Not quite. The Court has been very reluctant recently to give Congress the power to regulate non-economic activity involving commercial goods if there is no stated way in which interstate commerce is specifically affected. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (where the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not sufficiently affect interstate commerce), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (where the Violence Against Women Act did not regulate activity affecting interstate commerce, despite voluminous studies showing the economic effects of violence against women).
Heart of Atlanta, mentioned by Jodi, was predicated in part on “evidence showing the consequences of racial discrimination by motels and restaurants on interstate commerce.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 635 (J. Souter dissenting). Further, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) allowed the regulation of wheat grown for personal use on the presumption that such activity, in the aggregate, would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (“The power of Congress … extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce”).
Lopez and Morrison, however, seem to have pulled back from the “substantial effect” test, at least as it’s manifested by statistical evidence in Heart of Atlanta. That is, if Heart of Atlanta were decided by the Rehnquist Court today, I’m not so sure that it wouldn’t have come out the other way; they might well have held that forbidding hotels to discriminate on the basis of race was not justified by Congress’ commerce powers.