SpaceX Starship / Super Heavy Discussion Thread

What does that even mean? He’s the boss. Any big decision like “do we build a massive flame diverter” is his. You can’t “overrule” your own decision. And come on, “people are saying”? We’re better than that here. At least cite the source of your rumors.

It may be that his senior engineers thought a flame diverter was a good idea, and he thought they should try going without it instead. But that would hardly be the first time.

The one specific case I know about is whether they should go for a “face shut-off” design for the Merlin engine. Tom Mueller (propulsion lead) thought it would be too difficult to develop. Musk thought it would be simpler in the long run and worth the effort. Musk decided to do it, Tom and his team implemented it, and it proved to be the right decision after all.

The flame diverter thing isn’t just a right-or-wrong technical decision. They have a flame diverter partially implemented; they could have delayed a few months to finish and install it. That’s a few months of not having the information they have now. Even knowing that it would have gone this way, they may well have launched anyway.

Isn’t that EXACTLY what I just said? That he may have overruled his engineers? I’m not citing the rumors because I don’t put any stock into it unless it can be verified other than Musk likes to make these sorts of decisions regardless of the advice of his engineers (at both Tesla and Space X). The VERY next sentence was

Some more interesting shots of the launch pad. The shot of the tanks is pretty wild. There are more further down the thread.

From what I’ve been reading (unverified), that the tanks that were damaged were empty so they got kind of lucky there.

The door was blown off from the inside? That’s wild.

That’s not “overruling”.

I have a lot of autonomy in my day job, but occasionally I have to present a decision to management. Usually when there is some risk or cost involved. In these cases, I present my case, lay out the outcomes as best I can see, spell out the risk, and so on. I may or may not tell them my recommendation. But if they do go against it, it’s not “overruling” anything. The decision is theirs, and it’s my job to give them the best data I can. After that, it’s their job to weigh the risk and decide if the benefits exceed the potential downside. Sometimes they make a riskier choice than I would have, sometimes not.

Mueller undoubtedly knows 100x as much about rocket engines as Musk, but whether to implement face shut-off isn’t a pure technical decision. It’s again a weighing of risk, cost, development time, long-term gain, and so on. Mueller didn’t necessarily have access to the same information, and undoubtedly weighed the risks differently.

I’m sure the same kind of thing went on here. If the engineers said there was a 50% shot at the pad surviving, they may well have thought that was too risky to try. That doesn’t mean they got “overruled” if Musk said to go for it anyway.

You have to remember, by definition, Musk has never made a mistake.

And according to Liftoff, Musk wanted to use regenerative cooling on the first Merlin, but Mueller had experience with ablative rocket bell linings and wanted to use that. Musk relented, and the ablative cooling turned out to be nothing but problems. They scrpped it and went woth regenertive cooling. On het another occasion Musk overruled Mueller, and that time Musk was wrong.

Knowing the brittleness of concrete, wouldn’t it have made sense to cover the entire concrete area below the rocket with a contiguous sheet of steel? In terms of hazardous acoustic reflections, a steel surface backed by concrete would not have been any worse than a plain concrete pad, and the steel would have prevented chunks of concrete from being blown all over the place. It would have added a bit of cost, but not nearly as much as designing and fabricating an entire flame diverter structure.

Well, that’s certainly not true. But Musk’s mistakes seem to be simultaneously more spectacular and less disastrous than his competition’s.

The math that convinced other launch providers that rocket reusability was non-viable was just as bad as the math that led Musk to think the pad would survive this launch. In both cases, a bad decision was the result.

But while this pad issue will set back SpaceX just a few months, the bad decisions on reusability set his competition back 15 years. And they’ll be lucky if it doesn’t kill the company.

Deciding not to do something rarely results in an explosion, and so rarely makes the news. You don’t find out how disastrous the choice was until years later.

That’s exactly their current plan, with the addition of water cooling. The steel would slag without some sort of thermal protection. Some of the parts are already made, but it’s not done yet.

There’s a good thread by Dr. Phil Metzger, who has good experience in the area:

‘Steel Plates for Launch & Acoustics’

We used steel plates for some of the Morpheus launch locations so we weren’t tied down to places with concrete. I analyzed the heating of the sheet and showed that the heat would redistribute fast enough that it would not locally melt on the surface, andt hat the steel plate was large enough to take the heat of the entire launch event without melting. To be conservative (because that’s what nasa does :wink:) we also put paint-on ablative on the top of the steel. An ablative erodes under heat and thus uses up some of the heat…keeping what was under the ablative cooler. (Partly we were just testing the use of ablative. It wasn’t just conservatism that motivated this.) So compare to Elon’s tweet about Starship. They plan to make their giant steel plate water-cooled. That way it doesn’t have to be large enough to take all the heat of the plume without melting, the way we designed the Morpheus steel plates. For such a large rocket that much steel would be excessive. And ablative would not be enough to solve this, either. Would the ablative need to be 3 feet thick?!!

But he said it will be water-cooled, which is an awesome idea. The water will be taking heat out of the steel in realtime so it won’t melt. Simple, and it should be effective.

We still had two concerns. One was that the vaporized ablative was hazardous to breathe, but the rocket exhaust would dilute it into the air so no problem. (I still had to show this with math to convince the team.) The second was that the plate might be too hot to walk on, so you had to wait for it to cool before going onto the pad. We handled that with operational procedures. So we had the steel plates, the steel drop-in flame trench, instrumentation like cameras to record the launch, and lighting. We called this system “Launch Pad in a Box”.

This concept was inspired in part when I was driving to Maine and passed a carnival ride folded up on a truck going down the highway. I had a vision of an entire launch complex folded up on a truck for transport so we could launch anywhere, anytime.

We got a picture of the truck and I showed it to the Swamp Works team. I think Rob Mueller was already having the same idea. He and I started fighting to get the idea funded. Meetings, meetings, meetings. And we got the funds.

We were already working on these technologies when we applied them to Morpheus. The two projects were synergistic. We also talked about portable lighting arrestor towers but never developed that part of the kit.

So all that was just to say that I like the idea SpaceX is pursuing. I think it will work great to solve the plume erosion problem.

It will not mitigate launch acoustics. The flat plat will reflect the sound back up along the sides of the vehicle, shaking the structure.

There very first “sound” that happens on launch is the shockwave from engine ignition. It bounces off the pad then runs up the sides of the vehicle, stressing everything. At nasa it is called the “Initial OverPressure” or IOP. The IOP almost ruined the 1st Shuttle launch.

The reason there is a shockwave is because a converging-diverging rocket nozzle tricks the gas flow into going supersonic. The fuel burns in the combustion chamber and creates high pressure. The restriction at the throat causes the gas to “choke” at the speed of sound.

As it goes downstream from the throat it expands, cools, and speeds up to go supersonic. But initially it has to push the ambient air out of the nozzle. The supersonic flow is ramming into the ambient air as it pushes it, creating a big buildup of pressure…the ignition shock

That shockwave is slowly pushed down the nozzle (“slow” meaning a tiny fraction of a second). At the end of the nozzle it detaches then goes down and hits the launch pad. It then reflects and travels up to the rocket, running up along its sides, shaking the structure.

On the first Space Shuttle launch the IOP deflected the elevons— the control surfaces on the wings — so far the engineers were worried they could have snapped. So they added the water deluge system to absorb and break up the IOP shockwave. After the IOP, the rocket exhaust continues to produce acoustic noise. It does this through turbulence. The noise is random — not like a coherent shockwave — but it is still a lot of energy that reflects off the pad and vibrates the rocket. We do not have great models of acoustic noise production in rocket plumes. NASA’s models are conservative, predicting more noise than there really is. Therefore we build rocket structures stiffer than they really need to be. This wastes the mass margin, reducing payload mass.

So it is important to keep researching rocket plume acoustics to make rockets more efficient. But also, it is important to design launch pads to reduce acoustics so we can save more payload margin. In the previous thread I told how we designed the portable flame trench for Morpheus to duct the acoustic energy away from the vehicle, because we think that acoustic energy is what destroyed the first Morpheus. So I have no idea of the acoustics experienced by Starship or it’s structural beefiness. It may not be a problem at all, for all I know. I’m just saying that a flat steel plate does not do anything to reduce acoustic energy from coupling into the vehicle.

If the rocket doesn’t mind the shaking, then fine. But it is easy to design systems that reduce launch acoustics and give more margin back to the vehicle, so if SpaceX decided to do so then it could be done.

Whatever.

Allow me to inject a bit of perspective here. James Michener was a pretty fair journalist and novelist, if you don’t mind thick books. In his historical fictional novel “Space” he put forth it took Werner von Braun 612 failures before he got a V2 rocket to make a successful flight. So maybe SpaceX still has 611 more failures to go before their Starship will work.

So make the platform out of iridum.

That sounds kinda expensive… maybe after we get some asteroid mining going.

Let’s hope it doesn’t take quite that many. Even the Falcon 1 made orbit after just four launches. F9 and FH worked on the first try.

Ahh, I found the “people” that are saying things:
https://i.redd.it/0cokt1qt4jva1.png

Funny how you can easily spot a source from certain turns of phrase, especially when the phrase is nonsensical. OVERRULED!

Needless to say, this Jeneral Anxiety is an idiot. They couldn’t even be bothered to get the mundane facts right, like the number of engines on the booster. Or basic terminology, like calling them “jets”.

Or, for that matter, any of the history. The first static fire on the Orbital Launch Mount was less than a year ago (and was just a single engine). For the most part, the other tests haven’t been a problem. Which isn’t surprising since most of the previous tests were for the upper stage, which has much less thrust than the booster. The first time they had close to a real test was just a few months ago.

That one was at ~50% thrust and caused some concrete spalling. Nowhere close to the current amount. Something extra happened this time.

Deleted.

Ah well. I enjoy having a bit of pushback, as long as people cite their sources and don’t confuse snark with arguments.

I think it’ll be interesting to see what SpaceX comes up with, and on what timeframe. If this does turn out to be a year+ setback, I’ll happily admit that it was a really bad bet on their part. We’ll just have to see how it goes.

There are a number of possible solutions here as well. I’d say there are three basic categories: a flame-resistant plate (i.e., a flat water-cooled steel pad), an above-ground flame diverter (like an upside-down wedge under the mount, also possibly water-cooled), and an underground flame trench. Those are, IMO, in rough order of increasing cost/difficulty.

If it is the case that the thrust shattered the concrete pieces and lifted them from beneath, then it may be that a beefier plate is all that’s needed. On the other hand, perhaps that is just too much energy in too small a space, and a trench is needed to divert it elsewhere. Or somewhere in-between. I think we’ll find out which solution they pick pretty soon, but it’ll be a while before we find out if that’s the right choice.

Why stainless, and not some kind of carbon-steel alloy? Can’t alloy steel be made stronger than stainless (allowing for thinner, lighter parts with the required strength)?

Agreed! It was a pathetic effort on Musk’s part to “spin doctor” a fatal malfunction to the point where it makes him look pathetic and desperate. I agree with LSDGuy’s assertion that an all or nothing approach like success/failure isn’t productive or totally accurate. How about something like this: “Although we are naturally disappointed it the outcome of today’s launch, it is part of the learning process that will lead to our goal of ultimate success. Exploration has always been fraught with danger and setbacks, but the rewards have been spectacular!”

I’m not sure if I like that name better or worse than my actual one. But it sure carries different connotations. :grin:

In case it’s not clear, I find this funny, not impolite or insulting.