[QUOTE=RTFirefly]
Spencer Ackerman: “When people say the surge has succeeded, they’re trying to say the war has succeeded. But no one can stand up and say that. So you get this odd argument wherein the success of the surge is supposed to have alchemically balanced out the failure of the war.”
I think Ackerman’s got your number, Sam.
[/QUOTE]
Nice work. You managed to combine an appeal to authority with a straw man argument. Well done.
Let’s not forget that there isn’t a shred of evidence that that would have happened, and plenty of evidence that it wouldn’t have.
I’ll bet you a lot of people who argued against the ‘surge’ don’t even understand what it was. It wasn’t about just putting 30,000 more soldiers in Iraq. It was about changing tactics to a proper counter-insurgency doctrine, and that needed more soldiers.
Here’s what was happening before: The U.S., due to a shortage of manpower, was conducting a ‘run and gun’ campaign in Iraq - they’d get a report of insurgents fighting somewhere, and they’d send in air power and armored humvees to attack them. When the battle was over, they’d withdraw back to base. Or, they would conduct patrols by day, then withdraw back to base at night.
This is the way an insurgency likes to fight. They could set up IEDs for patrols, then duck away during the day and let the Americans drive around and get blown up. And the Americans couldn’t get intelligence, because the Iraqi people found that if they helped the Americans, the Americans would go away shortly and the insurgents would murder them as traitors. And maybe their families too. So the Americans were fed bullshit by the population or nothing at all. Many times they walked into traps because they were given bad intelligence.
The population was helpless, because the insurgents had all the force, had spies and snitches to tell them who was talking to Americans, and everyone knew it.
In the midst of all this, opportunists carried out grudge killings or plain old robbery/murders, and blamed others. Sectarian violence began growing, being inflamed by Al Qaida in Iraq, which was trying to kick off the civil war by doing things like blowing up the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
This is purely the fault of Donald Rumsfeld, who long ago convinced himself that America could use its high technology to run a leaner military, and therefore refused to assign enough soldiers to Iraq.
This is what General Petraeus told the Congress after Rumsfeld was sacked. He said that America was not employing a proper counter-insurgency strategy, which is to place soldiers in among the population permanently and win their trust and protect them. But there weren’t enough soldiers to cover the areas that needed to be covered, so he asked for 30,000 more.
Petraeus literally wrote the book on counter-insurgency. He’s the author of the army’s official counter-insurgency manual, which was ignored by Rumsfeld.
The theory was this: You send soldiers into regions and base them in local bases among the populace. You protect them 24/7. This forces the insurgency to come out to you and fight, for one thing. Another is that once the people see that the insurgency is being beaten back, and that they are being protected, they start coming up with intelligence. Real intelligence. As the population is protected, they begin to take an active role in protecting themselves. Crime drops. Commerce starts up again. This eases tensions. Sectarian tensions diminish because both sides have a common enemy.
A year and a half ago, none of these conditions existed. The people were controlled by the insurgency and by al-Qaida in Iraq. The U.S. withdrawing would have emboldened them, and increased recruitment. The militias would have become rival factions, and al-Qaida would be having a field day committing mass murder and blaming Shiites for it.
A year and a half ago, the Iraqi army was not nearly as effective as it is today, and it was still riddled with the remnants of militias and soldiers more loyal to their sect or tribe than to Iraq as a whole. It’s very likely the army would have broken apart and merged with the various Shiite and Sunni militias.
You would have wound up eventually in a war to see who could gain control of the government, and then probably either a Saddam II as the meanest Sunni made it to the top, or an Iran II if someone like al Sadr gained power.
That’s what Petraeus told Congress. He asked for one chance to try to fight the right way before giving up and letting the most strategically important place on earth fall into chaos. He had a record of achieving exactly what he said he’d do - his tour in Iraq was the most successful of any general there - then Rumsfeld screwed up the situation again when he left. So he wanted another chance.
Some Democrats, including Obama, wouldn’t give it to him. They knew the stakes, they knew the man’s reputation, and they knew the likely outcome of a withdrawal. And they still said no.
This means one of two things: Either they were absolutely, 100% convinced that there was no possible chance of making the situation better, which means they chose their own judgment over that of the general who wrote the book on counter-insurgency, in which case their judgment is suspect, or they said no because they were playing politics, in which case their character is suspect.