The Arbitration Committee made the same mistake you are making. Here’s what it said:
Please compare this definition with the Montevideo Convention! Note that it is significantly different.
For one, it has three criteria rather than four (the “capacity to enter into relations with the other states” is left out); for another, it misses the qualifiers “permanent” population and “defined” territory.
Your last source makes it clear that there is a live debate over this issue of the effect of recognition - even in the laws of international legal academe, it isn’t a done deal. Indeed, while extreme “Delaratory” theorists have a lot of legal support, they do not have it all their own way, as your own article makes quite clear - the reason being, it is a completelyt unrealistic position in a world that lacks any formal mechanism to evalute the criteria! Like many musings of international scholarly legists, it proposes a world that does not, as of yet, exist:
Note that the balance of the article is about how, despite the “declaratory” theory being “predominant” (that is, among scholars!), no-one considers Somaliland a state, because it is not “recognized”. :smack: From p. 48:
However, while the debate between “Constructivists” and “Declaratory” theorists is interesting, it all presumes that the proto-states in question want to be part of the state system!
In short, it is about entities quite unlike ISIS.
Your cited paper basically conflates “capacity to enter into relations with other states” with the “effective government” criterion (basically, an “effective government” is one with capacity to enter into relations with other states). The authors probably never dreamed of a situation in which an entity arises that has no such interests.
Thus the argument is - an entity such as ISIS cannot be a “state” since it lacks the essentials, even under “declaratory theory” - namely, an effective government capable of entering into relations with other states. Moreover, I would suggest that, while “declaratory” theory is popular with international legal scholars, your own article points out it has no effect on reality - in which, as always (or at least until an effective world government exists), “recognition” remains in reality the very essence of statehood - because only other states have any actual power.
When is a state a state? When is a person attractive? When is a food tasty? When is enough enough?
It comes down to definitions and opinions. There is no single set of criteria universally accepted by all states and all peoples that defines what is a state, although there are sufficiently commonalities (as discussed above in this thread) that usually (but not always) there will eventually be international consensus.
For shits and giggles, google about for “sovereignty” and “public international law”. Although ISIS is the subject of this thread, I think you’ll find more illuminative examples of what constitutes statehood if you research what has been going on vis a vis recognition of statehood in Palestine since the Balfour Declaration of 1917 through to the present.
More from the useless, evil, unworthy little Patrick Cockburn
Did anyone ask what it means to be stable ? How long do you have to hold land for to “qualify” ? How much territory are you allowed to lose or gain before being deemed unstable ?
Not that recently both Ukraine/Russia lost/gained territory - and nobody is saying they are not states any more because of it.
And re; the difference between Islamist groups
And a short comment on their backers
I don’t personally want ISIS to last as an entity, my bias would be to deny it’s statehood as an attack on it’s legitimacy, but it is what it is.
Do you just want someone, somewhere to agree with you, or do you want to actually get the correct answer? Because, as noted, that is NOT the correct answer.
Or better yet, why are you so personally invested in ISIL being a state?
What constitutes, really, capacity to enter into relations with other states ? There’s the legalese version in which the state has a recognised legal personality, Great, but on the other hand there are things called telephones and printers and the capacity to enter relations is right there.
You ask a lot of good questions - “Did anyone ask what it means to be stable ? How long do you have to hold land for to “qualify” ? How much territory are you allowed to lose or gain before being deemed unstable ?” and now “What constitutes, really, capacity to enter into relations with other states ?”.
The answer is the same in each case - there is no single body that can, definitively, answer any one of them!
Sure, there is the UN, there is international arbitrations, and there are international legal opinions - but as we have seen in the sources quoted above, none of them agree, or are in any way consistent.
So what does that mean, practically, in terms of real consequences (and not some airy theoretical opinionating that you once said you were against?) It is very simple, really - the answers to these questions are established by other, existing states, who pick and choose what they find important.
This, then, is what is meant by “recognition” (and why, despite the "considerable support for decalaratory theory [that is, the theory that “recognition” isn’t one of the criteria for statehood], in reality, it is the only one that really matters - recognition is other states deciding for themselves - sometimes based on “arbitrations” and the like, sometimes not - who is or is not a ‘state’.
Why is this the only really important criterion? Because only states that are recognized as “states” are treated by other states as having rights (again, not that states will not, on occasion, violate those rights). Non-“states” (that is, entities not recognized as states) have no such rights.
This, I think, is the heart of the problem. ISIS clearly isn’t a state, and the international diplomatic community is all about playing silly games.
What I want to know is, if others were to recognize ISIS as a state, would it be able to continue as such, or would it collapse?
Frankly, I think the best hope for the people there is if ISIS forms a state, and gradually shifts from barbarian lunacy to stability. I estimate that takes a generation, but if we let them get on with it, with not-so-subtle encouragement and many carrots and sticks, the whole region has a better shot than the current “bomb them into inescapable war” plan.
An example that proves the point I made earler: that the debate over the importance of recognition only applies to entities that want to be accepted into the “club” of nations as independent states.
Taiwan has maintained the notion that Taiwan is, and always was, and remains, a part of China. Although it has all the attributes of a “state” under “declaratory theory”, and although everyone de facto treacts Taiwan as a “state”, it can’t formally be a “state” because it doesn’t actually seek that status; however, it is “recognized”, even though it lacks the accoutriments of formal recognition - through diplomatic double-speak:
You can read all about the arguments both for and against Taiwan already being a state (in wiki form) here:
All very interesting, but moot if Taiwan doesn’t actually want to be an independent state.
ISIS on the other hand both lacks the attributes of a state and doesn’t want to be treated as a “state”. It can’t become a “state” until both of those change.
But which completely shoots down your latter, perhaps careless, claim that formal recognition is the only thing that matters.
Look, labels have power. Constructs do construct a level of reality. But it’s not the only reality. Physical facts still count, often overridingly. States largely treat Taiwan as a state, whether they call it so or not, because in physical fact it serves and acts as one.
Because its declared purpose is to re-create a universal Caliphate, as a precursor to the apocalypse. This is a set of goals completely incompatible with seeking “statehood” within a system of sovereign states. Under a Caliphate (or at least as it is conceived by ISIS), there is only one legitmate authority that can exist, and the relationship between it and the existing states is set.
Formal recognition “matters” only because, through it, states grant other states various rights - such as becomming irritated when their “sovereignty” is violated.
In the case of Taiwan, the US (the party, otherthan China, that really matters in this context) has made it clear that, while it does not “formally” recognize Taiwan as a state (because, among other things, Taiwan refuses to see itself as a seperate state - but more fundamentally to avoid irritating China), it supports the existence of Taiwan - in effect, that it will be annoyed if Taiwanese “sovereignty” is violated.
Taiwan has worked out a system where it obtains the benefits of statehood vis. the US and China without the label. This is tantamount to de facto recognition (even if “formal” recognition is withheld to avoid irritating China).
I see this as “diplomatic doublespeak”, not as “this shoots down totaly the notion that recognition is the only thing that matters” (I note you added the word “formal” to my point. Why?). On the contrary: remove the US assurances, and Taiwan’s position vis. China would be a lot weaker - depite the fact that it meets the “statehood” criteria just as much (namely, its own territory, its own government, etc.).
In “declaratory theory” terms, Taiwan is as much a “state” if the US turned its back on it and said to China “help yourself - we always knew Taiwan was just a rebel province, and really belongs to you”, as if the US told China “we will defend Taiwan against you to the last drop of blood”. Yet practically, the two situations could not be more different. At least, that’s my opinion.
OK, that’s what I thought you were thinking. But that doesn’t preclude it from being a state, just because it’s the only state.
Right now, it doesn’t even satisfy the definition of having a defined population and territory. Both are in flux. You cannot draw the boundaries of “The Islamic State” and have those hold true for even few months.
They are a rebel group that is trying to establish a state, but has not succeeded.
While I agree that it hasn’t got a defined population or territory, I disagree that it would satisfy the Montevideo Convention if it did - because it lacks the capacity (because it lacks any interest in) entering into relations with “other states”. How can it enter into “relations” if it doesn’t recognize the legitimacy of state-hood as such?
An apocalyptic, universal revolutionary group (unless it changes goals, which of course is totally possible) simply isn’t “trying to establish a state” among other states.
Even so, I still contend that calling something a “state” is meaningless unless it is recognized as such by other states - in that only other states have the ability to define what a “state” is.
Thus, even assuming it met all of the Montevideo Convention criteria - which we both agree, ISIS currently doesn’t - it still would not be, in any meaningful sense, a “state” without recognition - which is unlikely to be forthcomming (again, unless its goals change).
I’d just like to point out that even Wikipedia – Wikipedia!! – doesn’t recognize the Islamic State, because Raqqa is still described as being a city in Syria.