Second Winchester, I thought, Captain A., was pretty much Ewell’s show, not so much Lee’s. But yes, in was an engagement in which the Army of Northern Virginia, or at least the one corps I think was engaged, took an offensive stance.
Well, ok, technically, it was only the 2nd Corps, and Ewell had battlefield command. But, it’s still a great example of the Army of Northern Virginia’s ability at the tactical offensive.
A well-considered debate thus far, but some folks have chosen to draw their conclusions first and assemble supporting evidence second. It is more intellectually rigorous to assess the facts and follow where they lead. As others have already done (apologies for some redundancy), I am compelled to correct some interpretive errors:
- The goal of Lee’s campaign - Chance is right in that Washington was not the goal of the Gettysburg campaign. Rather, Lee desired to get the Army of the Potomac out from behind it’s fortifications where it would be vulnerable to his tactics of maneuver. But such as it is, this is an exclusively military objective. It has also been mentioned the South was in desperate need of a successful harvest from the Shenandoah, which is quite accurate. But to ascribe to Lee’s actions the political component of demoralizing the Northern populace or demonstrating to Britain or France that the South was worthy of diplomatic recognition is a serious misinterpretation. By his own admission, Lee pointedly abstained (turning down the position of General in Chief of Confederate forces on multiple occasions) from engaging in the broader policy debates of the conflict, focusing quite explicitly on what was taking place in his home state of Virginia.
Related to this, as interesting as the material from Churchill is (thanks for providing that link!), it is complete bunk. Churchill’s writing on the subject illustrates either an appalling lack of understanding of the underpinnings of the Civil War and the character of its protagonists, or an impressive imagination and a keen affinity for historical fiction as good as anything Shaara or Turtledove have written. The idea of Robert E. Lee getting involved in politics, making public policy declarations, or leading a military offensive anywhere or for any other reason than defending Virginia is patently absurd. Not to mention the fact that the aristocratic Southern elites would not in a million years have accepted the abolition of slavery. Don’t let anything you’ve learned about “states rights” fool you – the North-South conflict was about slavery, slavery, and nothing but slavery dating all the way back to the first Continental Congress. “States Rights” was simply a means to an end – the retention of Negro servitude as a necessary element of an agrarian economy.
(Sidebar: I also find it amusing to read Churchill’s jingoistic declaration that the Royal Navy would, if brought to bear upon the Union, triumph gloriously. Last time I checked, Ericsson and his ideas about ironclads were laughed out of Europe and he came to the U.S. Can you picture a Royal Navy fleet in line of battle getting pasted by a bunch of twin-turreted monitors with 14-inch rifled Dhalgrens?!)
- Morale and Logistics - simplee, I don’t think anyone is arguing that a victorious Army of Northern Virginia would be demoralized, but it is essential that you understand the fundamental changes taking place in the army’s leadership cadre. The general most in tune with Lee’s tactics of maneuver (Jackson) is already dead. None of the remaining general officers had Jackson’s fire or grasp of Lee’s tactics. Longstreet was a pioneer of defensive warfare and temperamentally ill-suited for managing forces on the move. The reason the en echelon attack failed was a direct result of the synergistic accumulation of leadership deficiencies across the entire general staff, a calamitous combination of timidity and rashness. And unlike the Union generals, who started off as amateurs and political appointees forced to learn under fire, the South’s leadership cadre were seasoned West Pointers at the top of their game, who, once eliminated, could never be replaced.
In another vein, indeed, nobody was going from Richmond to Chicago, but they might as well have been. With neither a rail line nor water transport, A of N Va was on a finite timeline. It has been suggested that they could forage off the line like Sherman’s March to the Sea. Logistically feasible, but Lee repeatedly issued upon his incursions into Union territory explicit admonitions to his troops NOT to take anything from the local populace. His ideas about “civilized” warfare precluded this. In addition, I’m pretty certain the fertile fields of Pennsylvania did not contain acres of Bullet, Cartridge, or Gunpowder plants. A horse-drawn supply train dependent upon the condition of roads running through hostile territory would be logistically insufficient to supply an 80,000-man army for more than one, perhaps two general engagements.
In addition, if the A of N Va had preyed upon the Pennsylvania countryside, the backlash and outrage almost certainly would have counteracted any “war weariness” which several posts (and indeed most historians) have referred to as a possible scenario for an armistice.
I realize this last is a supposition, but I think there is ample historical precedent to support it, from the fact Kentucky voted against secession the moment Bragg’s troops crossed the border in 1861; to the French Resistance of WWII; all the way to the present invasion of Iraq - regardless of the ante-bellum circumstances or even outright sympathy with the “invaders”, populations instinctively react against perceived infringements on sovereignty.
- Foreign Recognition - I hate to make a blanket declarative, but neither England nor France would ever have formally recognized the Confederacy. At the very best, they might have covertly loaned money and engaged in blockade trade (both of which they did, obviously to little practical effect on the outcome of the war). While I cannot provide cites at the moment (at work, no access to my library), the correspondence of leaders in both countries is clear on the fact. Napoleon III is the only person of consequence who ever seriously considered recognition, and then only with the intent of minimizing resistance to France’s acquisition of Mexico. His ministers vehemently opposed formal relations with the CSA, and he eventually took their advice.
The reasons for the above are two-fold:
a. Both countries had already formally abandoned and condemned the practice of slavery. They viewed the South as culturally anachronistic and fundamentally at odds with their ideals of “civilization”. Once Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, he essentially closed the door on recognition by European powers.
b. The only thing that trumps culture is economics, and besides cotton, the South had nothing to offer Britain or France that would serve to counter point a. With expansive colonial holdings elsewhere, Britain, after a very brief period of hardship in the textile sector, shifted it’s imports from American to Indian and Egyptian cotton – in retrospect an even better scenario for Britain in that it tightened its grip upon colonial holdings and promoted economic markets in those holdings.
Taking all of the above facts into account, it does not seem reasonable to conclude that Gettysburg going in favor of Lee would have accomplished much more than extending the war for another year. Granted, this in itself might be sufficient to change the ultimate outcome – who knows what can happen in a year. But as for a Gettysburg victory effecting a rapid end to the war in the South’s favor, as the OP posits? Clearly not.
P.S. Spavined Gelding, excellent posts - have you been snooping through my library? 
As an aisde:
Quite honestly, I can’t. I can’t imagine the US having ironclads in sufficient quantity or of sufficient quality to withstand the RN. And its important to remember that the French were building ironclads, and England had responded by 1861 with the HMS
Warrior (arguably one of the coolest ships ever built). A half-dozen Warrior-class ships leading a fleet, and the US fleet would be so many floating toothpicks, monitors or no. As strong as the US industrial base was in 1863, I don’t think there’s any doubt that England easily outproduce her as they did France.
Whether or not England would have brought the RN to bear is irrelevant to whether she would prevail if she were to–and I think that’s an unequivocal yes.
The above was posted on July 31. We are still waiting.
Well I looked but my books are in boxes and I didn’t see what I wanted without unpacking everything so sorry 'bout that
Trudeau’s recent book is very detailed and that’s the first place I’d have looked if it was near the top of the stack
I honestly didn’t think this topic would garner much popular interest
So you can consider me wrong on all counts 
The odds of England going to war with the Union after Anietien are ludicrously low. Secondly, by war’s end the North had a great many montors in service, much superior to the original.
Third, I’m guessing Lee could not afford to be to aggresive, less he overextend his supplies and/or open a big path for the Union to cut him off.