** The same way we can learn anything about the objective world – by looking at it.
Sweet, merciful Buddha on a pogo stick. Didn’t any of you people ever read any books, take any classes, or hear someone discuss the philosophy of science and inductive logic?
We generate hypotheses through induction, and test them by applying deduction to experiment and observation. We then apply induction to our new data and generate new hypotheses.
This isn’t rocket science, people. All it takes is a moderate amount of intelligence and a healthy sense of intellectual curiosity.
** What concept do you wish to study? All you have is a group of sounds and a collection of prejudices.
** And you know this how, exactly…? Scientific theories are wholly man-made. Scientific concepts only exist because, for various reasons, we want them to.
They are still either valid, or invalid. Our theories on the matter are limited to the available evidence, but they are not arbitrary or subject to our control – at least, if we limit ourselves to rationality.
“Sanity’s just a one-trick pony. It’s only good for one thing: rational thinking. But when you’re good and crazy, the sky’s the limit!” – The Tick
** ‘Observed results’? What do our observations tell us about morality? Why does consensus matter?
** You have claimed that there’s no such thing as a universal principle. This profoundly ignorant and arrogant thinking is precisely what I’ve come to expect from the past hundred years of college education.
** No, you’re simply unable to imagine that someone can use English precisely. You offer supposed examples of cases the standard cannot handle when even a rough and approximate analysis of the standard immediately reveals whether those conditions would apply or not.
** They never arise to begin with.
Is communication involved? Is the right to communication involved? Is the right to non-communication involved? Are rights being converted to obligations?
[sigh]
(And your avoidance of the earlier debate has been noted. Your implied surrender is accepted.)
Dewey if I may I am going to hold off on commenting to this until tomorrow. I think there may exist Supreme Court jurisprudence, either by dicta, rule, or holding, stipulating how substantial a governmental interest is by the extent to which the government tries to remedy it. But I knew this objection as coming when I made the post but had to watch the Cubs game and Smallville instead of doing any legal research on the issue.
Okay but if the state interest is as you noted: protecting the peace and tranquillity inside the home, and telemarketing constitutes as a small fraction of the market of entities among many that can violate this tranquillity with unwanted calls, while the remaining entities, a majority of the pie, can still violate this state interest, then it would appear to me the legislation is ineffective. The state interest is still being implicated by other entities. It is effective in keeping one entity from implicating the interest but not from others.
Now I will admit that the state does not necessarily have to move on all fronts. But when it moves on only one front among many fronts can that implicate the interest can it really be considered to be effective? I don’t think so. Suffice it to say I do not have an exact line in my head but I think it can be safely assumed that moving on one front or on a minority of fronts while leaving a considerate majority to implicate the interest does not constitute as effective.
All of these classes of unwanted calls can act as annoyances and disturbances of the peace of a household. Their content doesn’t affect this. However, when the government imposes a restriction intended to ensure that citizens have the right to refuse such calls, they make an arbitrary distinction based on their content, implementing a system that allows some categories to be blocked while others continue.
Thus the government is making a distinction that is not relevant to its stated interest, and unreasonably penalizing certain groups for the content of their speech without just cause.
Dewey’s position, that since commercial speech has less protection than political it can be arbitrarily restriction, is facile and grossly lacking in understanding.
In your case, you are correct. It is difficult to imagine that you could use English to convey much at all.
A “rough and approximate analysis” shows that you haven’t a clue how to address the examples, and are therefore attempting to ignore them.
They already have arisen. Dewey has spent far more time than you deserve citing example after example in which your formulation is just as ambigous of interpretation as the First Amendment.
Yes, yes, yes, and yes, respectively. Or no, no, no, and no, also respectively. Or some permutation thereof.
It depends on how you interpret and apply your supposedly unambiguous formulation. Which is, it seems, the basis for your habit of dealing with arguments by pretending they don’t exist.
Spoken like a true pacifist in the battle of wits.
** Communication implies an appropriate receiver. It’s clear that I haven’t communicated at all in this thread.
** None of the examples are germane. Dewey is offering examples based on principles that are relevant to the Constitution’s current interpretation, but have nothing whatsoever to do with the statement made.
In essense, he’s objecting to perceived violations in what he thinks the principle should be, not in what the stated principle is. He’s also assuming that the principle should in some way match general conceptions of freedom of speech when it is only required to be free of ambiguity.
Dewey is quite good at hijacking arguments and then pretending that’s what they were about all along.
We can observe the objective world to learn about, say, the effect of gravity on a dropped object. We can even extrapolate from those observations a testable hypothesis. And we can can extrapolate from what we know to be true about gravity even more exotic concepts about the physical world.
But it all starts with an observation. So tell me, where do we observe this ultimate principle of justice? I mean, sure, we can observe different situations and label them “just” or “unjust,” but that requires some preconceived idea of what “justice” means. If justice is an objective rather than subjective concept, how do we observe that abstraction? **
I’ve read enough philosophy to know that big questions like the nature of justice are hotly debated, and that it defies universal description. **
This is the question I asked: “Please describe what set of experiments we can run, or equations we can create, or program code we can execute to discover the ultimate, one true meaning of justice.” Your reply above is nonresponsive. You have posited a universal, objective, knowable notion of justice. I am asking you to describe the process by which you establish this universal constant. Please don’t punt to a generality, or just say “I’d apply logic,” or talk about the natural sciences. I’m asking you to describe the process – the experiment – you would use to discover this particular concept. **
Scientific concepts describe objective, reproducible phenomena. They are true whether we want them to be true or not. Not so with concepts like “justice.” **
Morality is largely the product of societal consensus. It’s a bit silly to pretend otherwise. **
Because, naturally, you’ve got the whole thing all figured out. And I’m the one who’s arrogant. Sheesh. :rolleyes:
** Where do we observe this ultimate principle of gravity? I mean, sure, we can observe different situations and label them “falling” or “downwards”, but that requires some preconceived idea of what “gravity” is. If gravity is an objective rather than subjective phenomenon, how do we observe that phenomenon?
Why do you ask questions to which you already know the answers?
** As the nature of chemical processes defied the descriptive attempts of alchemists.
** I would use the same process we use to discover all concepts. This is not cant! How do we discover concepts like “hot” or “cold”, “color” and “form”? They’re observed regularities in our early experience, or we have a biological predisposition to generate specific linkages in our thoughts, or both?
Why don’t you familiarize yourself with developmental psychology’s studies of children’s interpretations of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’, and why we think they think as they do? You might find it instructive.
** Again, says who? Repeating your preconceptions doesn’t make them valid.
** Why? Do you actually have an argument that leads to that conclusion, or are you just trying to uphold some random bit of information that somehow came to determine your worldview?
This is mere hand-waving. Please analyze the proffered fact pattern according to your stated standard, explaining what the results would be and why. **
Why don’t you try answering the question in concrete terms? How does your proffered language handle the described situations?**
“Avoidance”? What point of yours have I “avoided”?
This is what Dewey said. He said a 60% reduction in telemarketing calls was “effective”. However, this was said only in relation to the volume of “telemarketing calls”.
GSV you misread what he said.
I get the idea of a “small fraction” from the fact that telemarketing is only a small segment of all the entities that make unwanted and undesirable phone calls and Dewey’s statement was made specifically in relation to telemarketing and not the entire market as a whole. We have a pie. The pie is divided into ten pieces. Each piece represents an entity that makes unwanted and undesirable phone calls. Telemarketing is only one piece of this pie. There are still nine other pieces of the pie legally permitted to invade and disturb the domestic tranquillity inside the home and Telemarketing is but only one piece targeted among ten pieces. In addition to this, Telemarketing has not been completely removed but only reduced as Dewey said.
As GSV correctly notes, 40-60% is not a “small fraction” by any stretch, and if we take the high end of that estimate, it is also not true that the remaining entities constitute a “majority of the pie.”
On preview: Jimmy1, you really need to read the Colorado opinion, because it sounds like you haven’t. That is where the 40-60% estimate comes from. The opinion is hyperlinked earlier in this thread.
The court noted (and does not dispute) the FTC’s estimate that commercial telemarketing constitutes 40-60% of unwanted telephone solicitation. Your objection appears premised on the notion that the phrase “telemarketing” only encompasses commercial telephone solicitation, and not charitable or political telephone solicitation. We can quibble over whether that’s the right term or not, but the court clearly refers to the 40-60% figure as being the percentage reduction of total unsolicited calls that would occur under the do not call list.
Que? I just asked how your proffered language would handle certain real-world situations. **
So am I to presume that all the actions I described would be protected under your proffered language? If we read your language literally, that is the result we get. **
It’s pretty funny that, in a thread devoted to "Telemarketing and Freedom of Speech – a thread that asks a specific question about constitutional interpretation – that you’ve moved to a discussion of so-called “objective” moral principles, you’d accuse me of hijacking.
I know where the 60-40% came from. I read in your post that it came from the Colorado case.
Yes Dewey I was going to note that it depends upon what constitutes as “telemarketing”.
If I am correct, one of the rationales underlying a rejection of the do not call list was because of the fact so many other entities were still capable of calling. In my opinion telemarketing encompasses commercial telephone solicitation and not charitable or other forms of solicitation.
Under their definition of “telemarketing”. I would contend the exact contours of the word is necessary in order to ascertain whether or not the state regulation is effective or remote in relation to the states’ interest. Now I know you do not want to get into a semantics debate and neither do I. I am completely content in leaving it at the point that it can be agreed upon the exact contours of the word is relevant to ascertain if the state regulation is effective or to remote to the state interest.
Aside from that I think the fact other entities are still permitted to implicate the state interest, even at 40 percent, renders the legislation ineffective to advance the state interest. 40% percent is not a small number. In the opposite direction, if telemarketing is only 40%, then 60% of unwanted and desirable telephone calls still implicate the state interest and in my opinion demonstrating the laws ineffectiveness in relation to the state goal.
I will have to do some research to really make a better effort in this exchange with you Dewey but I am afraid I might not be able to. Right now I have to play catch before fall break.
Every one of Dewey’s examples have dealt directly with the ambiguities inherent in your formulation of “communication as a two-way street”. And you have failed to respond to, let alone refute, a single one of them.
More bull. His examples have demonstrated that your concept is just as ambiguous as the First Amendment.
And you are very bad at ignoring arguments, contradicting yourself, obfuscation, non sequiteurs, and meaningless generalities.
Feel free to present your rationale for believing that the examples do not disprove your formulation.
You know, you don’t need to guess. The text of the case is linked earlier in this thread. Adobe PDF readers are free. There’s really no reason for you to not go straight to the Colorado opinion itself. **
Fortunately, we don’t have to. The Colorado court is quite clear. It uses the term “telemarketing” to encompass all unsolicited telephone calls, commercial or otherwise. Consider this excerpt from the court’s statement of facts:
Really, Jimmy1, if you can’t be bothered to so much as glance at the court’s opinion, then this discussion will quickly become less than worthwhile. You’re only making yourself look foolish. **
Good Lord, you’ve got to be kidding. A government policy that solves 60% of a problem is “ineffective”? If the government brought 60% of the nation’s poor out of poverty, would you call that “ineffective”? If they cut teenage pregnancy by 60%, you’d consider that “ineffective”? If crime dropped 60% after a new policy went into effect, would you call that “ineffective”?
Sheesh. :rolleyes: **
You’re a law student and you think you’re busy? That’s so cute. Wait until you start practicing.
Dewey has done nothing but bring up situations that are troublesome for the First Amendment, which exists only in relationship to a system of additonal laws, but not for the principle I stated earlier.
It’s as if I said “Anyone willing to avoid damaging the books and other materials in the library, and accepts responsibility for their care and scheduled return to the system, may check out material freely.” and Dewey responded with “Well, what if they’re terrorists who want to learn how to build bombs?! Doesn’t that pose a problem for your rule?!”
No, it doesn’t. We could debate whether the rule embodies what we want the system to be, but the implications of the rule itself are clear.
And those implications for the situations I described are…what, exactly? You still haven’t told us. I think it reasonably clear that each of the behaviors I described would be protected under your formulation if it is read literally (they would also be protected under the first amendment if the free speech clause is read literally, BTW). Do please tell us if that is incorrect, and if so, why.
It seems to me there are three possible results under your proposed formulation:
The listed activities are permitted, and you’re OK with that;
The listed activities are permitted, and you’re not OK with that; or
The listed activities are not permitted.
If #1 is correct, it seriously calls into question your own sense of morality and capacity for good judgment.
If #2 is correct, then your rule is clearly incomplete, and requires additional text to describe certain exceptions to the basic rule. In which case, I await your revision.
If #3 is correct, then your rule is obviously not as clear-cut as you claim; there are obviously some implied carveouts not found in the text itself which require some measure of subjective judgment.
