I don’t agree that it is a “religious war”. I would argue that it’s an ethno-nationalist conflict, no different really than the numerous such conflicts in (say) modern-day and recent-history Europe. Part of that conflict is that each side identifies with particular religion(s), and some of the players are religious fanatics (notably, Hamas), but the conflict as a whole isn’t inspired by religion.
For proof, I would point to the fact that both the Zionists and the PLO were originally reasonably non-religious (most early Zionists were socialist atheists); also, that the Palestinians are partly Muslim and partly Christian - they do not share a common religion.
Indeed, one of the most vicious Palestinian terrorists was Christian in background and secular in practice: George Habash.
I’m inclined to believe it was a recognition that there was no logistical way to control rioting in the streets. No, guerilla action did not drive them out, but by attempting to cruise the streets of Gaza to find insurgents, they were particularly at risk from a hostile civilain population; and it was a no-win situation. Use lethal force against school children throwing rocks (or shell them playing socer on the beach) and the whole world condemns you. Nobody on the Palestinian side wanted to be the capos and keep order, and the number of military needed to truly control the place was far too large. Simpler to declare victory and withdraw… “all we wanted was these borders anyway”. For every “credible” pundit on the Israeli side, there’s another on the Arab side who will argue it was a “decisive victory”.
But you are arguing that just because the government expected the withdrawal to reduce attacks, does not mean that attacks were a reason for the withdrawal. Maybe you’re right. Not a word there about the border selection being a priority.
However, we’re not going to settle or even agree on the middle east. I think we can both agree that the current management of Gaza is not the desirable result. It brings to mind the result the USA got when attempting to set up a democratic Libya or Iraq. There’s a long way to go before there’s even a hint of moderation or compromise from Gaza’s leaders, let alone democracy - so I see no hope of improvement.
There is no doubt an increase in Islamic extremism throughout the ME, which has had a strong impact on the Palestinians: the development of Hamas as a challenger to the PA is proof of that.
However, that upswing in Islamic extremism long post-dates the origins of the Israel/Palestine conflict, and isn’t the cause of it (though obviously, it doesn’t make it any easier).
It isn’t uncommon for religious differences to exacerbate what are, at base, ethno-nationalist conflicts. The same thing happened in former Yugoslavia, for example.
As for “not a word”, this is what your second source has to say:
This is what I was talking about - that the PA (and many leftish critics) claimed that the move was designed, essentially, to allow Israel to craft its own unilateral “solution” to the two-state problem: discarding the worst bits of the occupied territories (in particular, Gaza, though some settlements in the WB were dismantled as well), while keeping the best bits for itself - as opposed to a negotiated solution, which would, presumably, have been more favourable to Palestine in selection of the bits that were left to the Palestinians.
The key to this is that Gaza is basically a giant slum densely crowded with impoverished Palestinians. No sane government would want to “own” that. The Egyptians were offered Gaza, but refused to take it.
Naturally, the violent extremists proclaimed victory for violent extremism. That’s what they do. Any concessions the Israelis make for any reason are proclaimed as “victories”. However, there is no particular reason to believe they are right - particularly when, as here, other Palestinians (namely the PA) are at the very same time complaining about the move. It is kinda hard to take credit for, as you put it, a “decisive victory”, while complaining that the “loser” was taking advantage of them, isn’t it?
A more logical way to proceed is to ask oneself - could the move have occurred even if there was no particular guerilla activity? In this case, the answer is pretty clearly yes: even if there wasn’t a single guerilla fighter in Gaza, Israel still would not want to be on the hook indefinitely for the upkeep of an enclave crowded with angry and poor Palestinians, who have, to put it mildly, no love for Israel as a state. They would at some point have to make one of four choices: (1) make them citizens alongside the other Arab Israelis; (2) make them formally or de facto a non-citizen subject class; (3) expel or kill them; or (4) cut them loose. Obviously, the Sharon government concluded that the last choice was the most palatable - in sharp contrast to the usual 20th century European and ME solutions in such ethno-nationalist conflicts, which have tended to be either (1) or (3).