Soviet "Invasion" of Poland in 1980-81

Factual Questions
1

Background to my question here.

I never quite understood what a Soviet invasion of Poland during the Solidarity era would have looked like. After all, the Soviets were already there, with military forces deployed in Poland (the Northern Group of Forces), and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany were supplied through Poland.

I’m guessing that when people talk of a potential Soviet “invasion” of Poland during this time, what they’re really describing is the Soviet Union disarming/replacing the Polish government, army and police to take control of the entire country, correct?

Admittedly, I’m sure such an action would have required more forces than the relatively modest forces the Soviets had garrisoned in Poland (and thus requiring a deployment from the Western U.S.S.R., or from East Germany-- although I suspect the latter unlikely, given the potential for confrontation with NATO). But it’s not really an invasion in the generally understood sense of the term, but more of a coup.

2

Rough analogy: Vichy vs. Occupied France.

Though I never fully understood the rationale for that either.

3

I read the “background,” and searched my memory, but there wasn’t a Soviet “invasion” in 80-81. That’s partly why it’s a remarkable part of the history of the demise of the USSR.

Or are you asking what a potential Soviet “invasion” into Polish life might have meant? The one that Jaruzelski claimed to have avoided?

I think its pretty clear that by '80 the Soviets couldn’t do in Poland what they did in Czechoslovakia in '68, or Hungary in the 50’s.

But I’m still not clear that answers your question. Can you rephrase it?

4

Hmmm. Thought I was clear enough (albeit I didn’t include a question mark! :).

I know there wasn’t an “invasion” of Poland-- it was threatened, it was expected in some quarters, and the historical record today appears unclear: some say the Soviets never would have done it, others say they seriously considered it but changed their minds at the last minute.

Regardless of the potential for it, my question was basically a logistical one: when we talk about invasions, we usually talk about an external power with no forces in the invaded country before the invaded country is, in fact, invaded. Germany invading Poland in 1939, the Allies invading France in 1944, etc.

The Soviets, however, had forces in Poland in 1980-81. Not as many as they had in East Germany or Czechoslovakia (or even Hungary, IIRC), but that was primarily because those forces were arrayed on the front lines against NATO. Still, in order to get to East Germany, CZ, Hungary, etc., the Soviet transit and supply lines all went through Poland. Soviet aircraft were based in Poland. And I believe that later in the Cold War period, two Soviet divisions were also specifically based in Poland, although they were intended as part of the follow-on echelons to any Soviet invasion of West Germany (or defense of East Germany, for the suitably communist and/or paranoid :)).

Also, I would figure that the Soviets had pretty much free reign in Poland to go where they needed to go at this time. After all, Poland was a puppet regime in a similar sense that all the Eastern European nations were (acknowledging, of course, the gradations-- Tito’s Yugoslavia, Ceaucescu’s Romania, and l’il ol Albania had their own degrees of “freedom” from Soviet rule. . . but in no case were they truly independent of Soviet domination).

Anyway. . . I was just curious. I always figured the word “invasion” in the Polish sense was really just a shorthand for a coup.

(Oh, BTW, the Vichy France example is close but not precise-- IIRC, no German forces were on Vichy soil until their invasion after the Allies landed in North Africa).

5

You may be overestimating the effectiveness of the Soviet Army on the ground. Yes, there were numbers there, and more numbers available to reinforce them, but they were made up mostly of young, disaffected conscripts who might not have been trusted to carry out such an operation on such a scale. Remember that the same problems and the same popular attitudes that were weakening the Jaruzelski regime were weakening the Soviet system too. The Moscow government might well have realized that, remembered the Russian military’s role in the 1917 revolution, and decided not to create an opportunity for a backfire.

6

Well, that’s O/T from my post, but as long as we’re sliding the subject. . . no, I don’t think I am.

Yes, the Soviet army was conscript based, but the officer corps was strong, and there’s no question that even in the late Cold War period, the Soviet army was more capable than the Polish armed forces. Training and doctrine was identical, of course, but the quality of conscripts were nearly identical (although the Soviets had their language problems). The Soviets had better equipment in all respects. Also, IIRC the two divisions the USSR kept on Polish soil (the 20th TD and variously the 6th MRD or the 38th TD) were Category 1 (or Category A, depending on the nomenclature preference). Additionally, the Soviets would have had limited access to the Cat 1 divisions in East Germany, as well as those in the western Soviet Union. They’re not the equal of a West German/Brit/U.S. division in this period, but they’re not too shabby, either.

As for Warsaw Pact support. . . that’s the tough unknown. I don’t see the Germans getting away with invading Poland again. I can’t see either the Hungarians or the Czechs feeling particularly motivated as well.

In the end, it may just be a Russian road show.

BTW, here is a fascinating old think tank study (from Heritage-- yeah, I know, but it’s contemporaneous, which counts for something) that talks a bit about the potential for a Soviet invasion. Obviously, the assumptions on what would be required vary greatly depending on the factors-- whether the Poles resisted, how many of them resisted, how quickly/quietly could the Russians have moved against garrisons/C2 nodes/road nets, etc. Perhaps at the beginning of the Solidarity crisis the Soviets could have “surprised” the Poles, but by the later period I’m sure the Poles were prepared for what could have been coming, at least psychologically.

That study I linked mentions a sixty division occupying force required, which strikes me as extremely excessive. Such a force would only be needed in the event of complete Polish resistance, but I can’t imagine such a scenario playing out, not even in their “rebellious” years.

Depending on who you speak with, you get a lot of different theories as to what happened, and why. Some are self-serving-- Jaruzelski, for instance, was either the instigator of all the trouble on his own, or in obedience to the Kremlin declared martial law. Long after the Wall fell, however, Jaruzelski has spoke about how his declaration of martial law “saved” Poland from invasion at that time. I guess everyone gets to be a hero in hindsight.

Anyway, I’m sure it would have been a mess. I could have seen it bringing about the Soviet collapse that much sooner, especially if the other Eastern European nations essentially told Moscow to pound sand, they’re not helping out with this one. Unfortunately, that kind of disloyalty and rebellion wouldn’t be met with the reformist movement under Gorbachev, but the walking corpse of Brezhnev combined with the KGB calculations of Andropov. . . lot more room for pessimism.

We got lucky so many times during the Cold War; this is just one of those instances. Tough, tough game.