Taking a stand on moral relativism

Great Debates
121

** Rubbish!

You said earlier that morality and ethics involve “what people should do”. The very concept requires looking beyond and outside people to the world in which they live, in the same way that the question “how should we build a house?” requires looking at the world to see how it works.

Our theories of physical law are necessarily flawed and incomplete at best, but there is no uncertainty about whether there is one actual set of rules. The laws of physics are. We can debate their nature, and conduct experiments to determine which theories best reflect the true laws.

Why is thinking about ethical principles any different?

How is this a problem? All of those ethical systems would truly be equally valid – at worst, the problem is no greater than your proposals, which don’t contain the capacity to validly discard any ethical systems.

122

Very well.

Imagine for a moment that everyone on Earth is given a small box with a little red button. No one can push anyone else’s button, and no one can push their button accidentally. Everyone is told that pushing their button will cause themselves to die – and this is actually the case.

Wait a while.

Now, you’ll quickly find that all of the people who are left, for one reason or another, do not wish to push the button.

Consider the evolutionary ethics experiment described in that article of Discover. In the starting condition, the little organisms have all kinds of ethical systems. Eventually, the selfish defectors no longer exist. Is it “wrong” to be a selfish defector? By evolution’s logic, yes.

123

sigh

You claim that “evolution selects among moral systems – some lend themselves to transmission, some don’t. Some tend to preserve the societies that have them, and some don’t.”

How does this explain the fact that there are numerous different societies that have vastly different moral systems? How does this explain the fact that there are numerous moral systems that exist simulateously in different societies? How does this explain the fact that there are societies that have different moral systems operating within them simultaneously?

As I stated before, Catholics have a different set of moral standards than Jews, and I dare you to say that they are evolutionarily different. Similarly, Jews all over the world may share the same moral standards, regardless of their enviroment or background – it’s a cultural decision to act in a certain way, not a biological impetus.

Your little “thought experiment” is interesting, but so far removed from reality that I fail to see what explanatory value it has. I apologize for not having a copy of the “Discover” article you keep referencing, so I’m afraid I will just have to assume that you have made this entire concept of evolutionary derived moral standards entirely out of whole cloth.

Evolution is a process by which species adapt and change, and whereby those species which adapt the best to their environment
survive to continue the species. Once a species has successfully adapted to its environment, evolution no longer has a role. And evolution does not determine how societies are created or maintained, else we wouldn’t have so many different societies coexisting simultaneously.

However, let’s just assume that you are somehow correct, and that evolution really is the determining force behind moral values. If this is the case, any moral system that allows a species to adapt successfully to its environment would be “correct.” Since there are numerous societies that have successfully adapted to their environment, in spite of wildly different moral systems, your argument would then indicate that there are multiple “correct” moral systems instead of one. In other words, to argue from evolution is to argue for moral relativism in the worst way: “Whatever works for a particular society is right.”

Feh. I’d still like to see a cite for your assertion that moral absolutes can be derived from evolutionary principles. One that we can actually read, that is.

Barry

124

Because ethical systems can be disobeyed, unlike your beloved laws of physics. You have noticed that, at least?

Of course they can validly discard other ethical systems. They can also proclaim themselves to have a privileged system. None of this actually does one little thing to remove the problem of having ultimately unjustified assumptions, so why not just recognize it and say, “There is no uniquely privileged system”? You tell me.

125

And how do we determine what needs justifying? “Whatever TVAA says is self-evident is self-evident”?

I’m sorry; you’re saying you have no concept of “what people should do”? That this is an empty concept?

126

** What’s the problem? Evolutionary theory does NOT imply that there should be a single, “Master Organism” on the planet.

Most land-dwelling creatures have specific physiological and behavioral adaptations to conserve salt. Most sea-dwelling creatures have specific physiological adaptations to eliminate salt. Does this present as a problem for evolution?

They’re not – any overall genetic differences between Catholics and Jews is negligible.

Their memes, however, most certainly are evolutionarily different. More to the point, the aspects shared by these groups show strong signs of being evolutionarily determined.

Not all Jews share the same culture. There is a biological impetus to form distinct tribal associations in humanity – that can manifest as nationalism or a preference for the local sports teams. Even more to the point – why was one tradition chosen over another? How did those traditions form? Why are they carried on?

** Oh, please.

Why are vastly more people afraid of spiders than of cars?

** Pffh. The specific article is irrelevant – how can you have developed such an interest in philosophy as you’ve demonstrated repeatedly on these boards without becoming even passingly familar with these ideas?

** Hah! You’re not as familiar with applied evolution as I thought.

No species is ever “successfully adapted to its environment”. What appears to be stability is actually a balance between genetic change (whether due to mutation or recombination) and selection pressures.

Are you familiar with the concept of a soliton?

And evolution does not determine how species are created or maintained, else we wouldn’t have so many different species coexisting simultaneously. :rolleyes:

** So far, so good…

** No. First, “whatever works” is not arbitrary – it is determined by principles that place significant limits on what can and cannot be considered valid. Secondly, all of the “correct” moral systems are special cases of a universally applicable moral system in the same way that “viable” species are special cases of the principles of adaptation.

You can find plenty by searching for “Tit for Tat” and “Prisoner’s Dilemma”.
Here are some examples:

http://sol.brunel.ac.uk/~jarvis/bola/unions/dilemma.html
http://www.deviantart.com/view/2593721/
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~parkx032/O-ETHICS.html
(This last one is interesting primarily because it uses the term “Rational Ethics” for the concept you’ve labeled “moral relativism”. I greatly prefer the author’s term.)
http://www.gametheory.net/News/Items/026.html

These are just a few of the examinations available to even a cursory search.

127

No kidding. But “can” doesn’t mean “should” – unless you’re arguing for a truly unorthodox morality.

Being able to make the pronouncement does not make it valid.

If we imagine people applying every moral code we can think of and widely pronouncing that theirs is correct, we can quickly see that some pronouncements will stop being made as time passes, since some moral codes are not viable strategies. If we define “validity” as “being pronounced as valid”, we can conclude that the strategies evolution eliminates are invalid and those that it preserves are valid.

The ultimate principle is existence: what continues to exist will be considered right.

128

** By following the chain of inference until we find the end – that is, a link that essentially justifies itself.

For example, I can (at least in theory) explain how any particular subsection of the universe changes over time, but my explanation will quickly fall into error because of interactions with parts of the universe outside my scope. I can then explain what happens by citing external realities, but I can explain those only by citing more external realities. In essence, I’m using the thing to explain the thing – we can go no farther than that.

The phrase by its nature references standards, but we’ve just been denying that it has any actual referent. Morality isn’t truly anything, remember?

If I make up the word “zolramhy”, and tell you that it doesn’t actually mean anything, what would you conclude if I participated in a debate as to whether something was zolramhy or not?

129

I agree. That’s why it’s mind-boggling that you would claim that evolutionary theory can somehow imply that there is one single “absolute morality”.

Well, since Jews can convert to Catholicism and vice-versa, I’m not even sure how you can type the phrase “overall genetic differences between Catholics and Jews” with a straight face in the first place.

Cite?

And? How does a biological impetus to form “distinct tribal associations” (assuming such an impetus exists) mean that there is some “absolute moral code”? If you like, I don’t see any problem with acknowledging that perhaps there is some vague evolutionary derived “absolute” moral principle that states simply that whatever leads people to “form distinct tribal associations” is “good.” However, that principle can be and has been applied in so many different ways by so many different societies and cultures that it it is useless when trying to determine any sort of complete moral code.

Cite? Why are more people afraid of public speaking than spiders? What’s your point?

As I said before, the most you seem to be able to derive from evolution is a single vague principle that whatever leads to people forming distinct tribal associations is “good.” That is not an entire “system” by any means, however, and the application of that principle to real-world situations allows so much flexibility that, once again, you are left with effective moral relativism.

If forcing women to have cliterectomies allows a certain group of people to successfully live together in a distinct tribal association, while such a practice would cause a different goup to be unable to form such a tribal association, then there is no “absolute” moral principle with regard to the practice of cliterectomies. The morality is relative, in spite of the fact that the moral code of each group supposedly an evolutionary basis to it.

So yes, if it makes you happy, I’m willing to concede the possibility that evolution is responsible for some moral principle that can conceivably be considered “absolute”. The application of this moral principle, however, can only be evaluated relative to the needs and desires of each individual society and culture, since the moral code of any successful culture will, by definition, have passed the test of allowing that culture to exist as a distinct tribal association. Saying there is an “absolute” moral principle that means that every society’s moral codes must be accepted as equally valid is functionally the same as saying that there is no such thing as an absolute moral code in the first place.

I actually am somewhat familiar with the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” I don’t recall ever having seen it used to prove that morals are evolutionally derived, however. If anything, it’s a proof as to how logic and reason can be used to determine moral principles. The parties involved have to be aware of the situation and make choices accordingly.

Barry

130

Forgive my incredulity, but, the Prisoner’s Dilemma as an example of a moral principle that can be derived from evolution? You’re aware of why there is the word “dilemma” in it, yeah? Traditionally, the optimal solution for each prisoner is to rat, and the optimal solution for both prisoners is to cooperate (in your first link, however, the payoff matrix is different than others I’ve seen; of course this is simply a facet of context: payoff matrices change). In any event, in a two-player game like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there are two methods of evaluating the payoff: in terms of individual players, or in terms of the total payoff they’ll receive. Each perspective is justifiable to a point, more or less so depending on your perspective of the game and how much context is abstracted away.

In the case of iterated PDs then the “tit for tat” shows some merit, at least in that it stabilizes outcomes (they become predictible, which, really, is to be expected if all parties involved follow a rule for behavior). But this requires that both parties adopt the same method of evaluation, which, in our thread here, is precisely what is under contention. Furthermore, the character of the game itself is likely to change the behavior. Finite-round play is usually different than infinitely long play (or rather, play of indeterminate length).

I have not really studied game theory, but my readings have not lead me to believe that there are guaranteed optimal solutions to all problems. The problem being, of course, that “optimal” is not necessarily an objective concept itself, it requires accepted standards of evaluation. Game theory, like all mathematical study, tends to abstract away subjective qualities and rely upon core assumptions. This does not mean said subjective qualities (“What is optimal?”) disappear, or that, if a game defines a quality like “optimal” that this will necessarily hold true for all players.

The link between PDs and evolution still escapes me, however.

Quite. This is not to say that something is self-justifying, however, it is simply to say there’s no more support to give.

This would be circular reasoning or tautology. I haven’t argued against the fact that a rational ethical system would declare its own assumptions sound and valid; indeed, they would trivially be so. This is why we follow them: because they’re right.

I remember. I was against your use of the so-called naturalistic fallacy where morality is equivocated with natural events or characteristics (in this case, evolution). It isn’t anything in the sense of “A is A it isn’t B”. Morality is morality: it is what we say people should do, or at the very least what I should do. That we may appeal to other sources doesn’t make morality those sources. Even to a cultural relativist morality is not equivocated with culture, culture is simply the last (or, if you prefer, first, or perhaps ultimate) thing we may appeal to.

131

** [sigh]

The absolute morality does NOT require that the same response be given to every scenario, any more than the rules of mathematics require that each problem have the same solution. Nevertheless, the rules define what the proper response is for any given scenario.

Precisely.

Now, if we examined the genes of all people claiming to be Catholics, and all people claiming to be Jews, there might be statistical differences between the two groups. I would expect they would be trivial and insignificant, in the same way that the population of San Francisco might be slightly different genetically than the population of Paris.

The available evidence suggests that the conception of Jews as a distinct ethnic group isn’t even valid. Still, you never know…

For what? Suggesting that their traditions have undergone different selection forces, or suggesting that their principles both have inherent biological predispositions?

** I’m not claiming that forming distinct tribal associations is good. We’re not living in the same conditions as the humans who developed that drive in the first place.

** It’s quite easy to induce fear of spiders in primates, and much harder to induce fear of cars. For the average person, a car is a MUCH greater threat to their life than a spider, but they’re much more afraid of spiders. Why? Because their fears have strong genetic components.

** :rolleyes:

I am not claiming that if a society holds a belief, it is good. I’m pointing out that societies tend to acquire and hold beliefs that preserve them – this is good.

132

RE: spiders: Might have something to do with being acclimated to motor vehicles and not to spiders through everyday activities. Just for, you know, an alternate hypothesis.

133

But you are also claiming that evolution can somehow provide us with a system “moral absolutes,” are you not?

No, you are not claiming that if a society holds a belief, it is good. I didn’t say you were. But you are, apparently, claiming that if a society acquires and holds a belief that that preserves that society, it is good.

However, since different societies hold different beliefs that preserve them, your appeal to evolution is nothing more than moral relativism, no matter how you want to phrase things. If one society is preserved by its belief in cliterectomies and infanticide, and another society is preserved by its rejection of those practices, then according to your argument they have equal claims to being “absolutely moral”. Whether these practices are “moral” or not then depends on the particular circumstances of the society in question, even though both societies can claim that their beliefs ultimately are “determined” by evolutionary principles. And once you start saying that morality can vary from society to society, regardless of the “ultimate” source of all morality, you’re talking about moral relativity.

All you’ve done is provide a rationalization for moral relatavism based on biological and evolutionary grounds. Which is perfectly fine, except that you seem to be claiming that you are somehow refuting moral relativism.

Ah, so your “absolute morality” allows that different responses are appropriate to different situations. Well, guess what, bucko? That’s the definition of moral relativism! As I said before, all you’ve done is provide a biological reationalization for moral relativism, and then called this rationalization “moral absolutism.” That, however, is NOT what everybody else is referring to when they talk about “absolute morality.”

Geez, what a waste of time… :rolleyes:

Barry

134

That’s a good explanation, but it doesn’t account for the experiments with monkeys.

It’s really quite difficult to teach a monkey to be afraid of, say, a flower. It’s much easier to teach them to be afraid of spiders, even when they have no experience of spiders.

This seems to be true of people as well. People are, of course, somewhat more flexible in what they fear.

135

** It’s a working definition of “good”, yes.

** Not at all. Being absolutely moral is equivalent to being perfectly adapted – it never quite occurs.

No, it’s not moral relativism. The behaviors can be evaluated according to universal and eternal principles. What these principles are is unknowable – we can determine them only through trial and error, and logic applied to the results of trial and error.

** No, the morality doesn’t vary, only in the results it gives.

Again, the laws of mathematics don’t change from one problem to the next, even though the answers change. This is the same: the laws of morality are universal.

** I really don’t think so.

** Not quite.

Would you argue that since you say “Good morning, dear” to your wife, you should say that to everyone you see in all conditions? Yet it’s the appropriate thing to say at least some of the time.

What this system does not allow is for different responses to be valid in the same situation. That’s what “moral relativism” seem to be to me – the idea that multiple moral codes are valid.

136

Simply that

  1. they exist
  2. and have different methods for determining moral validity so
  3. there is no unbiased way to evaluate them

Where you go from there, I have no idea.

137

No, instead it allows for different societies and cultures to be classified as “different situations” and therefore have different rules apply to them.

Tomato, tomahto. It’s still relativism when compared to the dogmatic “absolute morality” approach argued by those who claim that all morality derives from God.

A traditional moral absolutist would, for example, claim that it is immoral to kill young children under any circumstance, regardless of the society or culture. A moral relativist, on the other hand, would grant the possibility that infanticide might be justified for one particular society or culture but not another. Whether this is because there are no “moral absolutes” (my view) or because different “moral absolutes” can be applied to different situations (your view), the result is the same – moral relativism.

The problem (well, one of the problems) with your argument is that you don’t clearly define what you mean by “different situations”. Most people who ascribe to moral absolutism would claim that infanticide, for example, is infanticide – it’s the “same situation” regardless oif who is doing the deed or why. You, however, seem to want to say that infanticide in one culture is different than infanticide in another culture and that as long as each culture is able to prosper as a result of that deed they are following different absolute moral codes to justify the same action.

To summarize, if a moral code allows different societies to perform different acts in response to the same situations, then this moral code, taken as a whole, is relative to each society. The only way you can weasel out of this is to claim that the same act in different societies is somehow “different” purely by nature of occurring in a different society.

Barry

138

But merely being a “different culture” is not a sufficiently different situation. So what?

Now, two cultures that live in different environments, facing different challenges – they will utilize different solutions to the same moral equation.

The moral code does NOT allow different societies to perform different acts in response to the same situations. It wouldn’t be universal, otherwise.

I’m “weaseling” out of nothing. You continue to make the assumption that two societies should somehow have fundamentally different moralities – I’m telling you that is not the case.

I am NOT suggesting that different moral absolutes can be applied to different situations. Universal moral absolutes, when applied in fundamentally different situations, indicate that different actions are appropriate.

139

We can’t use moral systems to evaluate themselves. Each, if it’s consistent, will always give the same answer: it is correct, and all others are incorrect. Some may be less incorrect than others, but any variation from itself is an error.

But we don’t need to worry about that, any more than we need to worry about whether the design for a bridge will work or not. Build the thing and see if it stands!

140

Well, if moral systems were indeed completely logical forms and we knew all of the consequences of those forms, perhaps. This is not a necessary requirement of morality. Because of its profoundly contextual nature I don’t think a moral system can said to be complete in any sense. It is a work in progress, like man himself.