But look who ruled on the case where that citation comes from:
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 486 U. S. 870. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 486 U. S. 874.
Also, let’s step back to the overarching recusal standards – to wit:
That’s simpler than the language about ‘personal,’ ‘financial,’ and ‘fiduciary.’ It’s spelled out more explicitly here:
A violation of § 455(a) – which requires a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned – is established when a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts, would expect that a judge knew of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality, notwithstanding a finding that the judge was not actually conscious of those circumstances.
There just isn’t a lot of wiggle room there, unless one is playing what Bill Maher referred to as a game of “Gus (the Mule):”
It’s not unreasonable to argue that the Supremes answer to nobody (but their Chief) about recusal. Neither is it unreasonable to discuss the long list of times that Justices did recuse themselves.
Of course, some people who disagree may be relying on “What If We Didn’t ?”.
Which is a very dark door to just keep opening blithely.
This is too much like Trump’s “perfect call” with Zelensky. At some point, “These aren’t the droids you’re looking for” (forgive the endless mixed metaphors) must be made to fail. At some point, country over party should matter.