Listen, if you really want to test the law in order to point out it’s flaws, hire a lawyer and do it.
I’m pointing out some very obvious flaws in the opinion, that was just issued today, in order to debate here. If you just wish to keep throwing drive bys then perhaps another thread would be of more interest to you?
The opinion talks about Price Waterhouse which I read in law school, read after oral arguments in this case, and read again today.
Everyone says it bans “sexual stereotypes” and those words were used in dicta, but my takeaway from the case, which everyone says is wrong, seems pretty clear. The partners wanted an “aggressive” person to be a partner. So when they said it was acceptable for men to be aggressive, but found that when a woman was aggressive it was “unladylike” then they per se barred women from being partners, therefore sex discrimination.
I never took it, and cannot find anything in the holding that supports the idea that I cannot fire a man because he likes sewing or a woman who likes boxing because: 1) those are not class discriminations, they are individual ones that do not evidence an intent to discriminate based on sex, and 2) are not the type of sex based stereotypes that prevent a promotion, e.g. a woman because she is a woman cannot manage men or that a man because he is a man cannot be a nurse. Those (admitted irrational) types of discrimination are not at all what the law had in mind.
I am not discriminating against the man because he is a man, I am discriminating against him because he is a man who sews. Again, a very stupid and irrational employment decision, but not one contemplated or covered by any plain reading of the text of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Because I don’t think you can go out of your way to cause an injury to yourself. If the employer has made accommodations to you (provided a men’s bathroom, for example) and you refuse to use it, that’s on you. No reasonable person is going to believe that this case removes all sex-separated bathrooms, sports, locker rooms. It’s a ridiculous read of the decision.
The civil rights laws require reasonable accommodation, and if the employer is providing that, the employer should be ok. When the funeral home fired that woman for being trans, they didn’t provide that accommodation.
There are multiple other lawyers in this thread. Maybe one of them can say it better than I did.
I don’t think this is correct at all. Anyone who showers in the workplace locker room next to your new hypothetical colleague specifically in order to ogle that colleague would be guilty of sexual harassment. A lesbian who was doing that would be subject to sanctions the same as a straight man would be.
Yeah, it’s a shitty roadmap. Even if the House and Senate were majority Republican, and all the Republicans were on board, you’d still need supermajority in the Senate, and that’s very, very unlikely to happen.
Sure, maybe you’d like the Court to completely eliminate the possibility of such “fixes” by saying that specifically creating a law to avoid protecting LGB (and particularly T) people under sex discrimination would fall afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, but that’s not generally how the Courts work. That would need to wait until such a law was actually crafted.
And sorry for the double post, but to add to the above:
IANA employment-discrimination lawyer (or any kind of lawyer), but I don’t even think a sexual harassment case is necessarily dependent on there being any kind of “real” sexual or romantic attraction between the harasser and the victim. If Chris is making sexually suggestive comments to Pat (including following Pat into the employees’ locker room and making comments about and/or openly leering at Pat’s naked body), the putative fact that Chris is of a sex and sexual orientation such that Chris is not actually at all sexually or romantically interested in Pat (“Aw, I was just horsing around! Pat’s not even my ‘type’ at all! Geeze, Pat, can’t you take a joke?”) would not, as I understand it, keep Pat from successfully bringing a sexual harassment case against Chris.
How is doing something that would not be prohibited if I was a different sex causing injury to myself, according to Gorsuch? Mr. Bostock, in this case, could have resisted his natural urge and had sex with women or became asexual. Yes, it would be a much higher burden from Mr. Bostock than for me to just use the men’s locker room, but I have a right, according to Gorsuch, not to be treated differently, and certainly not fired, “because of …sex.” But that is exactly what they (hypothetically) did to me.
And remember, all it takes is one reason out of no matter how many. They can list 100. Say it was my insolence for not using the men’s locker room. My mouthing off. My not following rules. My eating tuna every day. My body odor. My using the women’s locker room…Oops! That one would have been different had I been a woman no? Actionable says Gorsuch. Please read it again. If the sex of the plaintiff had been changed and the firing would not have occurred, actionable. If my sex was changed from male to female, there would have been no rule against me using the women’s locker room and no firing. The holding is as plain as day. You cannot use two different things, one of them being because of sex, and be justified because of the other.
Of course I would say I was doing that, nor would the lesbian woman. I was just using a locker room, and selecting one without regard to my sex. Pretend I was discrete about it.
If you take Gorsuch at his word, I could waive my erect penis at her and be safe because as a woman (and the Court accepted the parties’ stipulation to use only biological sex) I could not have possibly done that, so if my sex was switched, I would be okay.
If Gorsuch backs away from that in a future locker room or bathroom or sports case, then his whole theory about switching sexes crumbles.
UltraVires, I think you’ve answered your own questions without noticing it.
If there actually is a need for different rules for the genders, then such rules would be permissible. Show the need.
I’m not all that convinced that there actually is a need for gender-based dress codes. Dress codes can call for clothing suitable for the work in question without specifying who among those doing the same work is allowed to wear what. There is a need for separate sports teams, because the physical skills are different enough, in people past puberty, to call for them. The need for separate bathrooms is pretty much society-produced. An actual need of many people of multiple genders for physical privacy, however produced, does actually exist; but this could probably best be dealt with by putting better doors on the stalls.
I fear that your misunderstandings of employment discrimination law, from the specific mixed motive language in Title VII to the kind of thinking you evince here, is an insurmountable mountain to battle against. And I am not well suited, nor do I have the patience, to respond to your every fevered imaginary situation.
I will simply point out that if you fired a man for liking sewing, but did not fire a woman for liking sewing then that is pretty clear evidence that you are firing him, not because of sewing, but because he’s a man. You remain free to fire ALL workers for not liking sewing, but when you specifically discriminate on the basis of the employee’s sex, then it’s a problem.
That’s like first week discrimination stuff.
If I answered my own question, Gorsuch’s opinion certainly does not. Look back where I posted the holding. If we switch the plaintiff’s gender and that changes the hiring decision, then that is a violation. Full stop.
Gorsuch said nothing about reasonable rules or anything of the sort. If I fired a man for not wearing a coat and tie to work, then I have two reasons: 1) he is a man, 2) who didn’t wear a coat and tie to work. According to Gorsuch, by #2 is subsumed by #1. As I would not have fired a woman for not wearing a coat and tie to work, the Court’s job is done and I have committed a violation.
I agree with you that reasonable rules related to gender can be followed, but this opinion says no, they cannot. Point out to me in the opinion where Gorsuch talks about reasonable rules, except for the part where he leaves it for another day to decide locker rooms, sports, and bathrooms.
Yeah it is. From your first week of reading Price Waterhouse. I am not discriminating against him because he is a man. Period. I hire a bunch of men…see they are all over. What I am discriminating against is because he is a man who sews. Sewing is not a protected class, and just a ridiculous extension led to the ridiculous result today.
If you can claim that it is still actionable because he is a man who does X, and X means sewing, then why doesn’t it also apply to “using the women’s locker room”?
The Court is going to the text of “because of…sex” and claims that there is no wiggle room there. If the sexes were switched, it’s actionable.
Okay, so how about this. A big burly man in my employ, with full beard, and identifies as a man asks for a raise. I don’t give it to him. He tries to find a way to jab at me without being fired.
He comes to work the next morning, before going out to meet clients in a rural area, wearing a flowered dress, with high heels, and wearing makeup. Just for spite. I tell him to get the fuck out, he is fired.
Under Gorsuch’s opinion, I am liable. Why? Because I fired him because: 1) he was being a dick, and 2) he was dressed like a woman. So #2 means that my firing is actionable. If we switched his sex to female, I would have no objection to him wearing a dress, high heels, and makeup. Just because I had an additional reason, that he was being a spiteful dick, does not provide cover for my sex based discrimination.
Could someone point to something in Gorsuch’s opinion that gives me as an employer some cover?
Then why do continue to make the same mistakes in thinking? Why do you continuously throw out idiotic examples?
Wiggle room? Whatever.
If you fire a male for sewing, but dont fire a woman for sewing, that’s pretty good evidence you are discriminating on the basis of sex. If you fire all sewers equally, that’s clearly evidence that you aren’t.
This really shouldn’t be as hard to understand.
If I have 400 men and 387 women employed my company and a I fire the one guy who likes sewing, which is the reason? Because he is male? I don’t discriminate against males, I have hired 400 of them. I have no problem with males. Women? Nope, have 387 of them. Sewing? Nope. 214 of the women like sewing.
The issue is men who sew. Men are a protected class. Those who sew are not. The Supreme Court has taken a wrong turn on this and this opinion has opened the door for pretty much everything.
I don’t know why you think it is so clear. Yes, the decision to fire the man who sews was sex based just like the decision to fire the man who keeps using the women’s locker room was sex based, but it wasn’t “because of his [sex].” It was because of his secondary actions.
Contrary to Gorsuch, the text seems pretty clear to me. If I fire a man because he has sex with other men, I’m not firing him because of his sex. I have no problem hiring men. I’m firing him for his secondary actions, the having sex with other men that is not protected by the law.
This but for causation leads to absurd results like in my last post or for locker rooms of women’s or girl’s sports.
ETA: The public accommodations law uses the same language. Women, look for men in your locker rooms at the gym soon. The gym cannot do anything.
Ooh, ooh, can I play?
Say I have this guy who’s working for me, and he’s really lazy and never arrives at work on time. And say I write him up a bunch of times and threaten to fire him if he comes in late again. And say that he comes in late the next day.
But wait! Wait!
Turns out, he came in late because he went to a doctor and had his testicles and penis chopped off, and got placed on estrogen therapy, just so that he could say that I was firing him for his transgender status?
And what if, that same morning, he (or is it she?) went and took a dump in BOTH the men’s AND the women’s bathroom, while simultaneously wearing both a tuxedo and a ballroom gown?
What if all that happened? Where would Justice Gorsuch’s stupid opinion help THAT employer, huh?
What if he had a detachable penis (NSFW) installed so he can be whatever gender is most advantageous at the moment?
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The part where he leaves it for another day to decide locker rooms, sports, and bathrooms. Stating that this decision doesn’t cover those situations implies that Gorsuch, and/or the Court as a whole, finds something different about them.
I presume, or at least hope, that such discussion would involve whether there is “actual need” for such rules in each of those distinct and individual situations; and, if so, which sort of rules might be considered reasonable and which might not.
And this business of claiming that that you ought to be able to fire a man for sewing specifically because he is a man, but that it wouldn’t be specifically because he is a man even though you’re stating that it would be, is so absurd that I’m not going to further address it.
UltraVires, you’re a lawyer right? Well up here in Washington State gender identity has been protected by state law since 2006. Yet dress codes are totally legal in this state, and none of the bizarre hypotheticals you post have come true. Why don’t you ask a lawyer in Seattle why your arguments don’t work?
You, and the Court, are ignoring the text of the law that says I cannot fire someone “because of …sex.” You haven’t addressed my straightforward argument. I’m not firing the man who sews because of his sex. I don’t hate men at all. I’m firing him because he is a man who sews. Men are permitted to work for me. Those who sew are not. Which is the deciding factor? The maleness or the sewing?
Gorsuch can “hold these things for another day” but his holding in THIS case makes them impossible to be challenged. Anyone can cite his own words as proof positive that you can’t fire me for using the women’s locker room.
Right, and that’s the way it should be done. Washington has passed a law making gender identity a protected class. It didn’t pigeonhole into this “because of…sex” nonsense. That’s why Washington can have reasonable provisions fro dress codes and locker rooms because it recognized that gender identity and sexual orientation have nothing at all to do with an person’s sex. A male or a female can change genders or have different orientations. That makes sense and doesn’t throw the law into gobbledygook.
This ruling holds firmly that any and all distinctions based on sex mean that the firing was illegal. I was being silly, but cannot understand under the Gorsuch opinion how a man waiving his dick around the office and gets fired is not covered, because if he was a female, he couldn’t have done it and therefore he is safe.
And remember, you can’t change other facts. You can’t say it would be like a female showing her hoo-ha in the office. Gorsuch somberly condemned those arguments as changing the facts and goalpost shifting. You have to keep the underlying facts the same. So if a woman wouldn’t be fired for waiving her dick around the office (and she wouldn’t because it is an impossibility) then a man cannot be fired for it either.
Point out a line or two in the Gorsuch opinion that suggests otherwise.
Really, if as you read it the ruling doesn’t explicitly include a caveat about reasonability parmeters, it has to be assumed absolute to the point of irrational enforcement?
The way I take it is that the criterion for fair employment practices on the basis of sexual orientation will be enforced in the same way as it has been so far for biological sex. Or how it has been in states where orientation/identity protection is already the law. AFAIK we haven’t seen M/F restrooms deemed unconstitutional nor have we rendered women unfireable.
And please don’t bring in the thing with a man just declaring himself a woman one fine morning. That’s not how any of this works.