be almost literally on top of the launch site when it goes (Sidewinder only has a range of 5 miles). The AIM-120, the only other missile likely to be carried by a US fighter and could conceivably work, has a range of 20 miles.
The upside to nailing a missile in the boost phase is it is at its most vulnerable and its a bigger, easier target (lots of hot exhaust…explosive fuel on board, still over enemy territory, etc.). Still, it’s hard enought that the US seems to have given up on trying to figure it out.
The problem with missile defense is not that it couldn’t be made to work.
The problem is that Bush has decided that we should deploy it NOW, when it doesn’t work.