I wasn’t exactly trying to make a full formal argument on the topic.
My own personal opinion is that there is no difference relevant to the fetus’ personhood between the moment before it passes through the birth canal and the moment after, nor a discernible threshold between the fetus about to pass through the canal and the fetus at any point after embedding in the uterine wall. I might conceive of a definition of personhood that excluded the fetus, if I were to require qualities such as rational thinking, moral agency, and so on. But I couldn’t tailor a definition along any rational lines that could make the distinction necessary to conclude personhood begins at birth, and therefore however I conclude the issue of whether an infant child has a right not to be killed by virtue of its personhood then this extends to the fetus as well.
As you can see, I am running over this all too quickly, and there are points you could make at different stages of the argument. For just one example, you might conclude that while neither the fetus nor the infant child are persons, the infant child nevertheless has certain rights by virtue of something other than personhood. At any rate, the point of my post in question was to attempt to give a brief overview of how a person who had equated human life with an entity posessing rights could arrive at the conclusion that the rape exception is not justified.
Cerri gives an emotional response to the conclusion that there should be no rape exception. Note first that such is not my conclusion, because I have a slightly different conception of rights (namely, I view all of an individuals’ rights as an extension of the same basic right and representative of the same thing, whereas many people introduce a hierarchy of rights wherein the right to life somehow trumps the life to property.)
First of all, I don’t believe that my gender is relevant to my conclusion. A conclusion exists independently of the one formulating it. Whether or not I may end up having a personal experience in which the conclusion is put into practice is not relevant to the conclusion’s truth or falsity. The personal experience is only important if it introduces new facts that would change the conclusion, that are relevant to the conclusion.
The emotional responses that you mention are not relevant to the ultimate conclusion. I need not have murdered a person or had a person close to me be murdered to argue and conclude that murder is wrongful, a violation of a person’s negative right to life. Your examples, were I to go through them, would certainly help me understand the experiential consequences of a particular incident of the event, and of adopting a rule about the event. But I am not a consequentialist, at least not within the sphere of actions that impede rights, and for the most part neither are abortion opponents. If we were pure consequentialists or utilitarians, we might simply declare abortion acceptable due to its tangible social benefits.
So the fact that a particular moral conclusion, if applied, would cause a certain amount of emotional pain is just not relevant to truth of the conclusion itself. Reality is objective, and the mere fact of your emotional pain, while everyone would certainly sympathize with you, does not alter reality.
As for Seige’s remark, I’m sorry to see that old canard spring up again about “imposing your morality on me”. If you see me about to kill my neighbor unprovoked, make a correct moral judgment that this is wrong, and act to stop me from doing this, are you “imposing your morality on me”. Not at all. If it is, then you better tell the gov’t to stop imposing their morality on all those thieves and murderers they arrest every day. If abortion were like marijuana use, something that does not infringe on any others’ rights, then to outlaw it would indeed be to “impose morality”, though I fail to see how anything could be immoral unless it trod upon anothers validly held right. In recognizing a real moral prohibition, you are not imposing it. The moral principle exists, you are merely inducing me to recognize it as well. I am subject to it whether or not I choose to see it or to ignore it. If you were about to walk off a cliff, stubbornly refusing to see the cliff right in front of you and protesting all along to me that there was no such cliff, am I “imposing” reality upon you by trying to make you see it? Do you gain anything from living a lie, from faking reality? Can you keep it up?
I strongly suspect that much of the support for abortion comes from those who would like to do just that, to fake reality so as to arrive at a conclusion which tells them that the action that will improve their life is also the morally correct action. I recognize the numerous and substantial social benefits of abortion. I recognize that many women’s lives have been made better by it, and probably alot of men as well (men who would otherwise have been financially obligated for 18+ years.) Alot of people see all that and decide to take positive consequences for one of the persons involved as conclusive of moral permissibility.