Pantastic does not dispute the thesis of my reply #14. Therefore I take it he agrees with me that Western attitudes toward the contribution and sacrifice of the WWII USSR constitute a form of intellectual criminality.
Now for some comments on the details of his own irrelevant post:
(reply #16)
[Quote= Pantastic]
I think that the East should be faulted for its virtually complete lack of appreciation for the Soviet contribution to Nazi early war victory, which led to terrible cost in blood to the people of Europe, and later to the Soviet union itself. They joined the Nazis in invading Poland, supplied them with war materials throughout the stunning victories of 1938-1941, and allowed them to leave only a bare garrison on the Eastern border while dealing with France and trying to deal with the UK.
The
If you’re going to accuse someone of ‘intellectual criminality’, you probably should remember 1938-1941 in addition to 1941-1945.
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1938? You aren’t confused about what year the war began, are you?
It so happens that the outstanding non-Nazi criminals of 1938 were Britain and France, whose behavior at Munich has entered the language as a synonym for treachery. Not only was the USSR not a party to this criminal behavior, it spent most of the crisis period beseeching the criminals to join with it in a real commitment to real military deterrence.
In 1939 prior to Molotov-Ribbentrop the USSR tried, again, to get a commitment to offensive measures against Germany, but Britain and France would have none of it, and Britain exhibited its lack of interest by dispatching a mere colonel to lead a negotiating mission. Hence, the USSR accurately viewed its choices as follows:
(1) Let Germany take over ALL of Poland unopposed, and hope that the next round, in the West, would see both sides fight to an exhausting stalemate a la 1914-1917.
(2) Oppose Germany in effect alone while Britain and France sat on their asses behind their fortifications, letting Germany and the USSR do the worst they could to each other.
(3) Make the best deal it could with Germany, and hope for the same next round result as in (1).
The USSR quite reasonably chose (3). Unfortunately for it, things did not go as hoped for in the West, but at least the 1941 German invasion was launched from 200 miles further west than it would have been absent Molotov-Ribbentrop.
Now, there is absolutely no disputing that the USSR’s treatment of its new Polish subjects was criminal, and the outstanding criminal act was probably the Katyn massacre. For those who wish to identify a Russian parallel to my thesis, post-Soviet Russian response to Katyn fits the bill- it was not until 2010 that the Russian government finally owned up to unambiguous Soviet responsibility for that crime of mass murder.
[Quote= Pantastic]
The Soviets didn’t have any allies on continental Europe because they helped the Nazis defeat everyone else in the area, not because the West abandonded them. The Soviets took high casualties initially because of Stalin’s purges and reorganizations, not because of anything the West did to them - he in fact ignored direct warnings about Barbarossa. It’s not really reasonable to expect a medal for shooting yourself in the foot twice.
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The 1940-1941 Germany Army was the best in world history up to then, probably by far, and would have been without any contributions from the USSR. Furthermore, although the RAF was nearly as good as the German Air Force, the 1941 Soviet AF was not close. Thus besides not enabling German victories pre-6/22/41, USSR could probably not have stopped the Germans from penetrating deep into its territory. Fortunately for the USSR Germany kept about 45 divisions (out of about 200 total) in the West, the Balkans, and Africa.