Taking a stand on moral relativism

[godzillatemple]

*Originally posted by TVAA *
The moral code does NOT allow different societies to perform different acts in response to the same situations. It wouldn’t be universal, otherwise.

No, but as you say, “Two cultures that live in different environments, facing different challenges – they will utilize different solutions to the same moral equation.” [bolding mine]

I’m “weaseling” out of nothing. You continue to make the assumption that two societies should somehow have fundamentally different moralities – I’m telling you that is not the case.

No, I have made no such assumption. You, however, seem to be arguing that two different societies can have different applications of the same “moral equation,” which can therefore lead to identical acts being moral in one society and immoral in another. Is this not true? If I understand your argument correctly, your theory allows that infanticide, for example, can be considered “moral” in one society and “immoral” in another society if those two societies live in different environments and face different challenges.

**I am NOT suggesting that different moral absolutes can be applied to different situations. Universal moral absolutes, when applied in fundamentally different situations, indicate that different actions are appropriate. **

Again, define what you mean and do not mean by “fundamentally different situations”. Are you saying that your theory of evolutionary determined absolute morality would prohibit infanticide, say, in all cases? Or are you saying that one society might have a “fundamentally different situation” in which infanticide would be justified? To a traditional subscriber to “absolute morality,” infanticide is infanticide, regardless of who performs it, or where, or why. You seem to be saying, however, that an identical act can be considered moral in one society and immoral in another, as long as the circumstances used to justify that act are “funadamentally different” in each society. Is this not true? Does your theory allow that infanticide can be considered “moral” in one society and “immoral” in another society?

Play semantic games all you want. The fact is that you are not describing a form of “moral absolutism” as the term is commonly understood (although, to be fair, neither are you arguing for a radical form of moral relativism wherein every moral system is equally valid). Both of us are describing a form of moral relativism wherein there are generally applicable fundamental principles that can be applied in different ways to the same situations depending on the unique circumstances of each society. The difference between us is that you believe that these “fundamental principles” derive from evolution, whereas I believe they derive from man’s inherent capacity of logic and reason.

Barry

[TVAA]

*Originally posted by godzillatemple *
**No, but as you say, “Two cultures that live in different environments, facing different challenges – they will utilize different solutions to the same moral equation.” [bolding mine]

** Yes? So? Both solutions conform to the same equation. Different inputs tend to lead to different outputs. That doesn’t invalidate the equation.

**No, I have made no such assumption. You, however, seem to be arguing that two different societies can have different applications of the same “moral equation,” which can therefore lead to identical acts being moral in one society and immoral in another. Is this not true?

** No, because the moral validity of the action depends on why it was done. As a hypothetical example, consider the paleocide you forwarded yourself. It may be worth preserving the life of the elderly, but not worth expending the resources to do so. Whether the elderly live or die depends on the nature of the environment.

If I understand your argument correctly, your theory allows that infanticide, for example, can be considered “moral” in one society and “immoral” in another society if those two societies live in different environments and face different challenges.

No. The concept of infanticide isn’t specific enough. It must be “infanticide for this purpose, in this environment” that is moral or immoral.

**To a traditional subscriber to “absolute morality,” infanticide is infanticide, regardless of who performs it, or where, or why.

** That’s just stupid. Fish die out of water. If I find my pet fish out of water, I must put it back in to preserve its life. But if I want to preserve the life of my pet puppy, I shouldn’t immerse it in water – it will drown.

If it’s right to immerse the fish in water, why shouldn’t we immerse everything in water?

Play semantic games all you want. The fact is that you are not describing a form of “moral absolutism” as the term is commonly understood (although, to be fair, neither are you arguing for a radical form of moral relativism wherein every moral system is equally valid). Both of us are describing a form of moral relativism wherein there are generally applicable fundamental principles that can be applied in different ways to the same situations depending on the unique circumstances of each society. The difference between us is that you believe that these “fundamental principles” derive from evolution, whereas I believe they derive from man’s inherent capacity of logic and reason.

It is moral absolutism, just not in a form you can easily recognize.

If I show that there are multiple ways to build an “acceptable” bridge within certain constraints, would you claim that I was suggesting that the laws of physics vary depending on the situation?

[TVAA]

*Originally posted by erislover *
**Well, if moral systems were indeed completely logical forms and we knew all of the consequences of those forms, perhaps.

** It’s not a possibility, it’s a certainty. For any consistent moral system, the moral system that best matches its own values and judgments is itself.

**Because of its profoundly contextual nature I don’t think a moral system can said to be complete in any sense. It is a work in progress, like man himself. **

It is clearly complete in one sense: it must be able to generate a response in all cases.

It can be considered “incomplete” only in a broader sense, according to another standard.

[godzillatemple]

TVAA: Please answer the direct question I asked in my previous post. To wit, does your theory allow that infanticide can be considered “moral” in one society and “immoral” in another society?

I’ll make it easier on you. Does your theory allow that infanticide can be considered “moral” in one society and “immoral” in another society, depending on the “nature of the environment”?

And, lest you fault me for not providing a cite for my definition of traditional moral absolutism, allow me to quote from our friend Wikipedia (not a definitive source, I realize, but it’s handy):

Moral absolutism regards actions as inherently or inarguably moral or immoral. Moral absolutists might, for example, judge slavery or childhood female genital mutilation to be absolutely and inarguably immoral regardless of the beliefs and goals of a culture that engages in these practices.

As for traditional moral absolutism being “stupid,” I agree with you 100%. However, your anology comparing infanticide in two different cultures to the difference between putting a fish in water and drowning a puppy is specious at best, and disingenuous at worst. Regardless of the culture, infanticide is the killing of an infant. The purpose may be different, the underlying reason may be different, but it’s still the killing of an infant.

Regards,

Barry

[erislover]

It is clearly complete in one sense: it must be able to generate a response in all cases.

This is, by inspection, never the case, however. Even those of us who take pains to try and reason out moral systems end up in situations we couldn’t possibly have forseen, if for no other reason than our limited understanding of objective events caused us to appraise the situation differently than we would have had we properly understood things. A perfectly logical moral system, like you seem to propose, cannot address such situations because they are impossible: to be in such a situation involves being bad in the first place (doing the wrong thing). In real life, any number of situations may crop up which become, and for someone who brought up an example I’d think you’d see this one coming, dilemmas. To avoid dilemmas means to have forseen all possible events, or (inclusive) to have generalized human behavior to the point of complete mathematization. Neither, I think, are practical, nevermind possible (indeed, following your mathematical ideal of morality we might, in fact, construct a system that could fall prey to any number of dilemma-like issues like incompleteness or halting problems, etc, but I only mention this to found my use of “dilemma” not to shift the debate there, PLEASE not to shift the debate there). And even if they were possible [to mathematize etc], it does not remove the problem fundamental to mathematical systems, to wit, the argument over what are “reasonable” or “intuitive” or “self-evident” axioms and assumptions. While, with the metaphysical assumption of a single objective world, physical observations can in principle select amongst various mathematical idealizations, it is still not obvious that the same applies to moral systems.

Hopefully the above helps you understand the point of the second assumption of relativism. Not that I’m saying you are misunderstanding it per se, but you have taken the “equally valid” tack a few posts ago so I want to get that covered as thoroughly as necessary.

It’s not a possibility, it’s a certainty. For any consistent moral system, the moral system that best matches its own values and judgments is itself.

Ignornance is bliss, pure and simple. At any rate, I still don’t see why you insist on asserting that moral systems must follow a set logical form, or more specifically, why they must follow the logical form you seem to be implying. If they were strictly mathematical in nature, that is, a series of propositions, definitions, and deductive inferences, then we may reach a point where we argue over the use of “consistent”. Which is tangential to the larger problem, the larger problem being why you assume a moral system must indeed have such a form in the first place.

Of course, we could sufficiently loosen the use of “logical form” and say that since the purpose of morality is a decision-making system, it must accept some input (the situation), frame the question (list possible choices), and generate a result (the “right” action), then I suppose we could say that all moral systems are logical.

As I say, we could run into problems here when we end up in situations that are impossible under the system due to imperfect information, something rather sticky in math but for which common heuristics might exist (that is, rules of thumb). In such insoluble cases, there is indeed much room for debate, speculation, and refinement of moral decision-making because there is no absolute path to take. In fact, as you seem to admit, there are no guaranteed solutions to all problems, specifically general-case problems, meaning that what people end up doing in fact allows for a great range of variation. Every split in possible solutions logically represents, by your admission, different moral systems. Such is the fact of life for a relativist.

[TVAA]

*Originally posted by erislover *
**This is, by inspection, never the case, however. Even those of us who take pains to try and reason out moral systems end up in situations we couldn’t possibly have forseen, if for no other reason than our limited understanding of objective events caused us to appraise the situation differently than we would have had we properly understood things.

** So? The system must still be able to generate a response, even if it’s “do nothing”.

**A perfectly logical moral system, like you seem to propose, cannot address such situations because they are impossible: to be in such a situation involves being bad in the first place (doing the wrong thing). In real life, any number of situations may crop up which become, and for someone who brought up an example I’d think you’d see this one coming, dilemmas. To avoid dilemmas means to have forseen all possible events, or (inclusive) to have generalized human behavior to the point of complete mathematization.

** Not at all – all that’s necessary is to not assume any principles that lead to contradictions. Normal linguistic analysis is sufficient.

While, with the metaphysical assumption of a single objective world, physical observations can in principle select amongst various mathematical idealizations, it is still not obvious that the same applies to moral systems.

I would argue that we’ve merely been looking at the problem in the wrong way.

**Ignornance is bliss, pure and simple. At any rate, I still don’t see why you insist on asserting that moral systems must follow a set logical form, or more specifically, why they must follow the logical form you seem to be implying. If they were strictly mathematical in nature, that is, a series of propositions, definitions, and deductive inferences, then we may reach a point where we argue over the use of “consistent”. Which is tangential to the larger problem, the larger problem being why you assume a moral system must indeed have such a form in the first place.

** What do you think language is?

If we’re going to begin considering moral systems that can’t be discussed in language, we might as well stop right now – we’ll never get anywhere.

**Of course, we could sufficiently loosen the use of “logical form” and say that since the purpose of morality is a decision-making system, it must accept some input (the situation), frame the question (list possible choices), and generate a result (the “right” action), then I suppose we could say that all moral systems are logical.

** In the same way that all computer programs are logical. But in another, important sense, not all computer programs are logical.

[erislover]

Not at all – all that’s necessary is to not assume any principles that lead to contradictions.

Good luck with that.

So?

So the system must be able to handle situations that it itself cannot generate ie starting from the premise that one has made a wrong decision.

What do you think language is?

A discussion that is tangential to the one under consideration.

In the same way that all computer programs are logical.

Indeed, that is a useful relativistic analogy. I shall play your game and leave the details to the reader.

[TVAA]

*Originally posted by erislover *
Good luck with that.

C’mon, it’s not that hard.

**So the system must be able to handle situations that it itself cannot generate ie starting from the premise that one has made a wrong decision.

** If the system doesn’t specify what happens when someone makes a wrong decision, it’s not a very useful one, is it?

A discussion that is tangential to the one under consideration.

Not at all. The descriptions of the ethical system ARE mathematical statements. They’re just not in a format you immediately recognize as mathematical.

If it’s possible to derive conclusions from the statements, the procedure for doing so is fundamentally mathematical.

[erislover]

The descriptions of the ethical system ARE mathematical statements. They’re just not in a format you immediately recognize as mathematical.

Supposing this is true, I am not clear on how this undermines relativism, a point I trust you’ll be getting to shortly?

If the system doesn’t specify what happens when someone makes a wrong decision, it’s not a very useful one, is it?

Mathematical systems, real ones not these quasi-mathematical ones you suggest morality is, do not “handle” what happens when you start with theorems that are not derivable in their system. This hardly makes them “not very useful”, however, as could probably be anticipated or expected. At any rate, no, I wouldn’t consider it a very useful ethical system.

[godzillatemple]

Hey – I’m feeling a bit ignored here, guys!

Can I get TVAA to respond to my direct question? To wit, does his theory allow that the act of infanticide can be considered “moral” in one society and “immoral” in another society (depending on the circumstances and the “nature of the environment” for each society, or whatever)? Yes or no?

How about an admission that his analogy comparing infanticide in different cultures to the difference between returning a fish to water and drowning a puppy is (I can’t resist) all wet?

What about that nifty quote of mine that “Moral absolutism regards actions as inherently or inarguably moral or immoral”?

Hello? Anybody home? Can I play, too?

Barry

[erislover]

godzillatemple, I have no clue what his system is at all, certainly all wet, and by definition.

[TVAA]

That question is just silly. I’m sorry, godzillatemple, but it is.

Is moving the index finger moral or immoral? Yes, it’s vital to picking up and moving objects, as well as a variety of other activities – including shooting an innocent person in the head with a gun.

For a more realistic example: what about the consumption of human flesh? That soccer team that crashed in the Andes didn’t seem particularly immoral by the standards of most people, yet virtually everyone disapproves of Jeffrey Dahmer? So, is eating people moral or immoral?

[erislover]

Which demands contextual ethics. Still, TVAA, you seem to be promoting the idea that there is still and absolute contextual ethical system. Please elaborate.

[godzillatemple]

*Originally posted by TVAA *
That question is just silly. I’m sorry, godzillatemple, but it is.

It may very well be silly to you, but it would not be silly to most people who consider themselves moral absolutists.

**For a more realistic example: what about the consumption of human flesh? That soccer team that crashed in the Andes didn’t seem particularly immoral by the standards of most people, yet virtually everyone disapproves of Jeffrey Dahmer? So, is eating people moral or immoral? **

Why is that any more “realistic” of an example? Now you are comparing eating the flesh of somebody who is dead (the soccer team) and actually killing somebody in order to eat their flesh (Dahmer). These are “different acts” just like putting a fish in the water and drowning a puppy are different acts. Infanticide, however, is the killing of an infant, no more and no less, and most “moral absolutists” would claim that the act is inherently immoral regardless of the circumstances.

A moral absolutist, as described in my quote, is somebody who “regards actions as inherently or inarguably moral or immoral.” Therefore, I am asking whether your theory holds that the action of infanticide is inherently moral or not, or whether you think that the morality of the action of infanticide depends on what the underlying factors that led to that action are.

In fact, can you come up with any action that you would consider to be “inherently or inarguably moral or immoral”? Or do you claim that, with regard to every action, it can only be judged with reference to the “nature of the environment” for the society practicing the action in question?

All right, I know, I know. I am wasting my time here. It’s like trying to convince somebody what they “really” believe. In fact, though, you already answered my questions awhile back when you said:

[T]he moral validity of the action depends on why it was done.

You can call yourself a moral absolutist if you so choose. I just don’t think anybody’s going to believe you, however.

That’s it for me on this one, guys. I officially give up. Ain’t semantics grand?

Regards,

Barry

[erislover]

godzillatemple, it seems to me that TVAA is driving not at an absolute system where we make moral proclamations like “it is always wrong to kill babies” but where there exists a single method of choosing among alternatives, the choice being defined, then, as “right”; i.e. – an absolute algorithm or set of algorithms. I don’t personally think this escapes the problems raised with absolutism, and I am not sure how the existence of this algorithm is guaranteed. If it were, of course, the second assumption of relativism would be right out and relativism would crumble into paradox.

I’m sure he’ll be developing the point any page now.

[dakravel]

It also seems like TVAA is more concerned with the intention of an action rather than the consequences. A sort of Kantian take on the morality of any particular action. It’s not the actual action or any following consequences that determine the right or wrong-ness of an action, but the intent with which it is done. Or at least the intent/purpose matters more than the consequences, something to that extent. At least that’s what it looks like TVAA is going by from my point of view. That would be the reason that godzillatemple’s infanticide question would be silly. The most important part, the intent/purpose of the action, is missing.

Now, it seems like the rules for determining the rightness and wrongness of any particular action can differ from situation/circumstance/environment, to situation/circumstance/environment, and it is the situation/circumstance/environment that determines the rightness or wrongness of an action. Now…, I think part of what TVAA is saying is that all else withstanding, if somehow identical situations arose in the same environment in different times on opposite halves of the world, the ethical system derived by both cultures would be most similar, if not identical. Reasoning for this is that there is one ‘best’ way to deal with any situation/circumstance/environment, regardless of anything else. At least, that’s what it seems like TVAA is saying from my point of view.

If I’m misinterpreting you [TVAA], please point out where, could you?

[TVAA]

*Originally posted by erislover *
**Which demands contextual ethics. Still, TVAA, you seem to be promoting the idea that there is still and absolute contextual ethical system. Please elaborate. **

I don’t know if I would call it that, precisely.

There are plenty of ways in which we can evaluate moral systems, and evaluate our evaluations of moral systems. But ultimately we’re faced with some very basic and important questions: why do we desire this and not that? Why should we act in one way but not another? Why this particular moral system when another would work just as well?

The reason we have our drives, desires, and preferences is evolution. The world is filled with states that have accumulated because they’re better at persisting than others. Our emotions are designed to steer us towards some behaviors and away from others. Our sensations are designed to steer us towards beneficial things and away from harmful ones.

For example, why do humans have a decided preference for salty, sweet, fatty foods? When we evolved, those nutrient-rich foods were scarce and difficult to acquire. Now the foods are plentiful (at least for most people in this country), and our preference for them is killing many of us. That preference was once “right”; now it is “wrong”.

Evolution produces standards, needs, and preferences from systems that do not have those attributes. It ultimately determines what is considered to be right and wrong, beneficial and harmful.

I’m not so much concerned with the intent as the end result of actions. (Intentions are very real parts of social interaction and the like, and they certainly can’t be ignored. But well-intentioned actions can have hideous consequences; those actions weren’t “more right” because they were meant well.)

[TVAA]

*Originally posted by godzillatemple *
**It may very well be silly to you, but it would not be silly to most people who consider themselves moral absolutists.

** I think they’re making a very basic (but possibly non-obvious) logical error.

**Why is that any more “realistic” of an example? Now you are comparing eating the flesh of somebody who is dead (the soccer team) and actually killing somebody in order to eat their flesh (Dahmer). These are “different acts” just like putting a fish in the water and drowning a puppy are different acts. Infanticide, however, is the killing of an infant, no more and no less, and most “moral absolutists” would claim that the act is inherently immoral regardless of the circumstances.

** But why are we regarding one type of action as being fundamentally different because of how it’s done when we’re not regarding another action that way?

Cannibalism is the eating of human flesh, no more and no less, but many people would split this action into distinct subdivisions based on the circumstances under which it occurred, then decide whether it was moral or immoral.

But why shouldn’t this be done with infanticide as well?

**A moral absolutist, as described in my quote, is somebody who “regards actions as inherently or inarguably moral or immoral.” Therefore, I am asking whether your theory holds that the action of infanticide is inherently moral or not, or whether you think that the morality of the action of infanticide depends on what the underlying factors that led to that action are.

** But what about a person who regards killing an infant because it’s not wanted as immoral, but killing an infant because it had an incurable disease which would cause tremendous suffering? He would regard those things as different actions, each of which is inherently and inarguably immoral or moral. Why isn’t he a moral absolutist?

**In fact, can you come up with any action that you would consider to be “inherently or inarguably moral or immoral”? Or do you claim that, with regard to every action, it can only be judged with reference to the “nature of the environment” for the society practicing the action in question?

** I don’t know what the ultimate moral code is, only how it can be found.

Those bold in daring, will die:
Those bold in not daring will survive.
Of those two, either may benefit or harm.

Nature decides which is evil,
But who can know why?
Even the enlightened find this difficult.

I honestly don’t understand why we’re having such trouble understanding each other. That’s life, I suppose.

[erislover]

Very well, TVAA, I agree that this is a good starting point for practical ethics. But problems still remain that, given such desires and emotions, conflicts will arise. If conflicts never arose there would be no need for explicit morality, agreed? So what I need to understand is how we resolve such differences through a single methodology. If there is no one way to approach the issue then we’re still in relativism: various resolutions to conflict that are mutually exclusive but solve the problem.

[TVAA]

Yes. We might find systems that satisfied our wants and desires, but how do we evaluate our wants and desires? What justifies them?

Evolution does, at least in the sense that some motivational systems are less compatible with continued existence than others. In the same sense that it’s wrong to be a dolphin in the middle of Death Valley, it seems to be wrong to have certain ethical structures in conjunction with a human lifestyle. The superficial similarity between dolphin and shark physiology is another metaphor for the concept: given certain starting points, certain designs are not only better than others, but will tend to be independently reached.

The application of game theory and evolutionary psychology (as limited and often flawed as that field is) to theories of ethics has been quite revealing, and I very strongly suspect it’s capable of much more.

If you want water to do something for you, you must first understand its nature; trying to force it to act against its nature will only waste your effort and quite possibly backfire. To rule nature, we must obey it.

The same principle applies to morality and ethics. To apply them, we must understand how they arise and are maintained.