I don’t think this is particularly telegraphing any information to a potential enemy, unless the Iraqi military leadership really is a bunch of clownish buffoons, which I rather doubt.
In the last Gulf War, the Coalition won an astounding victory because Iraq was impaled on a classic strategic fork. In order to retain their military gains (Kuwait), Iraq was forced into a far-forward deployment in desert conditions. The disposition of their troops was perfect for the use of modern mobile warfare tactics against them. They were fixed, flanked, and surrounded in short order.
Iraq can’t do that this time, for a lot of good reasons. Their own mobile forces are severely degraded both by the losses of the previous war and the lack of spare parts. It would be suicidal to try to deploy those mobile forces they do have in the no-fly zones already established–they would have little to no protection from air attack. The Iraqis probably well remember the material and qualitative advantages the Americans have over their own forces.
Instead, they’re almost certain to concentrate their defense in the strategic zone located between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers–the same ground that Alexander the Great and Darius fought over. Hussein is no humanitarian and it seems likely that he’ll go a step further and concentrate his best troops within the city of Baghdad itself, where he has at least a chance of strategic and political equalization. Most of the advantages that the American military holds over the Iraqis are largely negated once they have to start fighting street-to-street.
Urban warfare is a bitch. According to the CSIS’s observations on the battle of Jenin (.pdf document), there are only three major ways to fight an urban battle, which can be described as “light,” “medium,” and “heavy.”
The first option involves the use of a lot of stand-off precision weapons and high-finesse small raids, something which won’t work if there are two divisions of Republican Guards holed up in Baghdad.
The second option is fighting on near-equal terms with small arms in order to reduce civilian casualties and material damage. This can mean high casualties for both attacker and defender because of the close-range nature of the combat.
The third option, the “heavy” option, is unpalateable to contemplate, but is probably the least costly in the long run for the side which can employ the tactic. It basically means one side makes the battlefield unequal by bringing enormous and disproportionate firepower to bear against the enemy, blowing up the very buildings in which they are holed up. At the same time, it also takes out any civilians who have not evacuated, and it creates enormous swathes of destruction. Think Stalingrad or Berlin.
If there is a war, and if Hussein chooses to make a fight of it in Baghdad, America will have to choose between a medium or a heavy response there, with of course an infinite gray area between them. Appallingly high civilian casualties are a near-certitude, as are casualties among U.S. troops and their allies, if we have any left when it comes to that. The less America is willing to sacrifice either its own troops or Iraqi civilians, the longer it’s going to take to reduce the Iraqi forces. As the Washington Times pointed out, American public opinion will necessarily play a role in how the battle is conducted. (That editorial also ignores the “light” option and instead debates the pros and cons of the “medium” and “heavy” ones.)
That’s some very dodgy territory politically and militarily, and I don’t think it’s a given that the Americans have the stomach to see it all the way through to a clear victory. As we have already seen, Hussein has a remarkable ability to retain power in the face of near-total defeat. If he walks out of the next war unscathed as he did the last time, he wins.